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ABSTRACT 
Two elements have been isolated as having a profound 
effect on the adjustment of children and families to 
post-divorce life. These are the hostility expressed 
and experienced before, during and after the divorce, 
and the losses experienced as a result of the final 
settlement terms. 
Based on a review of the historical development of family 
law and the more recent reforms adopted throughout the 
Western World, the present shortfalls of the South African 
system of family law in providing for the needs of chi1dren 
and families. in divorce have been identified. 
A model of dissolution is presented which aims primarily 
at the reduction of the hostility and loss thus 
experienced. This includes the evaluation and updating of 
the 'best interests• standard used by the courts for 
arriving at custody/access settlements and a detailed 
discussion of the role played by the mental health profess-
ional at each stage of the dissolution process. The roles 
explored here include that of counsellor and facilitator in 
the pre-divorce, mediation and post-divorce stages; and the 





Laws governing family relationships have evolved from the 
early status of a civil contract reflecting social 
conventions and customs, through the ecclesiastical systems 
of laws which sought to preserve the marital relationship by 
imposing a punitive system of fault on the •guilty• spouse, 
to a system of law which, with the protestant revolution, 
came under judicial control. 
Until the late 18th Century the father's rights over his 
children remained paramount. It was the social upheaval of 
the industrial revolution which stimulated a growing awareness 
and concern for the vulnerability of children both on the 
labour market and as developing individuals. This resulted 
in the assumption of the role of 'parens patria' by the Courts 
and a spate of child protection laws which marked a move away 
from paternal supremacy to looking at the needs of the child. 
Talfourds Act of 1839 finally set the stage for what then 
became the powerful •maternal preference• rule which assumes 
that children are better off with mothers who are believed to 
be the natural caretakers. 
Recent reforms:· Over the last decades three important reform 
movements emerged as an attempt to mitigate against the 
destructive, traumatic and inappropriate nature of the 
adversarial system of marital and custody/access resolutions. 
i i i 
(1) T~ no fault divorce reforms, which were adopted by 
most western states, rejected the concept of fault 
as a ground for divorce as inapprop~iate and adopted 
either in whole or in part a 'breakdown' ground 
based on failure of the marital relationship. This 
went a long way to mitigating against long, 
protracted and hostile court battles for the purpose 
of showing fault in the spouse and 'winning' the 
case. 
(2) The conciliation/family Court movement focused on 
the psychological factors of divorce. It initially 
provided an investigatory service, but later 
reconciliation, divorce counselling and conciliation 
services were introduced and developed to assist 
parties to reach agreement on the ancillary issues. 
' 
Where they have been applied, they have proved to 
have held significant relevance in the resolution of 
divorce issues for families. 
While these services have not been denied to families in South 
Africa, the courts have shown great reluctance in becoming 
involved in psycho/social issues and have not adequately 
provided the machinery to put such services into effect. The 
problem remains therefore that fami~ies are left to themselves 
to find independent support and guidance in this area. 
(3) Provision for legal representation for the child which 
recognizes the child's undeniable interests and 
rights in court adjudicated cases has gradually 
evolved in most Western judicial systems. This 
safeguard, however, which is also incorporated in 
iv 
the South African Divorce Act 70 of 1979, remains 
dependent on the discretion of the court and once 
again adequate protection for these children has 
not been secured .. 
Pre-divorce Counselling 
With the recognition that the divorce was simply the end 
product of a long history of frustrations and hostility 
and that this final step served no purpose unless there 
was an understanding of the cause and the conflicts of the 
parents were resolved, the role of the mental health pro-
fessionals broadened beyond the confines of the consultant 
within court-adjudicated disputes. 
Lawyers are the essential link between troubled marriages 
and divorce and are currently in America acquiring the 
necessary training in certain law schools to enable them to 
assess the couples• motivation for reconciliation counselling. 
The role of the mental health professional~ through a brief 
crisis intervention and conflict-resolution approach, is 
one of helping couples and/or families to understand their 
contribution to the dysfunction, reduce the hostility and 
increase co-operation in order that both parents might con-
tinae in their responsibilities as parents during and after 
the divorce. 
Aft~r the decision has been made to proceed with the divorce 
the role of the mental health professional changes to one of 
helping parents to inform the child of their decision, to 
express their feelings, to cope with and understand the child's 
responses, to explain the legal process and financial aspects 
of the procedure, and to motivate couples for mediation. 
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Mediation 
This is the approach which best assures stability and 
continuity of the family relationship after the divorce. 
It provides a procedural structure which aims to foster 
co-operation and resolve ~onflict in the settlement of 
ancillary issues by the parents themselves, out of court, 
and should be readily available at any stage of the 
dissolution process. 
Mediation, is a new and separate speciality requiring 
specialized training in both psycho/social and legal 
elements. It includes principles of negotiation a~d 
bargaining and conflicts resolution and might involve a 
certain amount of .necessary emotional ventilation to allow 
blocked negotiation to continue. 
Mediated settlements have many advantages over adversarial 
settlements. These include a reduction in time, cost and 
post-divorce litigation and increased co-operation between 
parents. 
The Adversary Solution 
Child advocacy As an estimated 10% of families fail to 
reach agreement, adjudicated settlements need to be made by 
the court. The concept of child advocacy has become central. 
It implies knowing the child and his needs and being compe-
tent, knowledgeable and sufficiently objective to represent 
the child's interests in the dispute. 
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As neither the parents, their counsel, nor the court, with 
·all the constraints of the adversary system, are able to 
fulfill this role and as neither the child•s legal repre-
sentative nor the mental health professional alone has the 
knowledge and skills, true child advocacy requires at least 
a team approach. 
The Best Interests Principle 
Another concept central to the adversary solution is that 
of the •best interest• principle against which parents need 
to be assessed. 
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This standard moved from the still strongly held maternal 
preference assumption to more sex neutral sets of guidelines 
which focussed primarily on the affectional attachment between 
parent and child. Watson (1969) for the first time considered 
the •process• by which a result could be achieved in terms of 
the •best interests• principle. A suggestion which attempted to 
provide such a process was the replacement. of the •unfitness• 
test by •the most able parent• test. 
The choice between two able parents, however, remained difficult 
and often arbitrary. 
The growing belief that the child•s post-divorce adjustment 
is directly related to the maintenance of sound and loving 
relationships with both parents is supported by recent research 
and has been expressed by mental health and legal professionals 
and the court. 
The best interests of the child therefore point to a system 
of shared parenting in which both parents share the 
responsibility, rights and substantial amounts of time with 
the child. 
The adoption of this standard has been retarded by the 
guidelines proposed by Goldstein et al. (1973) which 
stressed the child's need for a stable and continued 
relationship with one parent and, in order to minimize 
loyalty conflicts, the severing of access with the non-
custodial parent unless the relationship between both parents 
is a positive one. This unfortunately helped to shape some 
commonly held beliefs that, 
(1) free access inevitabiy causes children to be 
treated as pawns by conflicting parents, 
(2) the effect of living in two households is 
disruptive to the adjustment of the child and 
(3) that it only works when parents get along. 
None of these potential difficulties are restricted to joint 
custody or free access arrangements, or indeed have been 
demonstrated to be true, and none take cognisance of the 
important contribution of limited post-divorce counselling. 
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The possible adjustment difficulties that are required to be 
made by joint custody families may be far less problematic than 
the negative aspects of sole custody which represents for the 
child the effective loss of one parent, a resulting sense of 
guilt and self-blame, untested fantasies, possible gender 
identity and behaviour difficulties; for the custodial 
parent the frustration, emotional pain and overwhelming 
sense of loss and poor self-image as a parent. 
The research in this area has, however, been limited to 
small, highly selected samples, and generalizations are 
therefore limited. The prognostic indicators that have been 
suggested are: the desire fa~ joint custody, commitment to 
the concept, mutual co-operation between parents, mutual 
support of parenting ability, capacity to negotiate and 
remain flexible, agreement of the implicit rules of the 
system, proximity of residence, and a receptive attitude 
towards counselling. 
The Investigative Process 
The choice of custody/access settlement is entirely dependent 
on the individual needs of each family. This requires a 
thorough knowledge and understanding of the child as an 
individual, the relationship between each parent and the 
child, the child•s family system and the child•s socio-
community system. 
1. The initial contact should clarifY and establish the 
briefing and basis upon which the consultant is pre-
pared to work. 
2. The Investigation or fact finding is achieved through 
di~ect interviews with the child, parents and 
significant others, school and medical records, where 
appropriate psychometric testing and direct 
observations and home visits. 
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3. The evaluative process requires the synthesis of all the 
data and formulation of a life plan for the child based 
on a thorough basic knowledge of child development and 
parenting characteristics and environmental ties which 
facilitate the child's healthy development from birth to 
adulthood. This stage also incorporates the conveyance 
of findings and recommendations to parents so that once 
X 
again the potential for a mediated settlement is provided. 
4. Report Writing. Reports need to communicate the findings 
and opinions in a clear and concise manner and should. be 
able to substantiate all statements by·factual -data and 
back up conclusions by a sound psychological knowledge. 
Confidentiality is a problematic issue, there is no clear rule 
about what is regarded as confidential and what may be used in 
reports in court. Opinions vary as to what should be disclosed 
to whom. In general, as a guide, it is important to consider 
the impact of the report or evidence on the family and child and 
if necessary bring the Court's attention to ~trictly confidential 
material. 
The ·Expert in Court. The reluctance of experts to appear in 
court has been recognized. The need to subject such "opinion 
' ' 
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evidence to cross examination has however clearly been stated.· 
Experts have also been criticized for their defensive and 
argumentative attitudes in court. Some practical suggestions 
have been provided. Briefly stated they advise the expert to 
keep accurate records, be honest in giving evidence, listening 
carefully to questions before answering, request permission to. 
elaborate where necessary, avoid reacting defensively, remain 
objective. 
Training is clearly required by psychologists to include the 
workings of the legal system and to cope with the emotional 
demands of this work. 
Post Divorce Counselling 
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Possibly the most important role of the mental health professional 
in terms of prevention of the serious sequelae of divorce is the 
provision of limited post divorce counselling which has been 
found to make a considerable difference to the single parent's 
ability to cope with the many demands made on them. 
This is justified by the observations that .emotional divorce may 
fail to occur, parents need to continue as parents, and the 
children's welfare depends on the parent's ability to cope with 
this experience. It is at this stage that the impetus for 
change is strongest, since old relationships are not ended, 
merely changed. 
The goals include helping parents arrive at a mutually acceptable 
working settlement, open up blocked communication channels and 
work through the mourning process. They need to be helped to 
delineate their roles as spouse and parent, educated regarding 
the sensitivity of the child to conflict and also need to be able 
to recognize serious symptoms and help the child cope_with.difficult 
feelings in constructive ways. 
There is always a normal period of stress and readjustment·wnich 
requires counselling appropriate to the child's age. At times, 
however, it may be necessary to refer for more intense psychotherapy. 
Because of the importance of peers for most children, groups have 
been enthusiastically advanced as an ideal medium. These 
children's groups need to be carefully structured and to centre 
on concrete activities. 
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Interventions are also focussed at the parent-child relationship 
level and may include other members or entire families. 
Intervention for the sake of the children can also focus 
on the parent who needs to primarily resolve his/her own 
feelings of loss. 
Post Divorce Community Support Systems are essential to help 
the parent cope with full parental responsibilities of single 
parenthood. These include different forms of self-help groups. 
Schools are central resources for children in providing possible 
groups and support systems. Education is the central preventative 
focus through books, television, films. 
.-
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Divorce in the Western world has increased steadily during 
the 20th Century. The white population figures in South 
Africa for 1977 showed that there was one divorce for every 
3.9 marriages and 13 019 minor children were involved in 
divorce. In 1981 the statistics rose to 1 for every 2.7 
marriages and involves 22 167 minors. (Department of 
Information and Statistics, News Release, 1981). Figures 
for the other population groups in South Africa tend to be 
unreliable and were therefore not included here. 
In America in 1978 there were 1 million divorces involving 
more than 1 million children and the prediction made was that 
45% of children born in 1978 will live part of their lives 
before the age of 18 years in a single parent family (Hammond, 
1981). This comprises a huge proportion of the population and 
indicates an increasing problem. 
The present study developed as a result of a need to examine 
and clarify the status goals and role of the clinical psycho-
logist and other mental health professionals who have in recent 
years been called upon to play an active part in marital and 
custody/access litigation. 
Divorce, for the Court, represents the legal step taken by a 
couple in terminating a marriage which for one reason or 
another has irretrievably broken down. It is the termination 
of one legal relationship between the husband and wife and the 
-2-
beginning of another legal relationship in which agreements 
have to be reached by both parties in five major areas. These 
include division of property, maintenance of the s~ouse, 
maintenance of the children, custody of the children and access 
of the non-custodial parent to the children and vice versa 
(Kressel et al., 1979). 
Custody, in essence, involves the practical care and control of 
the minor•s person (Hahlo, 1975). This intludes .the right to: 
(i) the physical presence of the child, 
(ii) the control of his daily life, 
(iii) decide all questions relating to his training, 
education and religious upbringing, 
(iv) determine what home or house the chil~ may or 
may not enter, 
(v) provide consent to surgical operations in cases 
of emergency, 
(vi) in a proper case to exercise custody vicariously 
(Roberts, 1979). 
Ideally, despite the dissolution of the spousal subsystem, 
parents should be able to continue their role and obligations 
as parents, maintaining objectivity in their relationships with 
their children and separating fact from feelings in negotiating 
and settling post divorce custody/access arrangements with the 
best interests of the children remaining paramount. Indeed, 
where marital conflicts have been contained and parents have 
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not imposed too great a stress on the child, so .that good 
parental care and a close re1ationship with both parents are 
maintained, it is theoretically possible for a child (and 
parents) .to emerge from the dissolution process mini~ally 
scarred (Littner, 1973). However, divorce inevitably contains 
an element of hostility and for most of the children an entirely 
cooperative approach by parents to final settlement does not 
occur. 
When hostility becomes uncontained and parents are no longer 
able to negotiate and reach ~greement on the settlement of the 
ancillary issues, it becomes necessary for an outside agent in 
the form of a judicial officer to take the responsibility for 
resolving the issues between the parties judicially, a process 
which normally fails to resolve the emotional conflicts. 
Custody decisions are accepted and,openly acknowledged by 
·judges to be, of all their tasks, among the most painful and 
difficult that they face. 
11 A Judge agonizes more about reaching the right result 
in a contested custody issue than about any other type 
of decision herenders 11 • 
B. Bokin, Trial Judge (273) 1952. 
A Judge traditionally makes decisions relating to issues of 
innocence and guilt about which definite ·standards exist which 
are explicitly defined. His task in custody disputes is very 
different. Here, where neither parent has committed a crime, the 
concepts of guilt and blame have no place. Despite the fact that 
he is dealing with a sensitive, delicate and emotional i~sue which 
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relates to the prediction and determination of a child 1 s life, 
the only assistance he gets from the legislature in South 
Africa, as in most Western countries, is that the interests of 
the child be paramount. This, in fact, is where the agony lies. 
Judges arrive at their decisions by evaluating and weighing up 
the conflicting evidence from advocates and attorneys represent-
ing the parties, in the form of affidavits and cross examination 
of the parties and their witnesses, and special reports obtained 
from expert witnesses employed by them. 
This evaluation is done against a background of standards 
based on legal precedent and case law and is thus deeply 
embedded in traditional cultural attitudes which often fall 
short of the needs and attitudes of our modern changing society, 
and do not necessarily reflect current findings in child and 
family research. 
Changes in the law relating to matrimonial disputes as also the 
comments of Judges in reported cases indicate that the judiciary 
is aware of the shortcomings of the adversary legal system in 
this area and has looked towards the expert for assistance. A 
strong feeling has developed, however, to the effect that the 
experts, psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers have 
failed in their purpo~e of making the task of the Judge any 
easier, and have not, in fact, represented the best interests of 
the child (Mlyniec, 1978). 
The reasons for .this would seem to be twofold. First, because 
of the nature and structure of.the process of law, the v~lue of 
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the experts 0ould seem to have been limited, for the specific 
reason that currently in this country they are employed by the 
parties who give them a specific contract. This immediately 
brings into ·question their objectivity as assessors and 
consultants in a case, requiring that,the best interests of 
the only unrepresented party be paramount. 
The second problem would seem to lie in the fact that up to the 
present in South Africa, no specialized training exists for such 
experts. They are irisufficiently versed in the law, their rights 
within the adversary system, th~ effects of the process of 
litigation and adversorial divorce on the child and their 
familial relationships as a whole, their duties and responsibilities 
towards the child and his family, the needs for and requirements 
of pre and post-divorce counselling and mediation, method of 
investigation, the best interest standard, writing of reports and 
their presentation in court. 
As an advocate for the child this professional must understand 
that his responsibility is first and foremost towards the child; 
however by logical extension, because the welfare of the child is 
largely dependent from that of his parents, his responsibility is 
also towards a healthy working parent-child ~nit. His objectives 
and guidelines in broad terms, therefore, are to promote a healthy 
renewed family life after the divorce has been finalized (Woody, 
1978)~ 
For the parents and children, the dissolution of the family unit 
and the restrutturing of new post divorce family units and 
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relationships, constitutes a major life crisis in which all 
the emotions associated with significant loss are experienced, 
shock, pain, grief, anger and need to be resolved (Grote and 
Weinstein, 1977). 
Although a great deal has been written and suggested, the 
question of exactly how divorce affects the child has not really 
been answered. Much of the literature has tended to look at 
clinical populations, with conceptual and methodological problems 
that have made the validity of these findings problematic 
(Levitan, 1979). Some exceptions were the various studies 
undertaken by Hetherington et al., and Wallenstein and Kelley 
which have influenced the more recent studies undertaken. 
Two factors, however, stand out in the literat~re as highly 
significant determinants of post divorce adjustment in both 
children and their parents. These factors are 
(1) the amount of interpersonal hostility and conflict 
to which the child is exposed prior to, during and 
following the divorce procedure (Littner, 1973; 
Hetherington et al., 1976; Jacobson, 1978) and 
(2) the loss of contact or the breaking of affectional 
bonds with a parent after the divorce (Littner, 
1973'11 Jacobson,. 1978 and Hess and Ca~ara., 1979). 
These findings ·have direct relevance for workers in the field of 
family law, as they imply .that healthy family relationships and 
adjustments after.the divorce require the minimal of inter-
parental hostility th~oughout the process of diss61ution and 
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the provision of adequate meaningful contact with both a mother 
and a father after the divorce . 
. The aim of this dissertation .is therefore limited to examining 
the role of the mental health professional through all the stages 
of divorce in terms of his potential for reducing trauma by 
facilitating mediated divorce, or if necessary adjudicated 
settlements, which assure the child continued and positive 
relationships with both parents after divorce. This will be 
done by: 
(1) Reviewing the historical development of family law 
through history in order to gain some understanding 
of the legal and social context of the area in which 
divorce and custody/access decision making belongs. 
(2) Critically examining the recent legal reforms. 
(3) Examining the role of the mental health professional 
as a facilitator of mediated settlements of divorce 
related issues at each stage of the divorce proceed-
ings. 
(4) Critically evaluating the concept of child advocacy 
within the traditional and proposed ideal model. 
(5) Reviewing and updating the concept of best interest 
of the child. 
(6) Proposing practical guidelines to assist the 
investigating consultant to coriduct his investigation, 
ev~luation, and presentation of his .evidence in a Way 
which is maximally helpful to .the court. 
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(7) Finally proposing a model which outlines a 
progression of ~teps thfough which diss6lution 
should move to ensure the least detrimental 
results both in the process towards such a 
dissolution and the outcome to families. 
It must be borne in mind that this study can never presume to 
be a definitive work on matrimonial and custody disputes. We 
are looking here at two at times unrelated disciplines, that of 
the mental health professional and legal practitioner. It is 
not possible within the confines of a study of this nature to 
examine in depth the whole body of psychological knowledge and 
of the legal concepts past and present which must be applied, 
which are presumed to be relevant in such disputes. For example 
it has been largely assumed that marital conflict detrimentally 
affects the socio/emotional development of the child but there 
is no attempt within the scope of this thesis to elaborate on 
this theme. 
Insofar as only a general overview can be given, focussing on 
central issues germane to the role of the mental health 





Working with families undergoing marital dissolution requires 
first and foremost an understanding of the current attitudes, 
guidelines, developments, approaches and difficulties 
experienced within the legal context of family law. 
The first chapter therefore attempts to locate family law in 
its historical perspective and to consider the social forces 
which have shaped its development. 
The South African Roman Dutch system of laws, with its roots 
in the early Roman, German and later Dutch systems, has. 
developed over time to the position it holds today through a 
process of assimilation by which aspects of other legal systems, 
which hav~ more appropriately reflected social conditions and 
served social demands, have been incorporated by the South 
African Judges into the law. This process has been particu-
larly evident in the system of Family Law. 
Attitudes surrounding the divorce process and custody and 
access matters primarily reflect the social and legal attitudes 
of divorce held by society. An understanding of current social 
and legal attitudes in this area requires an evaluation of the 
history of legal systems within those socia1 contexts which 
have influenced their development. 
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Laws regarding relationships between parents and between 
parents and children did not exist in the early legal systems. 
An early prototype of such laws is the "patria potestas" of 
the Roman Law which gave the patriarch absolute control over 
all family members. When the patriarch died his eldest son 
took over the running of the extended family from which members 
were neve~ freed, with the exception of ~aughters, who on 
marriage passed into the "patria potestas" of their husbands 
(Spiro, 1971). 
The "patria potestas" as such, was never adopted by the early 
German and English systems. It did however have far-reaching 
influence in the later systems by providing that parents, as 
the natural guardians of their children, have a duty to support 
t,hem and loo.k after their interests during their minority 
(Wessels, 1908). 
In the early German system, women and children were still 
largely corisidered part of the man•s household. Although 
women held certain parental rights these remained very much 
sub6rdinate to those of her husband and even with his death, 
although she maintained a great deal of control in matters 
concerning the children•s educatio~, marriage and personal 
welfare, a guardian was usually appointed by the .father, 
before his death, and later by the state, who would administer 
the property of the minor and assist in in legal proceedings 
(Franklin and Hibbs, 1980). Children, on the attainment of 
their majority or on marriage, were free to do as they saw fit 
(Wessels, .1908). } _, 
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1.1 MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES 
Marriages in these early systems constituted private civil 
contracts of sale arranged by the families, either between 
the bride and/or guardian of the bride, and the bridegroom. 
Similarly divorces by voluntary act (Chloros, 1978) were 
simple, informal, private arrangements between the parties 
concerned which were governed by social conventions, customs 
and ethics (Glendon, 1977). 
The advent of Christianity signified an important milestone 
in the evolution of Family Law. Marriage was placed on a 
higher plane, the consent of the bride was insisted upon, and 
betrothal and marriage considered a sacred institution in 
which the bride was expected to remain true to her husband. 
The principle of indissolubility of marriage became established 
in the Roman Empire during the reign of the Christian convert 
Constantine from 306 to 337 AD, when it then became extremely 
difficult to acquire a divorce except in special cases of 
adultery or gross misconduct of a party. It is as a result of 
this practice that the concept of 'fault', which has had a 
major influence in all matters pertaining to .the process of 
divorce, became firmly established. 
For centuries the church retained control over marital matters 
until .the·Protestant revolution of the 16th century, when the 
~ . 
view of marriage as a "wordly institution" challenged the 
ecclesiastical courts and led to divorce being brought under 
legal control (Hahlo, 1979; Brown, 1982). 
i ·-
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During the French Revolution; divorce by unilateral request 
became possible and formed part of the original Civil Code, 
until concern for family stability resulted in a tightening 
up of the law, requiring a period of separation as a measure 
of control over impetuous divorces (Foster and Freed, 1974). 
In England the Roman Catholic view of marriage as a sacrament, 
indissoluble except on death or by ecclesiastical courts on 
the grounds of adultery, persisted long after the breakaway of 
the thurch of England (Zuckerman and Fox, 1973). 
The early American system, again largely influenced by 
Protestant .settlers, granted courts jurisdiction to dissolve 
marrtage on specific grounds which were carried over from the 
ecclesiastical courts. 
· ·Russia, during the revolution, became the first and only 
European country to provide a purely administrative procedure 
--fdr the dissolution of marriage, requiring registration at 
the States Registry of status. There was an attempt to 
iri~roduce a stage of reconciliation into the procedure, 
however, voluntary divorce was reintroduced in 1968 (Chloros, 
1978). 
In South Africa the strong Calvanistic influence from the 
Netherlands determined the State's assumption of r~gulating 







1.2 CHILD OWNERSHIP 
With the influence of Christianity the role of the father 
towards his family changed from one of absolute authority 
and master to one of protector. 
Childhood, however, was still not perceived as a separate 
phase of life and once weaned, and having acquired a 
minimum of skills to care for themselves, children were 
considered, and in all respects treated, as 11 Small adults .. 
(Mussen, 1969), and were expected to provide service and an 
income from the age of 7 years (Franklin and Hibbs, 1980). 
A major change in attitude towards children came with the 
Reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries. Encouraged by 
the clergy, philosophers and humanitarians of the time, the 
notions that childhood was a separate phase from adulthood, 
that children needed protection from the corrupt adult world, 
tha-t rich and poor needed to be educated according to their 
age and that all education should be linked to religious and 
moral teachings, were being.established throughout society 
(Mussen et al., 1969). 
Throughout.this period, in matters of child custody the law 
did not inter_fere with the father's right to the children's 
- -
services once the marriage was dissolved (Franklin and Hibbs, 
1980). 
During the late 18th and early 19th cerituries, the entire 
We~tern World was caught up in the social upheaval of the 
Industrial Revolution in which basic rural cultural societies 
changed to industrial urban societies. 
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These years of rapid change challenged traditional social 
roles and values of men and women. As men were required to 
pursue work opportunities outside of the family home, at work 
centres, women took over the control of the family and 
became the primary child rearers and home makers (Title, 1974; 
Lom~x, 1978). This divided the wage labour of men from the 
private labour of women (Roman and Haddad, 1978). 
Society also became aware of the vulnerability of chi'ldren. 
The obvious and growing need to protect children from the 
exploitation of the child labour market resulted in the 
promulgation of the Child Labour Laws of the 19th Century 
(Houlgate, 1980). Furthermore, the work of such philosophers 
as John Loc~e (1632- 1704), who stressed the importance of 
the early experiences of children for their future health -and 
welfare, was influential, and there was a revival of interest 
in the rearing, training and social needs of children (Mussen 
et al., 1969). This brought about a revolutionary shift in 
the consideration of .relationships between parents and children, 
away from the concept of parental rights and towards the concept 
of parental responsibility for the care and welfare of their 
children (Derdeyn, 1976). 
These changes of attitude brought about fundamental .changes in 
the laws. To this point the paramount rights of the father 
had not been interfered with by the law. However, in England 
the doctrine of ''parents patria" was now established (Franklin 
' and Hibbs, ~980), and the court, as the upper guardian of all 
minors, assumed power to exercise discretion .in matters of 
custody and guardianship where the father could in any way be 






One of the first men to lose custody of his children 
for what was termed 11 Vicious and immoral atheistic beliefs 11 
was Percy Shelley, the poet (Derdeyn, 1976). 
For the first time, it now became possible for women to gain 
custody of their children where fathers could be proved unfit 
as a parent. Little regard, however, was given to the actual 
benefits that a mother could give her child (Oster, 1965). 
In America, during the early 1800's, article 146 of the Civil 
Code, based on the French Civil Code, provided that on separa-
tion, provisional .custody be given to the father whether 
plaintiff or defendant, but stipulated .. unless for the 
greater advantage of the child it be otherwise ordered .. 
(Title, 1974). In matters of permanent custody there were no 
guidelines; article 157 of the Civil Code ~imply provided 
that awards be left to the judge's discretion to either party 
irrespective of guilt (Title, 1974). 
Judges dealt with this situation by adopti~g the principle 
that the right of ownership of the children belonged to the 
parent who financed their maintenan~e and education. An 
1926 judgement explicitly stated that, ...... in consequence of 
the obligations of the father to provide for the maintenance 
of his infant children .... he is entitled to the custody of 
their persons and the value of their labou·r and service 11 
(Derdeyn, 1976, p.l370). Some American courts.held that there 
be no onus on the father to support and maintain children 
over which he no longer had custody (Derdeyn, 1976). Clearly 
the man's assumed superior competence, and control over 
financial and property matters gave him the advantage that 
perpetuated his paramount rights (Dster, 1965; Derdeyn, 1976)~ 
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It was Talfourd's Act of 1839, in England, which empowered 
the courts to give custody of infants under the age of 7 
years to the mother and in so doing, set the stage for one 
of the main governing principles of custody decisions, the 
Tender·Years Doctrine (Franklin & Hibbs, 1980). This was 
followed by the Custody of Infants Act in 1886 which extended 
this age to 16 and then later to 21 years. 
Gradually mothers' rights started gaining ground. In the 
early 1900's, in America, the father was finally held responsible 
for maintaining his children whether in his custody or not, 
thus removing an important financial constraint against 
awarding custody to mothers. Further, as a result of the 
socially dynamic, albeit precarious, social order in America, 
it was thought important that children be given a good solid 
start in life which would serve them for their future. 
Consequently, as the importance of maternal care in early 
development was being stressed, so women's rights in custody 
were increasing and the paramount rights af the father were 
slowly eroded (Derdeyn, 1976). 
This was reflected in 1921 with the amendment of article 157 
of the Civil Code which provided that the judge, in all cases 
of separation or divorce, award custody to the party, regardless 
of sex, who would "best promote the best i.nterests of the child" 
(Title, 1974). 
This development was reflected in other social systems. In 
England the Guardianship of Infants Act, in 1925, finally 
established the equality of both parents in the eyes of the 
law as well as the principle of the best interests of the 
child (Bradbrook, 1971; Sornarajah, 1973). The Canadian 
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system closely followed developments in England (Bradbrook, 
1971 ) . 
In the South African Roman Dutch system of law, as long as 
the marriage remained undissolved, it was traditionally held 
that the father•s rights, as the nucleus of the family, 
prevailed. Where divorce was granted, (as a deserved punish-
ment for such matrimonial offences as adultery, desertion or 
cruelty), the punitive policy was adhered to of awarding 
custody (for virtue) to the 11 innocent .. spouse, .except where 
the child 1 s life, health or morals were threatened (Sornarajah, 




Having_traced the developments of the early roots of family 
law, this chapter will examine the three major reforms 
that arose within the modern legal systems as an attempt to 
meet the needs of families for protection within the 
adversorial practice of law. These included the no-fault 
divorce reforms, the conciliation/family court movement 
and the provision of legal protection for the child who finds 
himself the subject of .custody/access disputes between 
parents. 
It also examines and evaluates, in the light of these reforms, 
the provisions made by the new South African Divorce Act No. 70 
of 1979 within which the mental health professional must work. 
In the second half of the 19th century, a number of child 
protection acts were promulgated. They specifically referred 
to the protection, care, welfare, removal of and supervision of 
children. 
The Child Protection Act of 1913 was an attempt to consolidate 
the law in this area •. It was later replaced by the Children•s 
Act of 1937 (Spiro, 1965). 
In matters of custody, however, the interests of the children 
remained subsidiary to the traditional principles. Nevertheless 
judges would seem to have had great difficulty in applying these 
principles. For example, in 1907 a judgement by William Solomon 
_I 
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stated that the court use its discretion in granting custody 
to either parent regardless of guilt and even consider a 
third party where neither of the parents are considered fit 
and proper (Roberts, 1980). 
In 1943 the Court in Milstein vs. Milstein, ruled the guiding 
principle to be 11 What is best for the children 11 (Sornarajah, 
1973, p.l35). It was not until 1948, however, that the Appeal 
Court acknowledged and accepted the departure from the Roman 
Dutch principle in these matters when it stated, 11 no apology 
is required for citing the practice under the English or any 
other modern legal system, and questions of custody may 
properly be decided in relation to human needs and .values as 
they are assessed in civilized countries generally at the present 
day 11 (Sornarajah, 1973, p.l35). The Matrimonial Affairs Act of 
1953 finally and firmly established the interests of the child 
as the paramount consideration in both cases of divorce and 
separation of spouses (Spiro~ 1971). 
-. ... 
-20-
2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FAMILY LAW 
The family, whatever form it takes, has remained the basic 
and primary economic and socializing unit in all societies. 
It provides, through the parent-child relationship, the 
physical, emotional and educational care of the child in a 
stable environment thus providing the basis for the child•s 
future relationships as an adult. 
The dissolution of the family unit, through divorce, consti-
tutes a highly emotional crisis, not only for the divorcing 
couple but for all the members of the nuclear and extended 
family system and represents substantial economic losses to 
society each year (Foster, 1966). 
Inevitably, therefore, the strong interest of the State and 
public in the stability of the family unit, makes the 
protection and preservation of the institution of marriage 
the primary object of the legislature and the courts of law 
(Kay, 1968; Watson, 1969; Levy, 1972). Their attempts to 
achieve this goal have traditionally relied on the same basic 
principle as was used by Constantine in the 4th Century, that 
is, to make divorce difficult to obtain by strictly limiting 
the grounds on which it was granted, and applying the concept 
of •fault• and punitive measures to marital misconduct. 
As divorce is obtainable only by judicial decision through the 
legal model of the adversary system this process inevitably 
involved an inherent principle of contest between two opposing 
parties. Traditionally each spouse with his other legal team 
defends their rights, while the success of the battle depends 
on allegations and evidence as proof of •fault•, which is 
exposed in court. 
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Zuckerman and Fox, 1973, describe this process vividly: 
"The oppression of the fault system is magnified 
at trial by the adversary system. No one 
connected with the court proceedings is spared. 
In a contested case, the emotional trauma 
experienced by the parties as a result of the 
breakdown of the marriage is heightened by the 
armed camp atmosphere. The one labelled •at 
fault• will be stigmatized and may lose rights 
in the matrimonial property and custody rights 
to the children of the marriage. In an effort 
to •win•, the parties are forced to demean 
themselves, their Counsel and the Court by 
parading in public the sordid aspects of their 
relationship, too often by engaging in personal 
vilifications and even perjury. Friends and 
neighbours of the wrong parties may be brought 
into the sordid little drama to provide 
· •corroboration•. of.the defendant•s or cross 
defendant•s wrong doings and testimony of the 
plaintiff•s good character". (p.524). 
The recognition of the inadequacy of the adversary system as 
a means of resolving divorce, custody and access issues has 
been strongly express-ed by many judges, counse 11 ors, academics 
and practicing lawyers (Mnookin, 1975; Derdeyn, 1976(a); 
Westman, 1979; Brown, -1982). 
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Their objections are based upon the manner in which the 
adversary system creates, perpetuates and deepens hostilities 
between family members, such that it finally becomes impossible 
to deal, in an objective, reasonable and realistic manner, with 
the settlement of the divorce and its ancillary issues such 
that the best interests of the child are ensured (The S A Law 
Commission Report, 1975). 
As a result of these expressed needs, three significant 
movements arose which gave rise to the •no-fault divorce• 
reforms, the conciliation/family court movement, and legal 
protection for children. 
2.1 .. NO-FAULT DIVORCE .. REFORMS 
As early as 1932, Prof. Vernier pointed out that it was 
11 incompatibil ity which induced married persons to do the 
specific things which statutes name as causes for divorce .. 
(Zuckerman and Fox, 1973, p .-541). 
It was only much later, however, that the approach of 
attributing guilt and innocence, which takes no account of 
the real complexities of the marital relationship, assuming 
that marital breakdown results from the specific acts recog-
nized as grounds of divorce, and granting dissolution only 
for marriages proved to have suffered such acts, was recog-
nized as simplistic and inadequate (Kay, 1968; .The SA Law 
Commissioners Report, 1975). 
i .,. . 
.j 
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It also became clear that couples, determined to dissolve 
their marriages effectively and with the minimum of pain to 
both themselves and their children, found themselves forced 
to subvert the system by making their case fit the law 
(Hahlo, 1979/80). By selecting the least offensive ground 
for the defendant and committing perjury the couple would 
build up a plausible case and by "collusive agreement" 
-- -
(Zuckerman and Fox, 1973), or "mutual consent" (Foster, 1973), 
obtain ·a "consensual-perjured divorce" (Levy, 1972). Lawyers 
had no choice but to play the game and Judges, finding these 
divorces difficult to detect (The SA Law Commission, 1975), 
also became party to the farce played out at these uncontested 
hearings (Zuckerman and Fox, 1973). 
Most divorces that were ostensibly based on fault, were in 
fact divorces by consent, thus making a mockery of the law and 
its institutions (Hahlo and Sinclair, 1980). 
Foster, 1966, observes that, 11 in the typical uncontested 
divorce case, proof is by formula and the entire proceeding 
may be disposed of within minutes .. ~.355. 
An estimated 90% of divorces in South Africa (Hahlo and 
Sinclair, 1980), 95% in England (Mortlock,-1972) and 90% in 
America (Foster, 1966), were uncontested under this system. 
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It was also suggested that the interests of the children and 
society might be better served by allowing the legal 
termination of marriage relationships which for all intents 
and purposes -have ceased to function as such (Kay, 1968; 
Hahlo and Sinclair, 1980). 
Commissions set up in England, Canada, the USA and later in 
South Africa examined the 'fault-based divorce systems and 
suggested alternative suggestions. The concept of divorce 
as a remedy for marital relationships which have irretrievably 
broken down was a concept voiced by Archbishop Cramer in the 
16th Century who suggested that where "such violent hatred 
as rendered it in the highest degree improbable that the 
husband and the wife would survive their animosities and 
-ever love one another again", divorce be granted (Foster, 1973, 
p. 186). 
Chloros (1978) comments that the recognition and adoption of a 
single break-down ground for divorce which replaces guilt by 
failure (Hahlo and Sinclair, 1980), would render it unnecessary 
for judges to make value judgements on issues of innocence and 
guilt and therefore for spouses to allege such guilt. 
Many attempts have been made globally to recognize a single 
breakdown ground. This has been attained in most Eastern 
European countries while the West European countries have 
tended to adopt a dual system where the new and traditional 





In England although the single breakdown ground was 
recommended by the Archbishop's group in 1966 (Mortlock, 1972), 
the tremendous conservative opposition to this resulted in a 
compromised Divorce Reform Act of 1969, in terms of which the 
single irretrievable breakdown ground had to be proved by 
evidence of such acts as had constituted the old traditional 
grounds of divorce. There was a further need to show that 
these acts were symptomatic of, or necessarily a sufficient 
cause for, breakdown (Zuckerman and Fox, 1973). ·The result 
therefore defeats the purpose of the reform by retaining the 
need for proof of fault and makes divorce, theoretically, 
even more difficult to attain. The Canadian Divorce Laws of 
1968 resembled the English System (Foster, 1973). 
Of the Western World Countries, by far the most liberal reforms 
in divorce laws evolved in the United States of America. · 
ln America each State was responsible for the promulgation of 
its own divorce laws. Several investigations had been under-
. taken by independent States which sought to develop a set of 
proposals which would guide the recodification of divorce laws. 
An important step in this direction was the promulgation of the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) in 1970 by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), 
which attempted to reform and unify the existing laws which 
varied tremendously from State to State. 
It contained widespread, revolutionary proposals which were 
based entirely on the 'no-fa~lt' principle. Briefly, it 
proposed to replace all existing 'fault' based grounds for 
.. 
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what it termed the •dissolution• of marriage by a single, all 
encompassing 'irretrievable breakdown• ground and abolished 
all defences preventing such 'dissolution• from taking pl~ce. 
In ancillary matters •no-fault• mechanisms or standards of 
assessment were proposed in coming to decisions. In property 
and maintenance matters, such factors as past, present and 
potential future contributions, resources and needs of each 
spouse were considered and replaced punitive decisions based 
on fault. In matters of custody and access it specifically 
prohibited any evidence of fault except where it has relevance 
to the parenting ability and relationship with the child of 
each parent. In matters of tustody and access it specifically 
prohibited any evidence of fault except where it has relevance 
to the parenting ability and relationship with the child of 
each parent. In matters of custody it permitted parents to 
reach settlements outside of the Court ~hich, except where 
found to be unconscionable, could not be set aside by the 
Court (Foster, 1973). 
Although not automatically adopted, a redrafted form which 
included provision for the establishment of breakdown in terms 
of past and present separation and efforts at. reconciliation 
served as a blueprint for the different states. California 
was the first state in 1970 to establish tno fault• divorce 
reforms and by 1973, 20 States, and by 1976 all but 3 States, 
had instituted divorce reforms based on the UMDA proposals. 
By 1975, the Australian Family Law Act and by 1979 the New 






In South Africa, the Law Commission of 1975 proposed the adoption 
of the concept of irretrievable breakdown by unilateral request 
to replace the two main existing grounds of adultery and 
malicious dissertion based on fault. The Commission defined 
irretrievable breakdown as the point at which "the marriage 
relationship of the spouses had degenerated" such that "their 
marriage no longer existed as a ~arriage in the true sense of 
the word, and there is no reasonable prospect of a normal 
marriage relationship between them b~ing resumed'' .(The South 
African Law Commission, 1978, p.ll). This was adopted in the 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (Appendix I). 
2.2 THE CONCILIATION/FAMILY COURT MOVEMENT 
"The judicial system has a singular opportunity at the time of 
divorce to play a preventative rather than a corrective role 
by detecting families with serious problems that are not solved 
by the divorce, but are carried over late into the separate 
lives of one of the parties or of both and· into the lives of 
their children" (Bodenheimer, 1971, p.727). 
This represents the views of many workers in the field (Musette, 
1978; Sinclair, 1979), and has helped to focus the attention 
of legal professionals on the emotional and psychological needs 
and issues involved with the aim of r~ducing and avoiding 
unnecessary stress and promoting the best alternative solutions 
for the child and his family. 
The Family Court movement arose as an attempt to remove family 





courts or conciliation services attached to courts. In 
essence it attempted to defocus from the contestation of 
rights and focus instead on the family, its welfare and 
problems. It was motivated by the success of the Juvenile 
Courts (Kay, 1968), which replaced the punitive approach 
by a process of investigation, diagnosis and treatment for 
child offenders and juveniles (Zuckerman, 1969). 
The hope was that these specialized courts would form part 
of the Superior Courts and would have integrate jurisdiction 
over a 11 fami 1 y prob 1 ems, be presided over by Judges with 
specialized skills and interests in family problems and equal 
in status to Superior Court Judges, be staffed by fully 
trained, investigatory and counselling professionals who 
could advise the court, and where hearings could be conducted 
in? non-adversary, therapeutic environment (Foster, 1966; 
Dyson & Dyson, 1968; Kay, 1968) • 
Th~ first prototypes of the 'Family Courts•- were the Domestic 
Relations Courts whose functions it was to fully investigate 
the history, character and circumstances of all parties in a 
divorce action (Zuckerman, 1969). The first was established 
in New York in 1910 as-part of the Magistrates' Court. 
The Domestic Relations Courts of Wisconsin_and Ohio, established 
in 1935 and 1938 respectively, were the first to attempt to 
counsel and reconcile couples who were filing for divorce. 
There are currently in America many reconciliation programs 
offered by the Court. These inClude "The Divorce Experience" 
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run by the Domestic Relations Staff of the Minneapolis 
Family Court in Minnesota (Fine, 1980) and others run by 
the Family Courts of Toledo, Utah, Los Angeles, New York, 
Milwaukee (Foster, 1966). 
The first Conciliation Court was established in Los Angeles 
in 1939. Conciliation has been defined by ·the Fine Report 
in 1974 as: 
11 Assisting the parties to deal with the consequences 
of the established breakdown of their marriage, 
whether resulting in a divorce or separation, by 
reaching agreement or giving consent or reducing 
·the area of conflict upon custody, support, 
access to and education of the children, financial 
0 provision, the disposition of the matrimonial home, 
lawyers• fees and every other matter arising from 
the breakdpwn which calls for a decision on future 
arrangements II 
(Stone, 1977, p.l06). 
Over recent years the counselling programs in con~iliation and 
family courts have evolved from being concerned with reconcilia-
tion and focussing on the marital difficulties to assume a 
service for the resolution of custody and .visitation disputes 
through a process of mediation. Mediation has been defined by 

















....... a voluntary, task orientated process in which 
a third person, a mediator, functions in a non-
judgmental capacity in helping a divorcing couple 
improve their communication through fewer 
distortions and misunderstandings, being more open 
and direct with each other, thereby changing their 
interaction from a potentially destructive, 
competitive, win-lose confrontation to a to-
operative, collaborative, negotiating, problem-
solving endeavour for dealing with their differences .. 
. (p.9) .• 
Some of the States that have·ensured that the mediation model 
becomes the standard include Massachussetts, Connecticut and 
California, wh~re 12 out of 15 courts provide some form of 
conciliation or counselling (Brown, 1982). 
In 1974 the Conciliation Court of Los Angeles County Superior 
Court, at the request of the Judges who recognized the need 
for counselling in families who were returning to court to 
solve their post divorce disputes relating to custody and 
access difficulties, set up a post divorce counselling service 
(Elkin, 1977). 
In 1959 the National Council on Crime and ~elinquency proposed 
a Model Court in its Standard Family Court Act, the r~sult of 
which was the mushrooming of Courts all over the States which 
called themselves •ramily Courts•. Dyson and Dyson (1968) 
. . 
point out, however, that 11 most of them fall short of the model 
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described, lacking one or more of the three essential 
characteristics of 'integrated jurisdiction', investigatory 
staff and 'tounsellors trained in social work'". It named 
the States of Ohio, Rhode Island, Hawaii and New York as 
being the only four to have succeeded in this goal. 
EVALUATIVE STUDIES 
Foster (1966) has reviewed the surveys that have been under-
taken. It is apparent that these services have filled a 
need and have yielded uniformly positive results. The Family 
Court in Toledo, Ohio, which functioned almost as an 
independent agency, received up to 4 000 calls in one year 
from troubled families not yet involved in litigation. The 
1963. statistics showed that of couples that had filed for 
divorce, 717 individuals had avoided or refused voluntary 
counselling and 626 had accepted. Of the 1 337 cases that 
had been tlosed, reconciliation was achieved in 439 or 30% of 
these. Perhaps of greater importance is that conciliation on 
the ancillary matters of custody and divorce was achieved in 
326'and 383 cases respectively. The results indicate that a 
selective process either through screening or .self-referral 
increased the success rates for reconciliation. In Utah 44% 
of self ref~rrals opposed to 9% of Court refer~ed clients 
were reconciled. In Los Angeles where screening was quite 
thorough the reconciliation rate was 64.2% in 1963 ~nd 58.9% 
in 1965. The problem with rigid screening is that only a very 
small percentage of troubled families have any contact with 
the available counselling services and this is an important 
consideration when in a place like New York, 90% of 






-ancillary matters, whi1~ 10% were aimed at actual marriage 
saving or reconciliation. Maine and New Jersey were also 
reported, while having had limited success with reconciliation, 
to have been extremely successful in resolving custody/access 
disputes and helping the family plan for the future. 
By 1977 the Los Angeles Conciliation Court had seen about 300 
families of which 90% were in conflict regarding access matters 
only. The results of a survey have shown that one but of two 
couples referred to post divorce counselling were able to reach 
an amicable agreement (Elkin, 1977). 
Foster (1966) concludes that what successful court systems 
have in common are· able Judges, competent professional staff 
and widespread acceptance of the need for conciliation approach 
by the legal profession. 
In England the reconciliation services .that existed fell 
under the probation or welfare officers attached to the divorce 
courts who were also responsible for the investigations that 
were undertaken. It was not un·til 1969 that a provision for 
reconciliation became incorporated into the law. By 1973 
solicitors acting for a petitioner in divorce were required to 
certify that the possibility of reconciliation had been dis-
cussed and the sources for ·such a service provided (Stone, 1977). 
The Finer Report of 1974 suggested the establishment of Family 
Courts in England and although this has not yet been implemented, 
the Family Law Sub-Committee of the Law Society in 1979 again 
came out in full support of such a system, which to date has 
been turned down on the grounds of cost (Richards, 1981). 
.. 
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The Family Court of Austra 1 i a, based on the American concept 
of a specialized integrated court, was established by the 
Family Law Act of 1975. 
In South Africa the courts have indicated great reluctance in 
becoming involved in the social and therapeutic aspects of 
the divorce proce.ss. The South African Law Commission felt 
that reconciliation could not be forced on people and felt 
that an assessing process of all cases for the purpose of 
assessing the potential for reconciliation would be too costly 
and would not be necessary in all cases. The Commission 
concluded that 11 a Judge should be able to tell at a glance in 
which cases it would be unnecessary to take steps with a view 
t"o reconciliation .. (The SA Law Commission, 1978, p.26). The 
Divorce Act, No. 70 of 1979 therefore provides that at the 
discretion of the court (on the basis of an enquiry into the 
irretrievable breakdown ground), proceedings be postponed to 
provide the opportunity for the parties to seek reconciliation 
counselling with independent agencies (Section 4(3)). 
One of the problems with this approach is that by the time 
divorce matters get to court, parties are so committed, lioth 
psychologically and financially, to going through with the 
proceedings, that it is no longer possible to interce.de. 
Another problem stems from the feeling that Judges may not 
be the right people to make such an assessment. Prognosis 
requires detailed investigations into the circumstances of 
the divorce and judges from the nature of their commitment to 
a heavy workload of diverse matters, are unable to comply. 
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Without a system which allows Judges to develop the 
specialized expertise to adjudi"cate in sensitive, social 
issues, the probability exists that the assigned Judge, 
without reflecting on his judicial integrity, may not have 
the necessary commitment. A third .problem is that the 
conflicting material usually presented to the Judge where 
ancillary matters are in dispute are far from adequate in 
the assessment of the potential of the relationship. 
Foster {1966) points out that the opportunity to succeed 
with reconciliation efforts is at its maximum before 
litigation is commenced. 
On the subject of conciliation, the new Divorce Act provides 
for the incorporation of a negotiated settlement relating to 
custody and access in the divorce order, if the Court is 
satisfied that the proposed arrangements are in the best 
interests of the children (Hahlo~ 1975), but again does not 
provide the machinery required to encourage mediated settle-
ments within the legal structure. 
Based on the recommendations of the Commission, Section 6(2) 
of the new Act provides that the court may, at its own 
discretion, call for any investigation it deems necessary in 
order to com'e to an informed opinion. Although this clearly 
enables the court to examine more objective, comprehensive 
and unabridged reports, it has been cautioned that where 
such a provision remains discretionary only lip service will be paid 
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to it (Sinclair, 1979). There is no provision made in the 
act for post divorce supervision and support. 
Where courts have not provided the necessary services, 
parties and legal professionals have looked to independent 
mental health services for such assistance, not all of which 
are suitable to carry out the demands made on them .. 
(a) Individual therapy in the field of marital breakdown, 
has many disadvantages. 
(i) it focuses on individual dynamics and behaviour 
and feelings rather than the marital relation-
ship (Benedek & Benedek, 1979), 
(ii) the skills and expertise of the therapist are 
seldom specifically divorce related and 
supervision is not always available (Benedek 
& Benedek, 1979), 
(iii) when called as an expert witness by one party 
there are inevitable difficulties with regard 
to the objectivity of his testimony (Frederick, 
1975), 
(iv) an individual approach is further accused of 
actually contributing to the adversary process 
in that when one of the spouses enters therap_y 
alone, and as insight, sensitivity·and a new 
language is learned, the gap between the 
spouses is widened rather .than narrowed, thus 
increasing the probability of an adversarial 
dissolution of the marriage. 
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(b) Marriage and Family therapists on the other hand are 
committed and trained to working with the marital and family 
system. This enables the sharing of insight, equal growth 
possibilities, maintenance of primary bonds between spouses 
during the'pre-divorce or reconciliation stage so that even 
when divorce becomes inevitable, essential communication is 
encouraged.(Steinberg, 1980). Therapists are also exposed 
to. both points of view and thus more likely to gain an 
objective and realistic understanding of the situation for 
indication purposes and as expert witness .. FAMSA is a 
specialized subsidized service which has 18 branches through-
out South.Africa. It provides marriage and family counselling 
in an attempt to prevent marital breakdown before the damage 
is irreparable. 
(c) Public Mental Health Clinics such as Child Guidance 
Clinics again tend to have no specific focus on marital and 
divorce issues. 
(d) Mediation .Services (Brown, 1982) .. The Family Mediation 
Centre, established by Coogler in Atlanta in 1974, became the 
first formal private divorc~/family mediation centre in the 
United States. At the same time a similar conciliation project 
was being pursued in.Toronto .in which a form of mediation in 
which counsellors with both spouses and their lawyers worked 
in 'open forum' or conference towards a voluntary, mutually 
acceptable agreement. 
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In 1976 Lohman set up a private Family Mediation Service in 
Mclean, Virginia, and it was at this time that mediation 
work took off in America. In 1980 the Family Mediation 
Association, an organization concerned with the development 
and advancement of divorce mediation as a viable alternative 
to the adversarial system was established by Coogler and iN 
the same year the Academy of Family Mediators was established 
by Irving, Lohman and Heynes in New York. 
(e) Other independent sources include special projects 
founded by grants or community based voluntary groups, 
for which the public are not charged. These have tended to 
focus on post-divorce problems and are run by specialized and 
experienced teams~ The Children of Divorce Project (Wallerstein 
& ~elley, 1977) comprises .a comprehensive research program 
dealing with post divorce conflict. Others include voluntary 
community (Guerney and Jordon, 1979), school supported 
(Wilkinson and Black, 1977; Hammond, 1981) and experimental 
(Green, 1.978) post divorce groups for children and seminars 
for parents (Granvold and Welch, 1977; Young, 1978(a); l978(b)). 
Although of great benefit to participants these projects are 
still at an experimental stage and thus are limited both in 
length of operation and availability to the general population. 
Evaluation studies. Brown outlines several projects being 
undertaken in the USA for the purpose of evaluating the 
different aspects of the mediation process in orde~ to provide 
an empirical base for the practice of divorce/family mediation. 
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Preliminary surveys indicate that more than .2/3 of contested 
custody/access cases in Connecticut between 1977/1979, 8/10 
in Denver, the great majority in San Francisco and 85% to 90% 
in Greater Washington were successfully mediated (Brown, 1982). 
Clearly these private services can fulfill the needs for 
families; however there are 2 inherent difficulties in all 
independent private services: 
(1) Unless amply subsidised they are limited to the affluent 
sector of the population. Swerdlow (1978) notes that medical 
aid schemes still restrict payments to specific diagnostic 
categories in which divorce related problems are not included •. 
(2) Contact requires referral which as a result of ignorance 
is often not made until it is too late. 
The courts have consistently been looked to to take responsibility 
for litigating families in distress. In many respects they have 
substantial advantage over independent and private services which· 
include early, automatic contact for all families without the 
need for pathology to be identified, access to a wide range of 
services from investigation to therapy, and the assurance of . 
quality and direct recommendations to the court in all cases of 
post divorce lit~gation (Benedek and Benedek, 1979). 
2.3 Legal Protection for Children 
When mediation efforts fail, the dispute between parents for 
custody of or access to the child becomes a function of the 
parent-centred adversary system which requires spouses to defend 
· .. 
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their 11 pr.inciple rights of custody, guardianship, access, 
maintenance and property that need to be distributed .. 
(Roberts, 1980), illustrating that most decisions state~ 
to be in the best interests of the child, are in fact 
basically ones of parental right (Derdeyn, 1976(a)), asserted 
by default to the parents (Foster and Freed, 1974). 
The Yale Law Review (1978) notes: .. as the subject of .the 
custody dispute, the child of divorcing parents has immediate 
and lasting interests in the custody decision before the 
court. The choice of custodial parent will influence the 
child's personality and personal attachments, and the process 
of litigation may itself put the child's well-being in jeopardy .. 
(p.ll29). Clearly therefore this situation constitutes a 
serious cause for concern. 
Wilcox (1976) states in support that 11 to the extent that 
standards and procedures are inadequate, the child becomes a 
pawn in a dispute which may affect his financial and psycho-
logical well-being. No judge would admit to treatment of the 
minor as a chattel. Yet when the court accepts the settlement 
of parties as binding on the child or withholds from Him the 
safeguards afforded parents, the child enjoys all the rights 
of the family car .. (p.927). 
The first attempts made to protect and promote the interests of 
the child in legal matters evolved during the First World War 
in 1919 with the creation of the 'Friend of the Court' who was 
required to contact divorcing parties and gather such info·rma-
tion as might not be exposed by either party or their counsel, 
and advise the judge on prdblems concerning the children 





In 1960 the Wisconsin Family Code imposed on the court a 
duty, in all cases where child custody was in dispute or 
wherever the welfare of the child was in question, to 
app6int a separate and independent attorney to serve a~ 
'Guardian ad litem' for the protection of the interests of 
the minor children (Foster, 1966). This provision as well 
as permission to consult with child care experts, and inter-
view the child in chambers rather than in open court, were 
included in the UMDA proposals (Foster and Freed, 1974; 
Zudermart and Fox, 1974). 
The final 1973 amendment of the UMDA of the Family Law 
Section for the first time provided for the mandatory appoint-
, ment of an independent counsel to represent the interests of 
all minor _or dependent children (Foster, 1973). 
The position at present, in most western states, is that 
children as the parties most affected by custody/access 
determination still fail to be granted full party status or 
mandatory representation by the courts and unless mandatorily 
required by the court are not granted independent representation 
by the courts (Mnookin, 1975; Wilcox, 1976; Mlyniec, 1977-78; 
Hahlo and Sinclair, 1980). 
When to appoint: 
Certain writers in the field have stressed the need to appoint 
an advocate for the child in all cases (Goldstein et al., 
1973). Others have specifi~d that an advocate should be 
appointed at the request of the court, parents, child or 
other qualified or interested party (Wilcox, 1976; Alexander, 
1977) where custody is undisputed but a threat to the welfare 




a representative at the very least in all contested cases 
(Coyne, 1969; Watson, ·1969; Wilcox, 1976; Ya 1 e Law Journa 1 , 
1978). 
Mlyniec (1977/78), in line with the principle of minimal 
interference by the Courts, suggests that a child's legal 
representative be appointed only where a di~pute arises and 
the child has stated a preference (thus placing a choosing 
child with a wanting parent) •. Where there is no dispute and 
the~child's wishes match the custodial. arrangement, and there 
is no suggestion of a possibility of harm; or where the child 
states a preference but the parent is unwilling; or where the 
child has not stated a preference and there is a dispute between 
the parents both of whom have been assessed by psychological 
investigations as fit; then the legal representative is not 
appointed. The child here is seen as having full party status 
and the role of the legal representative is the traditional one 
of furthering the child's case (Bersoff, 1976-77). Bersoff 
also sees a need for representation where custody is not in 
dispute but where the child's preference is at odds with the 
parental agreement, and where the child refuses to live with 
either parent, as in both these situations the interests of 
child and parents are in conflict. 
Alexander (1977), proposes that this question should be based 
on the mental health professional's assessed level of disagree-
' ment between the parties~ such that the consideration of the 
best interests of the child take either the form of mediation 
through an expert, or litigation through an attorney. 
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The question therefore remains unresolved. However, experience 
has shown that where the appointment of a legal representative 
for the child has not been a mandatory requirement in specific 
circumstances, appointments left to the discretion of the court 
or other parties, are seldom made (Yale Law Journal, 1978; 
Hahlo and Sinclair, 1980). Furthermore few minors have the 
sophistication or financial resources to secure the services of 
an attorney (Wilcox, 1976). The right to retain is therefore 
not sufficient. 
The new S A Divorce Act 70 of 1979 for the first time provided 
that courts "may, at their discretion, appoint a legal repre-
sentative for a child". 
This can only be seen as a dismissal of responsibility for the 
children by the South African courts. The courts in South Africa 
need to take m6re responsibility for the social role they play. 
Independent court services which involve counsellors, expert 
witnesses and legal representatives for the child, go way beyond 
the reach of the average man•s resources and becomes a luxury 
for the rich (SchSffer, 1981) •. 
Although new and important concepts have been introduced there 
is a feeling that the law has not gone far eriough. It has 
proviCied the opportunity that because of the Commission•s 
insistance on not curtailing the discretion of the Court, it 
has not provided the machinery nor the procedure to.give effect 
to its provisions. Though the act has restated the position of 




thus in theory safeguarding the panu:nount interest of the 
child, it has contented itself to allow the court to exercise 
this inherent status without compelling the Court to do so. 
Whereas parental rights over property and maintenance could 
be dealt with by lawyers, divorce and custody arrangements, 
where the welfare of the children and therefore the family is 
paramount, have no apparent place in the adversary system. 
In considering the question of cost, it is not sufficient to 
dismiss more costly procedures without carefully evaluating 
and weighing the cost to the state of the inevitable divorce 
related problems that are created and perpetuated by the present 
system. The initial cost of a more socially orientated system 
may indeed be higher, but the long term results, of having 
provided the necessary means for families to deal with the 
crisis constructively and resolve the problems adequately so 
that they can continue functioning as emotionally balanced 
members of society can, in the long term, only be of great 




THE PRE-DIVORCE STAGE - INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have illustrated how the legal systems 
have, in various degrees, progressively become aware of, and 
taken the welfare and needs of the parents, families and the 
child into account with recent legislation. They have also 
illustrated the clear unsuitability .of the adversary system 
for the resolution of family disputes. 
The lack of sufficient machinery to provide the family with 
, necessary safeguards in the adversary systems, however, does 
not remove from mental health professionals in this area the 
responsibility to assure the families of these services. 
The demands on mental health professionals within the process 
of marital dissolution have been varied. In general it has 
required involvement in a non-legal way as a counsellor or 
therapist to either one or both parents, the children or the 
family as a whole in order to resolve stress prior to, during, 
or following the divorce. It has also required direct 
participation in the legal process either as a mediator or as 
an investigator and expert in court to give opinions in custody -
and access disputes. 
The following chapters will attempt to define the role of the 
mental health professional at each stage of the dissolution 
process from the first contact with the client or attorney, 
through reconciliation, mediation, investigation and legal 
adjudication and the post divorce stages, as well as to derive 
guidelines based on the perceived needs of the child within 
his family. 
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The pre-divorce stage is pos~ibly the most important stage in 
the divorce proceedings, as the manner in which the couple is 
handled will determine the atmosphere within which the divorce 
settlement is reached. 
This chapter will examine the roles of both the legal and 
mental health professional at this stage and will describe 
goals and process of pre-divorce counselling. 
The frustrations a~d hostility of divorce start long before 
steps are taken to dissolve a marriage. The active search for 
and contact with an attorney represents a public admission 
that the marriage is in trouble (Herman et al ., 1979). Sabalis 
and Ayers, (1977), warn however that it is an error to assume 
that every client who consults an attorney is necessarily 
serious about wanting a divorce. In fact where a marriage has 
failed, 11 divorce serves nothing unless it includes an under-
standing of the causes of the marital breakdown 11 (Steinberg, 
1980, p.261). For this reason then, the rbles of.both the 
Counsellor and attorney in the pre-divorce period are crucial. 
3.1 THE ROLE OF THE REFERRAL AGENT 
The role of the lawyer, as the link between the client's 
motivation for a divorce and the action itself is vital in 
determining the final outcome for the family. Ideally it 
requires certain abilities and qualities. Sabalis and Ayers 
(1977), identify the following abilities: 
(1) to assess the prognosis of r~conciliation efforts 
through a clear understanding of the permanency 
of the precipitating factors and the purpose that 
the action is serving for the clients; 
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(2) to motivate and entourage the couple into 
counselling where.appropriate and necessary; 
(3) to understand the psychological make up of the 
client in order to anticipate and defuse the 
problems that arise; 
(4) to encourage realistic expectation of outcome 
by keeping the client informed, and ensure that 
all information remains reality based and concrete, 
especially in period of stress. 
Herman et al. (1979), generally define the need to be able to 
deal with the emotional and legal demands placed on him by 
the client. 
Where reconciliation attempts are refused or fail, the goal 
of the lawyer then is to make conciliation or mediation 
available to the client (Podell, 1973). 
The fact is that to a large extent the legal profession has, 
except in the role of expert, been reluctant to involve mental 
health professionals in the dissolution process (Woody, 1978). 
They have also been noted to lack both sensitivity to the 
emotional needs of clients and/or the knowledge and skills to 
be able to deal with this role (Duquette, 1978; Herman et al., 
1979). 
In a recent survey of 22 experienced attorneys in Georgia, 
attorneys put forward specific suggestions which they felt 




(a) the need for formal training in counselling; 
(b) the need for a better knowledge of referral services 
and 
(c) the need for increased sensitivity to the trauma of 
divorce (Herman et al., 1979). 
Law schools in America have given increased attention to the 
interface of law and therapy in the process of divorce. They 
have begun to incorporate interviewing and counselling courses 
into their curriculae, to publish interdisciplinary text books, 
to offer an increased number of law degrees combined with 
degrees in psychology or social work and more than 120 law 
schools participate·in an annual client counselling activity 
coordinated by the American Bar Association (Steinberg, 1980). 
They have clearly moved from a symbolic level of academic 
recognition of the need to the pragmatic level of practitioner 
acceptance. 
3.2 PRE-DIVORCE COUNSELLING 
The question of mandatory counselling has raised certain 
objections. These are that counselling efforts with 
unmotivated parties are futile, that it may violate the 
·integrity of the persons concerned, and that it becomes a· 
practical impossibility in the over-burdened courts and 




Rosen (1978) feels, however, that counselling should be an 
essential feature of the divorce process, to be offered at 
the institution of proceedings irrespective of whether conflict 
is in evidence through a custody or access dispute or not, as 
the fact that 90% of divorces are settled before trial 
effectively reduces the number of families receptive for 
counselling. 
3.2.1 AIM: 
Pre-divorce counselling is aimed at helping the marital couple 
resolve their conflict and where appropriate, preserve or 
restore the marriage (Brown, 1982). 
Steinberg (1980, outlines the purposes as being: 
(1) Understanding through insight of the role that each 
spouse has played in the relationship in order that 
these dysfunctional patterns become less, likely; 
(2) Increasing the likelihood of reconciliation; 
(3) Reducing some of the hostility and bitterness in 
the relationship and thus, 
(4) Increasing the likelihood of constructive communi-
cation and negotiation in the settlement of the 
ancillary issues where divorce is inevitable. 
The basic therapeutic model used in divorce counselling has 
drawn on brief crisis intervention, conflict resolution and 
problem solving methods. 
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The position taken by the counsellor is one of strict 
neutrality regarding the divorce decision. He does not 
impose his values and beliefs on the clients. He simply 
helps the clients gain information and insight so that they 
can best decide what to do regarding their marriage 
(Gardner, 1977). 
Fine (1980), proposes that 'fence-sitting• by couples is a 
justified position as they may need the time to explore the 
problem and its alternative solutions. 
An interesting feature of the Los Angeles reconciliation 
program is the 'husband and wife agreement• (Appendix II). 
This is a contract, drawn up by the spouses themselves follow-
ing a set number of interviews with the counsellor, which deals 
with issues of contention between the parents and specifies the 
manner of dealing with them should cohabitation be resumed. 
This contract is then signed by the ~arties and the counsellor 
and then approved and made an o~der of court by the Judge. 
Where reconciliation attempts fail, the goal of counselling 
then shifts to the conciliation or mediation of collateral 
issues (Foster. 1966). 
3.2.2 THE FAMILY APPROACH 
Musetta (1978) bases his pre-divorce appro~ch on systems theory. 
He states that ~emotional functioning is interdependent and 
reciprocal, causes of behaviour are circular and not linear, 
that perso~al motivation factors invol~e the covert expectations 
and loyalty obligations implicit.in being a member of a family .. 
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(p.60) and that each member plays a role in maintaining the 
status quo such that despite actuai separation or divorce, 
destructive family relationships may endure in the form of 
custody/access disputes. As the problem is a conjoint one, 
the responsibility in bringing about a solution is therefore 
also conjoint. Families must therefore be given the opportunity 
to generate solutions to their problems. 
Therapy therefore focuses on helping the family to understand 
what factors in family functioning have contributed to the 
dysfunction. Parents are encouraged in their responsibilities 
as parents and to understand the children's difficulties in 
coping with and maintaining their loyalty ties. 
Working with the family as a whole, including the children, as 
the parents attempt to cope with the conflict of interest 
between the child's need for continuity of the family system 
and the parental wish to dissolve the family structure, 
affords the advantage that this show of respect and acknowledge-
ment of the children's needs and feelings ~elps them to feel 
cooperative, considered and loved, rather than helpless and 
abandoned (Salk, 1977). 
3.3 DIVORCE COUNSELLING 
3.3.1 AIM. 
When parents make the decision to terminate the marriage the 
focus of the pre marital therapy switches to that of 
(1) Helping the parents with the task of telling the 
children, 
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(2) helping the parents to express their feelings 
appropriately to the children; 
(3) helping the parents to cope with·the feelings 
expressed by their children; 
(4) educating parents as to the natural and inevitable 
responses of children at this stage; 
(5) educating parents on the legal and financial 
aspect of divorce and 
(6) referring them to a competent attorney and 
preparing them for a mediated divorce settlement. 
These tasks are elaborated below. 
(1) Gardner (1977) has set out guidelines for parents 
in telling their children of their decision. 
Briefly he suggests that both parents need to tell 
the~ together, approximately one to two weeks 
before the actual. separation in order to allow 
time for adjustment, but not sufficient to 
encourage reconciliation fantasies. The child 
should be told the real reason for the divorce or 
separation at his level of understanding. Secrets 
finally result iri a lack of understanding, 
distorted fantasies and possible mistrust of 
parents, when the children most need a_trusting 
relationship. Gardner does not discourage parental 
criticism of each other in front of the children, 
as he feels the children are not unaware of their 
parents!_ disillusionment with ea~h other and 
would be dustrusful if their parents hid their 
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real feelings. He also feels that children need 
to see both their parents' strengths and weak-
' 
nesses as a way of learning tolerance of 
deficiencies in others. Musetta (1978) adds 
that children need to see that neither parent 
is solely responsible for the breakup, scape-
goated or idealized. Parents find this a 
difficult task to achieve. Rosen (1979) found 
that of the 92 children she had interviewed in 
her study, 35 felt that they had not been given 
satisfactory explanations regarding the reasons 
for the divorce. 
(2) The manner in which'the parental models express 
their feelings to the child will determine the 
way the child's expression or suppression of. 
feelings is encouraged or limited (Gardner, 1977). 
Parents should be encouraged to be emotionally 
open to their children. 
(3) Children should feel free and be encouraged to 
question the situation, repeatedly if necessary, 
and feel safe that in doing so their parents will 
continue to be available to them. Parents should 
therefore be prepa~ed for this and be ~~pported 
by the counsellor (Gardner, 1977). 
(4) Parents need to be educated as to the natural and 
inevitable reactions and feelings they can expect 
from their children at this time (Gardner, 1977). 
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Seagull & Seagull (1977), suggest three factors 
that could ease the transition for the child. 
(a) Being reassured that he was in no 
way responsible for the divorce, and 
that both parents still love him 
despite it. This needs to be re-
inforced, particularly when it emerges 
through the childis fantasies, that he 
feels he should be able to change the 
situation. 
(b) Being assured the right by both 
parents to love the other parent, 
(c) Being presented with clearly defined 
sets of values and rules by each parent 
in their own home without being faced 
with challenges by either parent of the 
other's rules which could exacerbate a 
loyalty conflict. 
(5) Gardner (1978) urges that parents wishing to divorce 
be warned of the dangers of courtroom litigation as 
a method of resolving their dispute and impressed 
that the decision as to where the children live would 
best be made by themselves. They should also be 
helped to "view their lawyers as their servants and 
advisors, not as people who rule them or make final 
·decisions for them regarding- custody". 
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3.3.2 EXISTING PROGRAMS 
Young {1978{a); l978{b)) describes a four hour compulsory 
pilot educational program set up by the Allen County Court 
in Indiana over a period of nine weeks for pre-divorce parents 
which focussed on the instruction of parents in didactic 
groups on 
{a) the legal-financial aspect of divorce, 
{b) coping with children during divorce and 
{c) understanding their own feelings during the 
divorce process •. 
Its purpose was to prepare them and encourage them to seek 
further help where necessary. 
The immediate responses to this program indicated that those 
who were particularly concerned about their divorce before 
held higher hopes for the usefulness of the workshop and were 
pleased with the overall result. 91% of the women participants 
felt that they would voluntarily attend such a workshop again 
and 90% felt that they could recommend it to others. The authors 
felt that such a program provided both emotional/supportive 
information-problem solving resources at a time of distress and 
contact with a judge/lecturer tended to have a desensitization 
effect of.the Co~rt system. On a three month follow up, the 
31% of participants who responded expressed some decline in 
the satisfaction previously expressed. 34+% and 50% felt 
respectively that the experience had been of •great• v~lue and 
of •so~e· v~lue to them, 37%, 25% and 21% felt respectiv~ly 
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that information on children•s reactions to the divorce, the 
legal and the personal experience aspects of the experiences 
were most useful. 
The Family Court in Minneapolis runs a similar program of 
educational seminars over three sessions for divorcing parents, 
but in addition to this, children are invited to group meetings 
which are divided into age groupings in which divorce related 
issues are discussed (Fine, 1980). 
Watson (1969) stressed the need to explain as much of the 





4. DIVORCE CONCILIATION - MEDIATION 
Once the decision has been made by the couple and divorce 
becomes inevitable, divorce conciliation or mediation becomes 
the method or procedure of choice in the settlement of all 
the ancillary issues. It is the approach which is most 
congruent with the belief that families need to maintain 
their autonomy and privacy and take responsibility for ·lthe 
expeditious resolution of disputes in order to maintain 
stability and continuity of the relationships of th; children 
with both their parents (Mnookin~ 1975; Mlyniec, 1977-78; 
Harvard Law Review, 1980; Brown, 1982). The point is also 
stressed that decisions made by people have an increased 
chance of compliance resulting in reduced litigation at a 
later stage (Elkin, 1977). 
Mediation, in which a neutral third party helps two disputing 
parties to resolve their conflict, is an extremely ancient 
method of conflict resolution which has been succes~fully used 
in modern times for labour management disputes.in industry. 
Its use in divorced family disputes is still however very new 
and as a result is still struggling to define itself in this 
field. 
11Mediation does not cause, support or encourage divorce. Rather 
it simply -provides a mean-s for resolving disputes, restructuring 
family relationships, and promoting the best interests of the 
children once-divorce .has become inevitable .. (Brown, 1982, p.9). 
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Mediation provides a procedural structure to certain conflict 
areas and to foster cooperation and settlement. The primary 
focus is conflict resolution by the parents themselves (Weiss 
& Collada, 1977), out of court (Fine, 1980). The issues dealt 
with in mediation cover "the assignment of properties and goods 
to each party; dissolution of the dependency relationships 
between the marital couple and how, for example, they are going 
to react to mutual friends, arrange church, clubs and sports 
group affiliations; discussions of the caring for the children 
where each parent draws up two programs (for whether he or the 
spouse gets the children). It is found that there is remarkable 
agreement on how the children should be cared for and only 
finally is custody discussed" (Fine, 1980, p.356). 
It has been shown that standards used by parents in negotiating 
custody arrangements were largely the same as those considered 
by the courts (Alexander, 1977) and as parents inevitably know 
better their own qualities and capabilities they are c)early 
better suited_~o make decisions in the child's best interests. 
The process of mediation varies. Rubin and Brown (1975, in 
Brown, 1982, p.l4) work at "reducing irrationality in the parties, 
by preventing personal recriminations and focussing and re-
focussing on actual issues, by exploring alternative solutions 
and making it possible for the parties to retreat or make 
concessions without losing face or respect, by increasing 
constructive communications between the parties, by reminding 
the parties of the costs of the conflict and the consequences of 
unresolved disputes, and by providing a mediator model of 
competence, integrity and fairness". 
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Others have placed more emphasis on the need for dealing with 
a certain amount of emotional material. Weiss and Collada 
(1977) see the need, in order to enable parents at times to 
adopt a cooperative spirit, to remove a blockage which may be 
caused by hostility, by allowing appropriate ventilation of 
these feelings. They also encourage focussing on the positive 
facets of each parent's wishes and concerns, thus promoting the 
mother and father roles. Duquette (1978) adds the need to 
provide the parents with insight into the child's psychological 
needs. For Weiss & Collada (1977), this includes the need of 
the child for a continued relationship with both parents. 
Derdeyne (1975) stresses the importance of parents' understanding 
of how their continued conflict hinders the ways in which the · 
child copes with his conflicts of loyalty. 
Mnookin (1975) suggests that mediation in a family therapy 
situation with a therapist and arbitrator lawyer would also 
~>serve the purpose of stopping the destructive games that are 
' 
··played out so that decisions can be based on affection for the 
child and mutual self interest. 
· 4.1 MEDIATION - WHEN? . 
The stage in the dissolution procedure at which mediation is 
attempted depends largely on ·the system wi~hin which one works. 
Spencer and Zammit ( 1976 in Brown, 1982, p. 16) , proposed a 
mediation-arbitration model consisting of 3 elements: 
"(1) The use of a mental health professional or 
marriage and family ~ounsellor who ~auld assist 
the couple in drafting a custody/visitation agreement, 
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(2) participation of the same specialist in a required 
mediation process to deal with issues that arise 
in working out the agreement, and 
(3) submission of any post-mediated unresolved issues 
to arbitration ... 
Such an approach supports the principal goal of mediation 
which is to see that only cases where settlements cannot be 
achieved by the disputing parties themselves be referred to 
court (Mnookin, 1975). 
The program used by the Child Advocacy Unit (CAU) of 
Philadelphia works on a 4 stage model in which mediation 
constitutes the second stage and follows the discovery phase 
(O'Shea and Connery, 1980). 
Suggestions have been made that referrals for mediation be made 
. by the judge at the time disputed cases are set down for hearing 
(Duquette, 1978), or after the first session with the lawyer 
(Steinberg, 1980). 
Basically, however, the mediation model should be available to 
the family at any stage during the process of dissolution, 
whether this be after an adversary action has been set in 
motion, or after the divorce order has been granted~ where 
disputes need to.be resolved and parents are willing to use 
this approach. 
4.2 · MEDIATION - WHO? 
On the question of who .should take the role of pre-divorce 
counsellor and mediator there exists a tremendous lack of 
.: 
-60-
consensus. The fear has also been expressed that with the 
rising rate of divorce, the increased need for this service 
and the lack of adequately qualified persons, the probability 
of charlatans posing as marriage counsellors will increa~e 
(Kaplan, 1969). 
Professionally, this role has been considered the function of 
both mental health workers and legal practitioners. In practice 
many attorneys; while seeing a conflict between the two roles, 
adopted the elements of.both the role of the traditional stereo-
typed attorney who sought maximum benefits for their clients, 
striving to win and de-emphasizing the emotional and social 
issues, and of the lawyer-counsellor, attempting to seek 
solutions fair to both parties with an aim to a reasonable 
settlement (Harman et al., 1979). In a survey conducted by 
these authors, 86% of the attorneys who participated stated 
their doubt about their ability to reduce conflict and strain 
in divorce and felt reluctant because of a lack of training and 
skills in counselling. They thus tended tb avoid dealing with 
the emotional issues or focussing on the child and dealt instead 
on the efficiency of the process and economic matters. 
Another problem faced by lawyers attempting to practice law and 
mediation is the difficulty of working with spouses an9 the 
ethical question of advising two parties with inherently opposite 
interests (Brown, 1982). A solution to this problem may well lie 
in the appointment of a legal representative for the child, which 
can also occur within a team approach, as at the Child Advocacy 
Unit (CAU in Philadelphia {O'Shea & Connery, 1980). 
Kay {1968, p.l21) suggests that the inclusion of mental health 
professionals would "free the lawyer from his present role as an 
/ 
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amateur family therapist and allow him to devote himself to 
the legal aspects of family dissolution such as division of 
property, establishment and enforcement of support and the 
protection of the children". 
A prediction has been made, however, that lawyers will 
increasingly object to counsellors as divorce mediators as this 
involves them in the unauthorized practice of law (Woody, 1981, 
in Brown, 1982). 
The point to be made, however, is that mediation involves both 
psychosocial and legal components and problems, and thus 
requires interdisciplinary cooperation and teamwork. Collaboration 
by an attorney-therapist team (Steinberg, 1980) and the team of 
legal and social professionals of the CAU of Philadelphia (O'Shea 
and Connery, 1980) are attempts to incorporate this concept. 
4.3 MEDIATION - A SEPARATE SPECIALIZATION 
While the question of who mediates remains unresolved, the 
feeling has been expressed that mediation represents a 
qualitatively different service from either legal representation, 
or therapeutic counselling and marriage and family-therapy 
(Koopman and Hunt, 1981, in Brown, 1982). Thus divorce/family 
mediation should not simply be tacked on to existing disciplines 
but should become a separate and complementary profession to the 
l_egal and mental health professions, 11 free of all conflicts of 
interests in professional loyalties, professional philosophy 
and professional function'' (ibid, p.4). The need for specialized 
training has therefore been raised (Richards, 1981). 
Those presently involved in the field in America have received 
at least some training in the mental health, and/or marital and 
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family therapy disciplines. Specialized training in divorce/ 
family mediation and conflict management programs have developed 
very rapidly and short term training is widely available. More 
than a dozen divorce/mediation groups or associations provide 
short term training, and 6 long term programs in the form of/ 
' 
academic courses and degrees at universities exist 1n the United 
States of America (Brown, 1982). 
Brown (p.22) has suggested that such topics as .''principles of 
negotiation, bargaining, and conflict resolution; understandirig 
the process and stages of divorce, survey of legal, financial 
and tax aspects of divorce; surveys of laws relating to divorce 
and review of the judicial process; assessment of the divorcing 
couple and fa1ily; effects of divorce on children; factors in 
child custody/visitation disputes; systems theory in family 
dynamics; and behavioural reinforcement marriage therapy 
principles", should.be included in training programs. 
4.4 ETHICS 
The need to establish a set of standards, qualifications, and 
a code of ethics in this new field has been proposed. Brown 
(1982) suggests that a list of ethical principles should include: 
"(1) Divorcing couples should be given the choice of 
mediation or adversarial representation based on 
a thorough explanation of the respective processes; 
(2) For couples who decide on mediation, a written 
contract should be used which specifies the cost, 
procedures, guidelines, and desired outcome of 
the process; 
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(the above points have previously been made by Duquette, 1978). 
(3) Mediation should not be conducted with a client when 
the mediator is seeing, or has seen them, in 
individual therapy or for legal representation; 
(4) Impartiality should be maintained throughout the 
process; 
(5) The mediator should determine whether both parties 
are capable of informed, independent, reasonable 
decisions about all aspects of their divorce as well 
as the negotiation process; 
(6) The mediator should require a full and complete 
disclosure by both parties of all relevant property, 
investment, tax and other financial data; 
(7) Confidentiality of the mediation process should be 
maintained at all times, subject only to requirements 
of the law; 
(Duquette, 1978, takes this point one step further but suggests 
that mediation material should not be subject to subpoena even 
where arbitration is called for). 
(8) Clients should be encouraged to seek specialized help 
such as financial or tax consultation if needed 
during the course of mediation as well as an outside, 
legal review of the proposed settlement prior to 
finalizing the agreement; 
(9) Mediation should be discontinued if, in the judgement 
of the mediator, either party is being exploited or 
harmed by the other; and 
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(10) The mediator is obligated to maintain current 
knowledge of developments and participate in 
continuing ~ducation experiences relevant to 
legal, judicial, legislative, and psycho-
logical factors affecting the practice of . 
divorce/family mediation 11 (p.23). 
4.5 LENGTH OF MEDIATION PROCESS 
The number of sessions per case has varied greatly but ~ould 
seem on the average to be between 6 to 7 sessions for 
successful cases and 4 sessions for·unsuccessful cases. The 
duration of sessions tends to vary greatly, from l to 4 hours. 
Family sessions of up to 5 hours in length have also been 
reported. 
4.6 THE SETTLEMENT 
Once negotiated and mutually agreed upon, Weiss and Collada 
(1977) propose that each party present the terms of the settle-
ment as they understand them to their attorney, who then 
prepares a draft which is presented to court for.approval to 
finally become a court order. Only custody arrangements that 
could harm the child should be intervened with and then only 
when there is sufficient cause shown (Harvard Law Review, l980). 
4.7 VOLUNTARY OR MANDATORY MEDIATION? 
Frederick (1975) feels that the creative 'explorer' has no 
difficulty in accepting court enforced conciliation as it is 
directed towards helping the family formulate their own guide-
lines for the coriduct of their post divorce relationships. 
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Mnookin (1975) in addition emphasizes that the 'bite' that 
such a mandatory system possesses would go far in ensuring 
compliance to such family formulated resolutions. 
4.8 THE ADVANTAGES OF MEDIATION over the adversary process have 
been tabulated in detail by Brown {1982) (see Appendix III). 
Some of the major advantages.inc1ude the following: 
(1) Reduction of time taken to arrive at an agreement 
(Steinberg, 19.80; Brown, 1982). Parker (1980 in 
Brown~ 1982) found that mediation required less 
than 1/2 as long as the adversary approach to 
arrive at an agreement. 
(2) Mediation is based on co-operation rather than 
competition between parents, as it focuses on 
problem solving of present issues rather than blame 
and revenge based on past behaviour; it aims to 
reduce emotional trauma for parents and children 
and encourages continuity of relationships, 
beliefs and values (Duquette, 1978; Steinberg, 
1980; Brown, 1982). Mnookin (1975) notes that 
_the attainment of agreement between spouses reduces 
the sense of losing and winning, and any animosity 
and hostility that might have been present. 
(3) As a result of a decreased need for court hearings 
the cost to the state and clients is substantially 
reduced (Mnookin, 1975; Weiss & Collada, 1977). 
Mediation at the Los Angeles Conciliation Court was 
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estimated at approximately 1/4 of the cost of the 
adversarial approach and saved the court thousands 
of dollars annually (Brown, 1982). 
(4) Post divorce litigation was greatly reduced in 
mediated cases (Weiss & Collada, 1977; Steinberg, 
1980). Brown (1982) estimated that mediated cases 
were 3 times less likely to return to court for 
post divorce .litigation. The reasons suggested 
were that, 
(a) decisions reached by the parents themselves 
were more likely to be respected and worked 
on than those imposed by a court (Elkin, 1977, 
Brown, 1982), and 
(b) that negotiated terms were bound to be more 
reasonable (Steinberg, 1980L In a 
comparative study by Bahr (1981, reported by 
Brown, 1982), 100% of mediated touples felt 
the monetary/property settlement was fair as 
opposed to 49% of the adversarial sample. 
On the custody/access issue, 96% of mediated 
as opposed to 86% of the adversary sample felt 
satisfied with the arrangements. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5. THE ADVERSARY SOLUTION 
Despite all the opportunities and encouragement provided in 
order that parents make their own compromise to resolve their 
divorce related disputes through mediation, an estimated 10% 
of families will fail to reach agreement {Weiss and Callada, 
1977). 
These are the parents who, for whatever reason, either to win 
at any cost, for revenge or embitterment or genuine concern 
for the children•s welfare, are not able to settle their 
disputes themselves and require intervention of an outside 
arbitrator to impose a solution on them based on the best 
interest of the child. It is the Court as upper guardian of 
all minors that takes on this function. 
The court in turn commonly turns to psychiatrists, psychologists, 
pediatricians and social workers for assistance. The mental 
health professional brought in at this stage has a very different 
role to play from either counsello~/confidant or mediator, 
although all mediatory attempts to settle are never abandoned. 
In this chapter the concepts of child advocacy and the best 
interests principle, two central features of the adversary 
system and the role of the mental health professional as 
investigator, evaluator and expert will be examined. 
The first section will attempt to define the concept of child 
advocacy and compare the ideal to the way child advocacy has 
traditionally been practiced. It will examine the legal team 
approach and attempt to .clarify the role of the mental health 
profession based on this model. 
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5.1 CHILD ADVOCACY 
The child advocate ensures through tho~ough investigations, 
evaluations and carefully considered opinions, that the child's 
best interests remain adequately protected. 
The term 'child advocate' has already been used with reference 
to the legal representative for the child. It is therefo~e 
appropriate and necessary at this stage to define briefly the 
concept of child advocacy and on this basis evaluate the 
traditional child advocacy syste~ before presenting an ideal 
model of child advocacy in the true sense of the word. 
Very briefly the Child Advocacy approach exposes the world as 
the child experiences it. It involves 
(a) knowing the child, 
(b) knowing the child's needs and 
(c) possessing competence and knowledge to speak for 
the child (Westman, 1979) 
and, above all, 
(d) an ability to objectively assess what constitutes the 
best interests of the child (Goldstein, 1973; Wilcox, 
1976; The Yale Law Journal, 1978). 
For the majority of children caught up in divorce disputes the 
responsibility for ensuring that their best interests are 
protected, both in the outcome or final settlement and the 
process by which this is achieved, is entrusted to .the parents, 
l .. 
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their counsel and the Court except when at the discretion of1 
any of the above a legal representative is appointed for the 
child or when expert advice is sought. 
5.1.1 PARENTS AS CHILD ADVOCATES 
The delegated authority and responsibility of parents for 
their children forms the basis of the concept of child 
advocacy. Ideally, in families held intact by affectionate 
bonds and mutual dependency, the interests of parents and 
their children remain largely complementary and parents are 
presumed best suited to represent their children•s best 
interests (Goldstein et al., 1973). Even in dissolving 
marriage the vast majority of parents (90%) are able to 
negotiate'and resolve .the issues of custody and access reasonably 
and in the best interests of their children (Mnookin, 1975). 
When disputes between parents over these issues arise and 
reach the stage where litigation becomes the only recourse, the· 
atmosphere, usually highly emotionally charged and fuelled by 
the stakes of each in the outcome, results in parents getting 
caught up in the further upsetting and confusing damage of 
accusations, exaggerated demands and frenzied bargaining which 
tend to constitute the legal games played by Counsel, the rules 
of which are not always understood by the litigants (Bradbrook, 
1971; Harvard Law Review, 1980). 
~ 
The end result is the loss by the parents of all ability for 
cool objective reasoning in which the interests of the child 
are protected (Wilcox, 1976). 
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Many support the observation that a great number of children, 
in disputed cases, form part of the bargaining process in 
which they are dis~osed of in exchange for advantageous 
property and support terms or as a means of punishment and 
revenge by the parties (Hansen, 1964; Watson, 1969; 
Bodenheimer, 1971; Goldstein, 1973; Alexander, 1977). 
Clearly, in this situation, parents are no longer able to 
act as advocates for their children in the true sense of the 
word. 
Other situations in which the same could be said are when the 
-· 
psychological needs of the parent for the child becomes so 
intense.that the relationship no longer permits the necessary 
process for the child of individuation and growth towards 
self fulfillment (Mlyniec, 1977-78; Westman, 1979), or when a 
third party becomes involved in the dispute for custody 
· (Alexander, 1977). 
5.1.2. PARENTS• COUNSEL AS CHILD ADVOCATES 
It has been suggested that if legal representatives for the 
parties were more responsible, separate representation for the 
child would be unnecessary (Schaffer, 1981). It is further 
stated that lawyers are ethically bound to represent the best 
interests of the child in disputed custody/uccess cases 
(Westman, 1971). It has become quite·obvious, however, that 
the role of the child 1 S advocate and that of counsel for the 
parties are quite incompatible. 
. .... . 
·-,. 
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The attorney's role is one of an agent .who manages the 
prosecution or defense of ~ legal claim· processed ·by a 
client, so although he may render advice, the authority 
to make decisions rests entirely with the client (Galligan, 
1973). His role is also determined by the nature of the 
adversary system so much that as Counsel for one party he 
acts to prove his client 'fit' and 'good' while attempting 
to show the other as being 'unfit' and 'bad' as a parent 
for the child (Watson, 1969). 
As, advocate for the child he is expected at all times to 
give paramount consideration to the child's interests, both 
in outcome and in the process of such determinations. 
In the first place, Galligan (1973, p.ll) points out, "it 
is unreasonable to anticipate that counsel will be able to 
detach themselves from the interest of clients who retain 
them •... to view objectively the welfare of the children", and 
further that it might be "in breach of 'Counsel's' ethical 
duty to his client to advance what he may objectively think is 
in the best interests of the children if that is contrary to 
his own client's interest". 
This conflict has been recognized and expressed by others, 
(Watson, 1969; Westman, 1971; Foster, 1972; Foster and 
Freed, 1973-74~. Derdeyn, 1975; Wilcox, .1976 and Brown, 1982). 
~ second reason for a lack of confidence in a lawyer as advocate 
for the child has been the noted insensitivity of many to the 
emoti6nal results of the proc~dure~ used (Watson, 1969) and their 
lack of training in the field of behavioural science. 
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Duquette (1978, p.l93) quotes Robins (1975), a past Chairman 
of the Family Law Section of the Michigan State Bar 
Association: " •••.• nor do I know of any area of the law 
where there is such a dearth of expertise among the lawyers 
who try the cases and the Judges who hear them. Certainly 
the law school curriculum does not prepare the ~tudent for 
this type of litigation, other than purely procedural aspects. 
Guidance must be obtained from the behavioural scientist". 
This situation has clearly started to change in the United 
States over the past 2 years with the intlusion of counselling 
cours~s in law school curricula. 
5.1.3 THE COURT AS CHILD ADVOCATE 
In the adversary system of law, the Judges' role is that of 
neutral triers of facts as presented by counsel for the 
parties (Coyne, 1969). They hear evidence of proof and 
argument by counsel in favour of their clients. This evidence 
of past events is assessed and evaluated ~gainst articulated 
and ~escribed legal presumptions and standards as judgements 
are made. 
Judges are first and foremost lawyers learned in the law·and 
versed in the rules and procedure in order that th~ purpose of 
the law may be made ~ffective and the individual's rights 
respect~d (Zuckerman, 1969). · 
In disputed custody/access determination certain essential 
differences are noted: 
(l) Determinations .are person rather than act orientated. 
Persons are evaluated as social beings based on .their 
attitudes, dispositions, capacities and shortcomings. 
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(2) Determinations are based largely on present events 
and relationships rather than past acts. 
·(3) Determinations are based on predictions of future 
events for the child and 
(4) Determinations affect the continued social and 
psychological relationship of the parents (Mnookin, 
1975). 
The Judges function is also clearly twofold. He is firstly 
required to act as an arbitrator in a private dispute settle-
ment where he is expected to choose between two or more 
private individuals, each of whom claims an associated interest 
in the child, and secondly as an advocate for the best interests 
of the child to see that the standards of parental behaviour 
thought necessary to protect the child are enforced (Westman, 
1979), each of which requires the consideration of different 
sets of standards. 11 Many times, they seem to be saying one 
thing and doing another - espousing the su·premacy of the 
child 1 s interest but subordinating it to the parent•s rights 
. . 
when the two conflict .. (Rothenberg, 1981, p.l35). 
The role of the Judge therefore has significant inherent 
problems. 
(1) The Court in reaching its judgement relies on the 
presentation of a comprehensive and objective data 
base. The problem, in a system of law geared 
towards asserting the rights of parents is that, 
except where .the Court has undertaken or requested 
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an independent investigation, the evidence which 
is exposed is highly selective (Dyson & Dyson, 
1968), often incomplete (Westman, 1979), presented 
out of context, inaccurate, or exaggerated or 
distorted (Mnookin, 1975). 
A survey of judicial attitudes revealed a statement by Judge 
Moorhouse that .. the real problem for the judiciary is that 
they never get a true unbiased picture 11 (Watson, 1969). One 
of the adversary Court's basic problems is therefore a lack 
of necessary and relevant information. 
(2) Judges are often faced with complicated issues and 
technical information from experts which they are 
expected to weigh up in the process of predicting 
the best alternative for the child. Unfortunately, 
an impression repeatedly expressed has been that on 
the whole they lack familiarity with the contributions 
of the social sciences concerning the-psychological 
mechanics of divorce and child development (Kay, 1968; 
Watson, 1969; Foster, 1972; Goldstein et al., 1973, 
Wi 1 cox, 1976; Duquette, 1978, Rothenberg, 1981 ) . 
Finlay and Fold (1971; p.90), ask 11 How can a Judge 
untrained in the behavioural sciences assess the 
real effect upon the developing psyche of a child 
who is the subject of a custody order, of the arrange-
ments therein proposed 11 • 
This has become an increasing problem as the traditional system 
of rules and standards has broadened and become highly 
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individualized, often resulting in an impossible choice 
between two fit parents {Cyne, 1969; Westman, 1979), which 
requires increased discretion on the part of these ·Judges. 
The result of this state of affairs is judgements, made by 
intuitive evaluation based on unspoken personal values and 
unproven prediction (Mnookin, 1975) which give token reference 
to the best interest rule (Wilcox, 1976). 
(3) The difficulties experienced by Judges in this 
field, combined with their noted desire to be 
quite correct in their decisions, as well as 
perhaps their inability to cope-with their own· 
and the litigant•s responses to such painful 
decisions may result in either •a decision 
paralysis• or the forcing of settlement of cases 
by counsel even before they come to court 
(Watson, 1969; Mnookin, 1975). This avoidance 
of responsibility for making such decisions is 
seen as a failure in the duty of the tourt towards 
their minors to making such determinations based 
on adequate hearings directed to relevant issues 
(Podell, 1973). 
(4) Despite the earlier expressed reluctance on the. 
part of Judges to look to the psycholqgical 
professionals as expert witnesses for assistance 
in these matters (Foster and Freed, 1964; 
Brad brook, 1971; Rothenber_g, 1981). Swerdlow 
(1978) in a more recent survey undertaken in 
California, found that, altho~gh onlY 160 'Judges 
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responded to a questionnaire which was distributed 
to 509 Judges; 6£% of these indicated that they 
util~zed mental health services in connection with 
family law proceedings, mainly on a selective 
discretionary basis. 
(5) Another real problem is the pressure of time in 
often crowded courts. Wilcox (1976) concludes 
that with ~uch over-crowding, irisufficient training 
and limited resources 11 the child•s predicament does 
not receive sufficient scrutiny thus resulting in 
the •rubber stamp approach• of accepting agreements 
reached by counsel for the adult parties. 
Many suggestions have been made to remove or reduce the responsi-
bility of the courst in custody/access determinations considered 
a social rather than a judicial problem. Kubie (1964) proposed 
the formation of a committee of professionals in the field of 
child development appointed by the parties to make decisions for 
the family, but this had practical difficulties and was never 
adopted. 
This solution has again been raised by Rothenberg (1981) who 
expounds the need for the creation of an agency with staff 
qualified from the psychological, social and educational fields 
who would function as arbitrators whose findings would be final. 
The obvious advantages are that decisions would not be hurried, 
procedures could be informal, cooperation would be strived for 
and decisions ~ould refl~ct qualified and knowledgeable opinions. 
.· 
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Watson (1969) proposed that behavioural science professionals 
sit with the divorce court Judge much as experienced assessors 
sit with Judges in civil and criminal mattets. Solow and 
Adams (1977) suggest that the most qualified to make such 
evaluation is the investigating clinician. The courts 
however guard their decision making power and society itself 
continues to look to them for legal solutions to family problems. 
W~stman· ( 1979), however, suggests that where the true advocacy 
approach has been adhered to, the court removes itself from the 
process of making personal decisions for families and concentrate 
instead on monitoring processes at an administrative level. 
The questions he feels the court should be asking are: 
11 (1) Was there a full and fair opportunity for exploration 
of facts and opposing views? 
(2) Was there adherence to the requirements of the law? 
(3) Was information rationally applied to reach the 
ultimate conclusions?.. (p.288). 
It has also been argued that due to the potentially high 
emotional ~ature of such decisions there must be a figure of 
authority to ratify and enforce the final decision or settlement. 
This is seen as properly vested in the Courts (Der.deyn, 1975). 
5.1.4 THE CHILD REPRESENTATIVE AS CHILD ADVOCATE 
It is of significance that in South Africa (as in most other 
systems) the child who is most ~ff~cted by a dispute has no 
party status in such litigation.· Some Courts .have become more 
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aware that the best interest of the child may not be best 
represented by parent orientated advocacy and have made 
genuine attempts at considering the best· interest of the 
child as primary (Franklin and 1 HHbbs, 1980). 
The evidence of tension between on the one hand, the rights 
of children and on the othei, their parents, their counsel 
and the compromised position of the courts, demands that the 
right of children to due process, equal protection, appropriate 
care and treatment be met, (Westman, 1979). One person able to 
fulfill such needs is the legal representative for the child. 
Many different titles and role conceptions have emerged in 
America for what is termed the legal child representative, which 
has left this position sadly lacking in definition and clarity. 
The role of the legal representative for the child is dependent 
~ on the status ~iven to the child as a party in the dispute. 
Where statutes have conferred full party status on the child, 
the role of the adversarial attorney becomes that of advocate 
for the child•s stated preference (Wilcox, 1976; The Yale Law 
Journal, 1978). Westman (1979) warns, however, that the simple 
extension of adult rights to children is in fact tantamount to 
abandoning them completely unprepared\to their rights. He 
argues that inherent to legal rights is the assumption of the 
capacity for assuming responsibility for o~e·s own life. 
As most children are unable to articulate their own needs and 
possess a limited capacity to function as mature.independent 
members of soci~ty, their legally protected rights should intlude 
.. protection against their own immaturity so that they have the 




At the other extreme the •fact finder• sees himself primarily 
as an impartial investigator who assures that all considerations 
regarding the child•s best interests are brought to the court•s 
attention, including, as one of the factors, the child 1 s 
preference {Frederick, 1975). 
In practice, however, it was found that most lawyers took on 
characteristics inconsistent with their formal role so that at 
times, •advocates• tended to protect the child even when this 
counteracted with the child 1 s expressed views, counselled the 
parents and attended to the child 1 S emotional needs during 
litigation, attempted mediation between parties to facilitate 
understanding and acceptance. •fact finders• also found it 
, necessary at times to attempt to persuade the Judge and to hold 
back information in order to reduce conflict. 
The role of child advocate cannot simply be restricted to •tact 
finder• or •advocate• as each on their own preclude the very 
protection sought by the provision of legal -representation for 
children. 
The unique and quite powerful position of the child•s attorney 
would both enable the uncovering of different kinds of 
information and the motivation and even pressurizing of parties 
and their counsel towards mediation of conflicts and settlements 
out of court, as suggested by th~ Yale Law·Journal (1978). 
I 
Nevertheless, the dangers of this very power have also been 
recognized. The legal representative who possesses the authority, 
as suggested by Pod~ll, 1973, to gain access to .all parties and 
information, to ·subpoena witnesses·, argue, and make representations • 
to court, possesses a power effectively greater than either that 
of the tradition~l attorney or Judge, and potentially threatens 
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a situation where a stated or actual. interest of the child 
may be ignored, while the interest, as perceived by the 
guardian, often psychologically untrained, is presented 
I 
(Mlyniec, 1977-78). 
5.1.5.1. A TRUE ADVOCACY MODEL 
With the advo~acy model envisaged by Westman (1979), this 
problem would largely be resolved. Westman has listed what 
he would consider to be the central characteristics of a 
child advocacy approach: 
(1) Systems Bridging which involves the building up 
of a thorough understanding about all the systems 
that make up the child's world in order to see the 
child as an independent part of the family, society 
and culture. It follows from this understanding 
that in each child the problem is a combination of 
emotional, intellectual, cognitive-behavioural, 
family and social problems differing in degree, 
and that any categorization of the child leads to 
a fractional and disconnected management of a part 
of the child's problem by professionals. 
In child custody problems bridging requires collabora~ion with 
others in the child's sphere, mediation and finally the 
adversarial system where opposition is brought to bear thr·ough 
pressure and coercion. 
(2) A Developmental Orientation which takes into account 
the age of the child, his current dependency needs 
and. stage of individ.uation, and aims to facilitate 
child development and adaptation. 
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(3) Conflict Resolution for both inevitable conflict 
within the divorce situation and optional conflicts 
based on hostility. Conflicts between the child's 
wishes and ultimate interests all need to be 
resolved. 
(4) Fact finding so that resolution is based on knowledge 
of individual children and their life circumstances 
rather than on generalizations. 
(5) Interdisciplinary team work requiring interdisciplin-
ary integration and coordination. 
(6) Protection and promotion of the equal rights of 
children 
Westman states however that advocacy cannot represent the rights 
and needs of the child apart from the parents, it requires the 
capacity to provide the child's interests and the congruent 
interests to those who are essential to the child's welfare. 
He concludes that there is no one professional person 11 With 
sufficient knowledge and background to put together the facts 
about the child's life experience, bridge the legal and mental 
health system, and make convincing argument for the termination 
of parental rights in court 11 (p.189). True advocacy as defined 
above requires at least a team approach. 
A lawyer can provide for the child the authority required to 
ensure the implementation and monitoring of reasonable life 
plans for children. However, the training and skills required 
to evaluate, assess the child's emotional state, needs, and 
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the developmental stage of each individual child as well as 
the system impinging upon them, falls within the purview of 
the mental health professional. 
5.1.5.2 The team approach in which each professional offers thejr 
own expertise in working for the child is one that has 
gathered much support (Watson, 1969; Duquette, 1978; Woody, 
1978; Warner and Elliott, 1979; Felner and Faber, 1980; 
Steinberg, 1980; Bentovim and Gilmour, 1981). 
The Child Advocacy Unit of Philadelphia has established 
collaborative strategies within an interdisciplinary team of 
legal and social service professionals whose approach is non 
adversary with respect to parents and whose goal is to 
preserve the family unit where possible, while their primary 
responsibility remains the protection of the personal safety 
of the child client {O'Shea & Connery, 1980). 
Ideal as this approach is, certain problems r·emairi inherent 
in this working relationship. The major barrier that both 
professionals face is their vastly differing philosophical 
orientations, traditions and values, lack of trust in each 
other, their pursuance of different goals (Steinberg, 1980). 
Mental health professionals are not trained to understand legal 
procedure, philosophy and phraseology, and lawyers are untrained 
in psychological teachings, techniques and interpr~tations of 
psychometric and behavioural material (o•shea & Connery, 1980). 
Lawyers also need to see therapy as medicine and clinical 
evaluation as X-rays (Alexander, 1980). 
Despite these net unsurmountable difficulties and challenges, 
there are.e great number of advantages of such a 'collaborative' 
\ 
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approach both in the mediation, investigation and evaluation 
stages, with which Steinberg (1980) has dealt in detail. To 
summarise, these include: 
(1) Better information gathering in which selectively 
presented information from clients is shared so 
that each gains more accurate insight on which to 
base settlements. 
(2) Timely referrals would be more likely as the 
tendency to postpone interdisciplinary referrals 
would be reduced. Referrals wou1d also lead to 
increased professional potency as 
(a) lawyers would be spared with having to 
deal with emotional issues which com-
plicate the legal resolutions and 
(b) clients heading for marital breakdown 
would be referred to 1 a.,.1yers who would 
serve to introduce a sense of reality 
into the process and deal with the legal 
issues for which the therapist is not 
qualified. 
(3) Creativity in the solution of problems of divorce 
is fostered by use of such interdisciplinary referrals 
and consultations. 
(4) The timing or modulating of the process of divorce is 
best coordinated through interdiscipl·inary consul tat ion 
so that spouses are not taken through the process at a 
pace with which they are not able to cope emotionally. 
\ 
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(5) The uncovering of the real issues that may be 
blocking the resolution of divorce or ancillary 
matters is facilitated. 
(6) Mutual support which serves to avert the adversary 
process and protects the client's progress and 
interests avoids a sense of isolation. 
(7) Replacing cynical expectations about the legal 
system and the therapeutic process which are 
largely the result of stereotyping, abstractions 
and ignorance transmitted by each profession about 
the other, with knowledge, experience and 
concerned people. 
(8) Exposing in each and for each profession those 
prepared and suited to work in this field. 
(9) Exposing each profession to the other sets up a 
continuous process of ~ducation and sensitivity to 
the other's values, capabilities and appreciation 
of the other's function. Contact develops 
familiarity and understanding (O'Shea & Connery, 
1980). 
(10) Creative changes introduced by an interdiscipiinary 
team become sponsored by the client who then becomes 
responsible for gradual changes in social values, 
which, when generally accepted, become incorporated 
into the legal system. 
5.1.6 
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Westman (1979J adds, with legal and mental health collaboration 
even the courtroom proceeding can be conducted in a supportive 
and therapeutic manner. 
Bentovim and Gilmour (1981) stress the support and shar~ng of 
responsibility that teamwork provides in the often stressful 
and difficult role with which both professions are faced. 
They further advocate the differentiated approach of team work 
by which different points of view are brought to bear on the 
evaluations of each situation. 
The Clinician as Child Advocate in Disputed Custody/ 
Access Cases 
In terms of Westman's Child Advocacy model the court can only 
come to an informed decision by weighing all the relevant 
information. The objectivity of such data in the form of 
reports and evidence is therefore an essential requirement. 
Investigations need to be fair, impartial and free of prejudice 
and investigators, as independent witnesses and free of the 
confines of parental legal rights, should not act as auxillary 
advocates for either side (Nichols, 1980). This model also 
requires the possession of competence and knowledge in order to 
qualify the expert to speak for the child. 
5.1.6.1 Objectivity The observation that too many experts are biased 
in favour of one of the parties, and try to act as advocate 
for this party without having any real ground for their view 
{Bradbrook, 1971, p.561) is supported by many (Solow and 
Adams, 1977; Woody, 1977; The Yale Law Journal, 1978; 
Nichols, 1980; Stock vs. Stock, 1981) and clearly constitutes 
a seriou.s problem for the child. The source of such bias 
therefore requires careful scrutiny. 
I ., 
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(a) The investigator/evaluator - client relationship 
Unlike the therapist/counsellor whose clients come 
to him and voluntarily express their thoughts, feel-
ings and experiences, parents being evaluated 
naturally fear that what is revealed may result in 
deprivation of the custody of or access to their 
child. 
Investigators are perceived as powerful and needing to b~ 
influenced, swayed and impressed (Foster, 1966). As a result 
parents remain very cautious and selective in what they 
expose and even with the best interests of the child at heart 
may distort or withhold information they feel will adversely 
affect their case (Gardner, 1977; Rothenberg, 1981). 
Over and above the fear, Court-adjudicated cases generally 
tend to reflect the parent's inability or difficulty in 
relinquishing emotional ties related to the marriage, which 
are then acted out in negative ways making such cases difficult 
and complicated, and the work atmosphere one of guarded 
hostility (Rosen and Abramovitz, 1975; Warner & Elliott, 1979). 
Salk (1977) stresses the need for a positive and constructive 
approach. This includes the need to interview parents rather 
than interrogate them (O'Shea and Connery, 1980), as well as 
to reduce stress and being open to all contacts on both sides, 
keeping views and thoughts open to review, listening and 
willingness to learn (Frederick, 1975). 
Warner and Elliott (1979) see the need ~n investigations not 
just to gather data but to build upon alliance with the parents 
through which they are helped to 
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{i) experience and express their feelings 
associated with the gain or loss of 
custody, 
(ii) understand the separate needs of the 
child and 
(iii) become aware of their own needs of the 
child and of the previous marriage. 
In the process of resolving some of 
the stress the clinician becomes aware 
of the defensive styles employed by parents 
and other information he requires for his 
assessment. 
(b) The appointment of experts 
Problems clearly exist in the appointment of experts. 
Traditionally, experts are appointed and retained by 
one of the parties engaged ·in the adversary process 
(Rosen, 1977) who tend to •shop around' for experts 
·to support their claim (The Yale Law Journal, 1978). 
Responsible experts should not be affected by the 
fact that one of the parties has employed him and is 
paying his fee. The tendency, however, for experts 
to become emotionally invested with the parent who 
engages them has been noted (Derdeyn, 1975; 
Duquette, 1978). 
The more unscrupulous professionals are also aware that their 
reputation to testify for the side that pays them, assures 
them of a vet·y lucrative practice (Gardner, T977}. A conse-
quence of this approach is the introduction of a parade of 
experts by both sides either as a delaying tactic (Watson, 1969), 
\ 
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or to show evidence of proof and to disprove particular 
points (Gardner, 1977) which effectively cancel each other 
out and finally proves useless to the court, which is not 
compelled to accept contradictory expert evidence, havi.ng 
the power to seek their own evidence through a court appointed 
expert (Derdeyn, 1975n Finlay and Gold, 1977), thus making 
pointless a very costly exercise. 
There have also been many who have strongly objected to the 
use being made of clinicians, by the legal profession, as 
pawns to help their case (Se1zer and Benedek, 1965), and the 
frustrations of working in a system which they find inconsistent 
with the psychological and emotional best interests of the child 
and in which they have no impact (Duquette, 1978). 
(c) Limited access to sources of relevant information has 
proved to be another problem area (Benedek and 
Benedek, 1972). Often opposing parties are not 
willing to be interviewed (Rosen and Abramovitz, 
1975) or limits are set down by counsel on either 
side (Derdeyn, 1975). The result is that often 
controversial opinions have been ventured on the 
basis of incomplete and inaccurate information 
(Rosen and Abramovitz, 1975; Stock vs. Stock, 1981). 
Bradbrook (1971) observed that 10- 25% of reports 
are made on the strength of an interview with only 
one of the parties, which can only be seen as highly 
irresponsible and destructive. 
(d) The manipulation of objective reports is another 
source of bias when the report and recommendations 
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made do not find their way to court (Oerdeyn, 1975). 
Experience has shown that where expert opinion does 
not support the client's side he may either not be 
called as witness, or only the most favourable 
testimony ~ay be selected to be presented (Duquette, 
1978). 
The blame is not entirely that of the lawyers who wish to make 
use of experts, but also of the experts themselves. 
It would seem as though experts have either adapted or taken 
advantage of the system for their own purposes or that they 
have allowed themselves to be intimidated and dictated to by 
the system and thus failed in their duties to the child, the 
family and the court. 
Suggestions forwarded to improve the situation on these 
points include the following: 
(1) A consultant/expert should be appointed by the 
court as a special officer of the cour_t, who is 
"equally accepted by both parties because he is 
non-aligned with eit~er of them or their attorney, 
and who makes his recommendations direct to the 
court, or both sets of attorneys simultaneously" 
(Rosen and Abramovitz, 1975, p.79-80). 
(2) Consultants should be appointed by the attorney 
for the child which would help to orientate him 
better to his responsibilities towards the child 
( Derdeyn, 1975; Westman, 1979). 
. L -. 
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(3) Consultants approached by either side should be 
sufficiently committed to their role as child 
advocate, and assertive enough to firmly establish 
their neutrality and conditions with referring 
agents from the beginning (Fredericks, 1975; 
Jenkins, 1977; McDermott, 1978; Rosen, et al., 
1978; Fine, 1980). 
Their conditions should assure free access to all parties, 
children, and significant others in the child environment, 
and that any report, whether it supports or opposes the 
client's case, be freely available for the scrutiny of both 
parties and the court (Foster, 1966; Watson, 1969; Derdeyn, 
1975'n Jenkins, 1977; McDermott, et al., 1978; Bentonim 
and Gilmour, 1981). 
A further suggestion is that should these conditions not be 
agreed to by the parties, experts should feel compelled to 
refuse to carry out the investigation (British Medical Journal, 
1971). 
(e) A source of bias inherent to the task is the 
inevitable necessity for subjective evaluation 
of factors through the personalized value 
system of the consultants (Westman, et al., 1970; 
1979; Rosen and Abramovitz, 1975; Hoody, 1978). 
The sort of values that could blur the objectivity of 
consultants towards divorce include the view that long 
marriages and intact families are 'good' and disrupted 
families are 'bad' as opposed to an emphasis on the rights 
of people to determine their own lives; that divorce 
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inevitably 'ends' relationship rather than alters them in 
such a way that there is often more parent/child contact 
following divorce, and blindness to the often constructive 
aspect of divorce (Westman et al., 1970). This view of 
divorce aiso affects the way that the parent who initiated 
proceeding is perceived by the consultant. 
The earnest suggestions made are that consultants in this 
area be aware and develop sources of checking and controlling 
such idiosyncratic bias in judgements (Rosen and Abramovitz, 
1975; Woody, 1978; Westman, 1979). Here we see how working 
as a team would again be an advantage in overcoming and con-
trolling this problem as points are argued and reasoned from 
different perspectives. The added advantage of a male and 
female team would be that it provides a balance of sexes and 
perspectives based on sex (Brown, 1982). 
5.1.6.2 Knowledge and Competence 
The mental .health professional/corisultant is a professional 
specifically trained in the method and skills required when 
working in the sensitive area of human relationship and personal 
dynamics and must therefore be seen as the ideal person to deal 
with these highly sensitive emotional i~sues. 
The discipline of human behaviour as an area of knowledge, 
however, still lacks a tremendous amount of empirically based 
'fact• and relies to a large extent on unproven hypothesis and 
theories. Certainly the concept so often bandied by all, 11 the 
best interest of the child'' is not a quality ascertainable by 
formulas or certainty as the court would so often wish. 
-92-
The point has been taken to ·suggest that where mediation has 
failed, and neither parent i~ unfit, their equality and the 
ignorance of experts should be openly acknowledged by the use 
of the flip of the coin to determine final settlement (Mnookin, 
1975). 
It is, however, precisely because of this problem that the 
need for careful investigation and assessment by persons trained 
in the skills arises where the aim is not to impose general 
formulas on families, but to look at each family on a case by 
case basis and ensure the best fit between each family system 
and its custodial arrangement (Felner and Faber, 1980). 
Westman (1979) supports this view when he states that generaliza-
tions about child developmental stages are less helpful than 
information about specific children within their specific life 
situation. 
The nature of this work makes this a responsible and emotionally 
taxing role which involves the practical problems of possibly 
having to attend sometimes gruelling court hearings which are 
very time ~onsuming and disruptive to a private professional 
practice. Not all professionals are capable, o~ inclined, to 
take on this type of work. Rosen and Abramovitz (1975) suggest 
that before accepting an appointment to such a case, one should 
be aware of exactly what this entails. 
Despite all proposed reforms, the reality of the situation is 
that at present the demands most often made on the mental 
health professional are in the fot·m of investigating consultant 
in a very destructive adversariallsystem. The consultant 
would simply be abrogating his responsibility in refusing to 
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work within this imposed structure, as notwithstanding the 
defects and shortcomings of the legal system, they do have 
the power by their conditions and methods of work and 
convictions, to assure the child and family the choice of 
appropriate alternatives which are in their mutual best 
interests. 
5.2 The last section specified the need for child advocates to 
be competent and knowledgeable. This implies some understanding 
of what constitutes the best interests of the child. This 
section will therefore present the evolution of current best 
interests, standards used by the courts, and in the second 
instance present an alternative standard of shared parenting 
which is based on the belief that child adjustment following 
divorce is largely dependant on the child's undisturbed 
relationship with both parents. It will consider the myths 
that have developed concerning shared parenting, the disadvantages 
of sole custody for the children, the custodial and non-custodial 
parents and will present guidelines for assessing potentially 
successful shared parenting arrangements. 
5.2.1 The Best Interest Principle- an Evaluation 
The first task facing a consultant approached by either an 
attorney or the court, to invesigate and provide a professional 
opinion in terms of a life plan for the child (and thus the 
family), requires a basic understanding of what the best 
interests of the child means. 
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With the introduction of the best interests principle in the 
first half of this century, Judges were forced to abandon 
their previous well defined traditional standards. As the 
study of child development was very much in its infanc1 and 
the majority of Judges had little knowledge and/or training 
in the area, they were left to make intuitive guesses about 
the welfare of the child, based on moral and popular assumptions 
of the time which have unfortunately not always kept abreast 
with the findings of empirical research (Kay, 1968; Watson, 1969; 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, 1973). With a growing source bf 
knowledge in the field and changing social rteeds, the concept has 
gradually changed over time. 
The •tender years doctrine•, granting the custody of infants in 
their early years to their mother, was the first real move by 
the Court in considering the well-being of the child (Franklin 
and Hibbs, 1980). It was based on the assumption that fathers 
were the natural providers and protectors of the family and that 
the mothers, b~ nature and culture, the child-bearers and 
providers of love, affection and nurturing care (Foster, 1965; 
Title, 1974; Salk, 1977; Franklin and Hibbs, 1980), and was 
closely linked to the needs of society at the time, which 
required such divisions of labour. This doctrine was the first 
tangible legal issue on which the developing rights of the 
mother was based. 
Such judicial reasoning was portrayed by the statement: 
"There is but a twilight zone between a mother•s love and the 
atmosphere of heaven, and all things being equal, no child 
should be deprived of that maternal influence unless it be 
-95-
shown that there are special or extraordinary reasons for 
doing so", by a 1938 Judge (Derdeyn, l976, p.l372), serves 
to illustrate the trend of thought which was evolving in 
the field at the time. 
It became clear that until the mother was "clearly proven to 
be morally, physically or emotionally unfit to be entrusted 
with the care of the child .. (Title, 1974) the courts were not 
concerned with the qualifications of the father as care giver 
to the children. 
In 1951, Bowlby· published his W H 0 monograph in which he 
stated that 11 prolonged breaks in the mother-child relationship 
during the first three years of life have a characteristic 
impression on the child's personality ... He went on to suggest 
a strong relationship between maternal deprivation during the 
2nd and 5th year of life, and the development of an affection1ess 
personality and/or delinquent miscondutt. Ainsworth (1979) also 
concluded that maternal deprivation in infancy and early child-
hood could have far reaching and detrimental r~sults on child 
development. 
These theories lent strong support to the maternal preference 
stand so that despite legislative or statutory language as to 
the equality of parental rights and the detailed set of criteria 
developed by the Courts covering economic, social, moral, 
religious and emotional considerations, against which .potential 
custodians were to be assessed, the best interests of the child 
principle was effectively based on the presumption that ••between 
two natural parents, the mother is preferred .. unless proved at 
fault o~ unfit (Bratt, 1978, p.168). 
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Because of the absdlute and uncontrollable rights of both 
parents to the custody of their children, the Court in its 
role as 11 parens patria 11 acquired the right to determine the 
fitness of the parents seeking custody (Mlyniec, 1977-78), 
and the·unfitness test became the approach of choice. 
This test is determined by the proof of fault or misconduct 
which includes gross immoral behaviour, excessive use of 
intoxicants, neglect, desertion or cruelty of husband and/or 
child, imp~ired physical or mental health, or conviction of 
a crime (Foster & Freed, 1964; Title, 1974; Bratt, 1977). 
The application of the unfitness test was, however, no assurance 
that the father would succeed in a custody action for two reasons. 
Firstly, the importance of the misconduct would generally be 
weighed up in terms of how this would affect mothering ability. 
Secondly, 11 just as the father could present evidence of fault to 
cut off the maternal presumption so the mother could present 
evidence of equal or greater fault with the father, thereby 
restoring the presumption .. (Bratt, 1977, p.169). 
Bratt goes on to state that in order to gain custody the father 
\'IOUld have to prove that he v.!as an exemplary father, a faultless 
husband and then find grievous fault in his spouse. He would 
then have to overcome the obstacle of a society \'Jhich generally 
disfavours paternal. custodians, in Courts that perceive him as 
an runnatural' guardian and lawyers that dissuade him from 
seeking custody (Richards, 1981). The destructive nature of 
the adversary process in which such fathers \'Jere virtually 
forced to show how degenerate their spouses were, was another 




As a result the extreme mother preference ·rule still dominates 
Court decisions in most Western countries. Statistics today 
show that 90% of contested cases are awarded to women (Oster, 
1965; Derdeyn, 1978; Weiss, 1979; Franklin and Hibbs, 1980), 
and one could safely assume that this percentage increases in 
uncontested cases. 
The maternal presumption has been severely criticized over the 
last two decades, especially in view of the ma:ny changes and 
demands that society makes on parents which have blurred the 
traditional roles of men and women, and the recent research 
which indicates a lack of scientific basis for such a presumption. 
Roles: As a result of the continuing women's equal rights 
movement, the gap in earning capacity between the sexes has 
narrowed tremendously and an increasing number of women are 
presently employed outside the home. By the mid-1970's, 40% 
of all married women in America \'Jere employed (Titico, 1974, 
note 22) and by 1976, 50% of all single mothers were working, a 
third of them on a full time basis (Stack, 1976). 
Accompanying this was the increase in the percentage of fathers 
willing and wishing to assume primary responsibility for the 
socializing of their children and the adoption of a more equal 
role in domestic duties (Stack, 1976; Franklin and Hibbs, 1980). 
Child care is a culturally determined concept. Titico (1974, 
. p.200) states: "The prenatal ties of a child to its mother is 
biological, but after its birth the tie is socially and culturally 
described". 
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Research: Empirical research has also failed to provide 
scientific evidence to show that mothers are more important 
than fathers even in the early stage of development. On 
the contrary, studies tend to show that both mothers and 
fathers have direct and important influences on the psycho-
logical deve1opment of their offspring, (Lamb, 1977(a); 
' . 
1978, 1979). The absence of fathers have also been associated 
with a wide range of disruptions in their social and cognitive 
development (Hetherington and Deur, 1975). The father•s role 
in the personality development of their daughters is significant 
in the process of femine identification, personality and social 
adjustment (Biller and Weiss, 1970), especially in heterosexual 
relationships later on (Hetherington, 1973). In sons fathers 
play a vital role in their development of masculine self-concept 
which tends to be of greater importance before the age of 5 years 
(Biller and Bahm, 1971). 
Anderson (1968) stresses the importance of the father•s role in 
the early object relations in ego development especially during 
the 4 years to 7 years period. lamb (1979) notes that the child•s 
attention towards the same sexed parent starts at the beginning 
of the second year. Research by Greenburg and ~1orris (1974) in 
Parke (1981) identified a developing bond between fathers and new 
barns before or by the first 3 days after birth. Parke (1981) 
notes that while there is little difference between the way 
mothers and fathers involve themselves with their newborn at 
the beginning, the traditional division of roles is found to 
occur very soon after this although there is great variation 
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among individual families. This seemed to depend on such factors 
as the father's masculine self-concept and the wife's expectations. 
In terms of their abilities as early care givers, Parke (1981) 
found that fathers were just as sensitive to the child'·s signals 
as mother and responded appropriately. 
Studies in post divorce adjustment have also shown that there 
is no significant difference in the progress and adjustment 
between children in the custody of mothers and those in the 
custody of fathers (Rosen, 1977; Richards, 1981). 
Despite the changed demands of society and the growing body of 
research, Western cultures continue to teach that mothers are 
the primary parents (Seagull and Se~gull, 1977). Despite the 
fact that under American, as in English and South African law, 
neither parent should be given preference because of sex in 
custody cases, the Equal Rights Amendment Movement has found the 
need to note in Section (1) of its proposed amendment: 
11 Equa 1 ity of rights under the i a\'1 sha i1 not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State on account of sex" (Myricks, 197_7, p.321 ). 
The demand is that Courts award custody of children .. according 
to the individual parent's capabilities and situation in 
relation to how these will affect the child's needs and desires .. 
(Tritico, 1974, p.886). Salk (1977) reports a major step taken 
by the American Psychological Association's Council of 
Representatives in January 1977 which approved the following 
resolution which has far reaching implications in matters of 
custody: 
-100-
"Be it resolved that the Council of Representatives 
recognizes officially and make suitable prrimulgation 
of the fact that it is scientifically and psycho-
logically baseless, as well as in violation of 
human rights to discriminate against men betause of 
their sex in assignment of children's custody, in 
adoption, in the staffing of child-care services, in 
personal practice providing for parental care in 
relation to childbirth and emergencies involving 
children, and in similar laws and practices. 
Further it is recommended that suitable prrimulgation 
of the resolution ••••• include specific mailing to 
the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
in his capacity as the chief administrative officer 
of the Federal Court System, to the presiding 
Judges of the various State Court System, to the 
Attorney General of the United States, and to the 
Attorneys General of the States" (p.50). 
The shift by the Courts away from a maternal to a primary care-
taker preference, which might include a third party (Hudson, 
1970), as well as a move away from parents' rights towards the 
rights of children in custody awards, as in all attitude change, 
has inevitably been much slower in evolving than legislation 
(Mlyniec, 1977)~ As a result, maternal preference has 
unfortunately, to the present, remained a major factor in the 
determination of custody awards, both in South Africa (Sormarajah, 
1977) and other Western systems (Franklin and Hibbs, 1980). 
Over the past 15 years many attempts have been made to achieve 
a sex neutral application of broader, best interest guidelines 
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in terms of looking at the most effective ways possible of 
rearing children congruent with their needs. 
Perhaps the most encompassing ahd detailed set of criteria 
requiring an evaluation of emotional and psychological factors 
in quite concrete. terms was provided by the Michigan Child 
Custody Act of 1970, ~tJhi ch deems the best interests of the 
child to be assessed by considering the sum total of the 
following factors: 
(a} The love, affection and other emotional ties 
existing between the competing parties and 
the child. 
(b) The capacity and disposition of competing 
parties to give the child love, affection, 
guidance and continuation of the educating 
and raising of the child in its religion or 
creed, if any. 
(c) The capacity and disposition of competing 
parties to provide the child with food, clothing, 
medical care and other remedial care. 
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a 
satisfactory, stable environment, and the 
desirability of maintaining continuity. 
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the 
existing or proposed custodial home. 
(f) The moral fitness of the competing parties. 
--· --
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(g) The mental and physical health of the competing parties. 
(h) The home, school and community record of the child. 
(i) The reasonable preferenc~ of the child, if the cou·rt 
deems the child to be of sufficient age to express 
preference. 
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant 
to a particular child custody dispute". 
Foster and Freed (1973-74, p.487). 
Another example is the set of factors provided by the Uniform 
Marriages and Divorce Act. They include: 
(1) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his 
custody; 
(2) The wishes of the child as to his ·custodian; 
(3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child 
with his parents, his siblings, and any other person 
who may significantly affect the child's best interests; 
{4) The child's adjustment to his home, school and 
community; and 
{5) The mental and physical health of all individuals 
involved. The court shall not consider conduct of a 
proposed custodian that does not affect his relation-
shop to the child. 
Podell and Peck (1972). 
Each of these provide that no one factor be decisive in itself 
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and that some in fact are more relevant than others and 
therefore more heavily weighted. Generally the materia 1 
factors beyond those required to satisfy the simple needs 
are not amongst the most important. 
McDermott et al., (1978), found, in a survey that they undertook 
at the Department of Psychiatry of the University of Hawaii, that 
consultants tended to consistently use 8 major categories of 
criteria in deciding on custody i~sues, the first of which were 
practical and reality based and constituted the actual deciding 
factors in the final outcome. These are: 
(1) Caretaking arrangements in terms of parents 
availability for child care, level of physical 
care each could provide, the stability of the 
home environment for child development. 
(2) Parenting skills and commitment based on 
present and past involvement of caretaking, 
and capacity to provide emotional support and 
understanding. 
(3) The child's wishes to live with a particular 
parent, sibling, or in a particular neighbour-
hood as well ~s an assessment of the interpersonal 
relationships with these significant individuals. 
(4) The·child's adjustment and functioning and social 
and academic performance at school. 
(5) The parents• own interpersonal relationships and 
attitudes towards the other parent, relatives and 
potential spouses on both sides. 
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(6) Parents motivation for custody and evaluation of 
their practical justifications. 
(7) Parents as functioning adults, their emotional 
state, maturity, stability and anti soci a 1 tendencies. 
(8) Assessment of alternative caretakers in each home, 
baby sitters, creches, relatives .and potential step-
parents. 
Despite .the comprehensive nature of these standards therefore, 
they have nevertheless remained broad and v~gue and limited in 
practice (Sornarajah, 1973; Wilcox, 1976; Mnookin, 1978; 
The Yale Law Journal, 1978) and open to misuse by courts who 
still relied on traditional presumptions and procedures to 
come to decisions. 
The kind of generalized presumptions which still tend to be 
used by the South African Courts include the belief that: 
(a) the custody of a child of tender age should be 
given to the mother; 
(b) custody of a son should be given to the father 
and that of a daughter to the mother, so that 
better guidance can be provided to the child. 
(c} Custody should not be given to an immoral parent. 
(d) Antagonism of the child towards a particular parent 
should be considered~ 
(e) The child's existing associations and environment 
should not be lightly disturbed. 
(Spiro, 1971; Sornarajah, 1973; Hahlo, 1975). 
/ 
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Watson (1969) had introduced the 'psychological best interests 
of the child' concept. His definition, stated in very broad 
terms, included not only the standards or criteria against 
which assessments are made, but for the first time the manner 
or procedure by which this is achieved. 
The most strongly supportedapproach.in"decisions of di~put~d 
custody and access has unfortunately remained the 'unfitness 
test~, a test open to parental manipulation. The labelling of 
parents as 'unfit' or 'undesirable' has been recognized as 
. . 
undesirable in itself, as it tends t6 reflect on and create 
even more stress for the child. 
Woody, 1978, proposed a more positive approach by replacing the 
concept of 'unfit' parent by the 'most able parent'. The 
advantages being clearly that it maintains the integrity of 
both parents, and dis~ourages the need to advocate for parents. 
The aim is to determine "which parent \'lill optimise the child's 
opportunity for growth, development and 1 ife. style without the 
connotation that one parent is unfit or unsuitable'' (Woody, 
1978' p. 84) . 
While still considering the different aspects of fitness (moral, 
physical, mental ••• ) ihe purpose is not to punish the culpable 
or infirm parent, but simply to assess how these aspects relate 
directly to their parenting capacity and relationship with the 
child from the child's perspective (Wilcox, 1976). 
5.2.2 
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Alternatives - Shared Parenting : Joint free acces~/custody 
No matter how one approaches the problem, the task of choosing 
between the merits of a mother and father, especially where a· 
large range of factors need to be weighed up and where both are 
clearly able and willing as parents and are attached to the 
child, is an extremely difficult and often arbitrary one (Stack, 
1976). 
Over the last few years studies have focused on the effects on 
children of the process of separation and the structure and 
relationships within the post divorce families. 
A fundamental aspect of the trauma of divorce appears to be the 
threat of loss of primary bonds or actual separation from one of 
the par,ents, as the disruption of these bonds interferes with 
the child's developmental progress socially, emotionally, 
cognitively and intellectually (Wallerstein and Kelley, 1975; 
Hess and Camara, 1979). 
Hess and Camara (1978) found that the 11 family relationships 
that emerge after divorce affect the children as much or more 
than the divorce itself" and that the child's relationships to 
their parents are more significant in this adjustment than the 
level of cooperation or discord between these parents. 
Access: The child's relationship with both his parents, 
custodial and non-custodial, is important to his well being 
and separate from his relationship with the other parent. The 
importance of children to maintain sound and loving relation-
ships with both psychological parents after marital dissolution, 
by the provision of open and free access to both parents for 
the child, has been consistently expressed over the years both 
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by mental health and legal professionals, and the court in 
mitigating the negative effects of divorce for children 
(Watson, 1969; Bates, 1974; Bates v. Daly, 1976; Kramer 
et a 1. , 1976'n Benedek and Benedek, 1977; Seagull and -
Seagull, 1977; Grote and Weinstein, 1977; The Yaie Law 
Journal, 1978; Grief, 1979; Roman and Haddad, 1979; 
Richards, 1981; Stack vs. Stack, 1981). 
In 1967 an Ohio Court suggested that children's rights 
assume that the child should receive "the totality of the 
benefit that should have been expected if divorce had not 
occurred" (Mlyniec, 1977-78, Note 28, p.S). This clearly 
implies the right of the child to the company of both parents 
after the dissolution of the marriage. Courts have in fact 
clearly stated their opposition to depriving the child of 
access to either parent unless it is entirely satisfied that 
the emotional or phy_sical \'Jelfare of the child is being 
threatened (Hahlo, 1975; Soni, 1976; Richards, '1981) and 
in South Africa the General Law Amendment Act No. 93 of 1962 
specifically renders a custodian parent guilty of an offence 
if he or she "without reasonable cause refuses or prevents 
access by the other parent to a child in contravention of an 
order of Court" {Germani v. Herf and Another, 1975, p.898). 
Despite'these clearly stated standards however, Courts remain 
reluctant to grant orders which would effectively provide 
these rights to children (Hahlo, 1975). Richards (1981) 
estimates that in England an order of access is awarded in 
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one quarter to one third of all custody orders. Many South 
African Court orders provide access in such broad terms, 
'reasonable access' as not to secure the adequate provisions 
for the child's needs (Rosen and Abramovitz, 1975). Judge 
de Villiers in 1960 defined 'reasonable access' as being 
"aimed at the preservation of some degree of parent-and-child 
relationships between the non-custodian parent and the child 
for the benefit of both, but in a manner not incompatible in 
substance of the care and upbringing of the child by the custodian 
parent" Roberts (1980). 
In practical terms this effectively places the relationship 
between the non-custodial parent and child in the hands of the 
appointed custodian. Richards (1981) stresses the need, where 
custody orders are made, to carefully work out an access arrange-
ment to suit the needs of the family and not simply to allow it 
to go by default. 
Joint Custody 
Much of the settlement in divorce is influenced by what the 
attorney advises his client, which is in turn influenced by what 
the attorneys believe the courts will accept (Weiss, 1979). As 
the law stands at present primary importance is given to the 
stability of the child's relationship with one sole custodian 
parent while granting access rights to the other. 
The gr~nting of sole custody orders is regarded by Richards 
(1981, p.l7) as a 11 public acknowledgement that the role of the 
non-custodial parent is expected to be reduced". It is a 
declaration that one parent is superior to the other in the 
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eyes of parents, child, family and friends (Grote & Weinstein, 
1977). Richards suggest that what is needed, and is within 
the Judges power, is a public affirmation that in spite of the 
adult separation, parental duties and obligations, as ~pposed 
to looking purely at parental rights, persist. He suggests, 
therefore, that orders of joint custody become the norm. In 
other words, that the custody of neither parent be terminated 
unless strong and specific reasons relating to the child's 
welfar,e or the inability or unwillingness of parents to 'under-
take this role presents itself. 
Benedek et al~, (1979) have defined Joint Custody as the 
aggregate of 3 characteristics they believe distinguishes it 
from traditional or sole custody arrangements: 
-(1) The acknowledgement that both parents assume equal 
responsibility for the physical, emotional and 
moral development of the child, 
(2) the sharing of the rights and responsibilities for 
making decisions that directly affect the child, and 
(3) that the child lives with each of his/her parents for 
a substantial amount of time. 
The practical arrangements are normally made to fit in with 
the needs of the family (Bourn, 1976) and not to disrupt the 
child's routine activities, but generally an equal amount of 
time is spent with both parents who during that time minister 
to their daily needs. Usually a 31 days per parent per week 
system is adopted where clothes, toys are duplicated or split up 
(Dancey, 1976). 
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The ambivalence among legal professionals regarding the 
concept of shared parenting, which is used here as a general 
term, following divorce,· has been largely influenced by the 
views expressed by Goldstein et al (1973), who at the ~ime 
filled a need for psychologically backed guidelines for legal 
professionals which unfortunately was welcomed, widely read 
and uncritically/unquestioningly adopted. 
These authors argue that continuous relationships are essential 
for children, and as they require stability and continuity, 
children who wander from one environment to the other cease to 
identify with any set of substitute parents. They go on to 
state that they may have contact with more than one adult only 
where these adults feel positively towards one another. Where 
they are not in positive contact, loyalty conflicts arise which 
may have devastating consequences for the child and result in 
destroying the child's positive relationship with both parents. 
They conclude therefore that contact with the non-custodian 
parent following divorce should only be permitted at the 
discretion of the custodial parent where a positive relationship 
exists and th~t once granted, an order be final. 
As a result certain beliefs have evolved which require careful 
evaluation. Unfortunately a major difficulty in this area is 
the lack of sufficient empirical data to prove or disprove 
these beliefs as the available research is based on a few studies 
of small, highly selective samples and experiential reports. 
One of these beliefs is that with such arrangements the child 
becomes a pawn in continued marital disputes. It has been 
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pointed out, however, that the inherently unequal distribution 
of power between parents in sole custody settlements is far 
more likely to result in conflict, hostility and resentment 
between the parents. Such arrangements encourage parents to 
fight bitter custody battles for something they fear losing 
(Grief, 1979). Continued custody battles and maintenance with-
holding are often used by non custodials as a way of regaining 
some sense of control. 
In joint-custody situations on the other hand, where both 
retain satisfactory relationships with their children, the 
motivation for such hostility is substantially reduced. 
It must be recognized that even for parents committed to 
promoting contact of the child with the other parents, contact 
periods do provide fertile ground for the expression of 
unresolved parental conflict or of intolerance of practical 
snags inherent to this situation which do result in loyalty 
conflicts being stirred up in children (Oerdeyne, 1975; 
Benedek & Benedek, 1977; Jenkins, 1977). The periods before 
and following visits are also difficult periods for the children 
when they commonly act out their expressions of_ loss, hurt and 
hostility relating to the divorce and overall situation and 
conflict of loyalty which are distressing to the parents and 
often misinterpreted as negative reactions to the visits 
themselves (Benedek & Benedek, 1977). 
These expressed feelings of distress on the part of all the 
family are by no means limited to the joint custody situations, 
they are not avoided by the awarding of sole orders or the 
-112-
elimination of contact with one of the parents. An important 
point to make is that where they do exist they need not remain 
permanent patterns of interaction. As the post divorce adjust-
ment relies entirely on how the feelings of the members. are 
resolved, the period immediately following the divorce is a 
critical point for appropriate psychological intervention which 
will help parents to avoid using children as weapons. 
A second misconception is the belief that it is disruptive for 
a child to have two different homes. In all post divorce 
situations there is an inevitable period of adjustment which 
may vary from approximately 2 years with the period of highest 
stress occurring after 1 year (Abarbanel, 1979), to 3 years 
(Brown, 1976), during which both parents and children work 
through their felt anxieties. Grief (1979) reports that the 
children in her study were not confused about where they spent 
their time. She points out that children are shuffled to and 
from school aid care centres daily yet this is called consistency 
and schooling. Baum (1976) felt that the problems that did tend 
to arise were of the organizational, practical every day type of 
problems. Dancey, (1976, p.71) found that in her sample "most 
children seemed to feel pleasurable anticipation about alternating 
homes rather than resentment or sadness at leaving one home for 
the other". Ricci (1980) has·published a practical guide to help 
parents develop a working relationship after.the divorce even 
when parents are not on friendly terms. 
A third misconception reported by Grief (1979) is that shared 
parenting only works when par~nts get along and therefore is not 
likely to work for parents who can't stay married. She reports, 
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however, that many parents in her survey, despite tremendous 
hostility towards·their ex-spouse, were able to separate their 
parental responsibilities from their marital problems. They 
also found that once freed from the conflictual marital 
relationship they were better able to fulfill their parental 
roles. This is supported by others {Dancey, 1976; Baum, 
1976; Abarbanel, 1979). 
Finally, while supporting the need for maintaining continuity 
for the child, Bentovim and Gilmour {1981) define this concept 
in far broader terms and stress the need to avoid separations 
to ~vhich children are sensitive, as with a primary presenting 
figure. 
Having dealt with some of the 11 myths 11 that have evolved it is 
necessary to remark on the noted negative aspects of traditional 
sole custody arrangements in which access is clearly demarcated 
and limited and then to consider how free access to both parents 
for both the children and the parents in reconstructed families 
aids the adjustment process. 
5.2.2.1 Effect on the Child 
An order of sole custody has been described as a restructuring 
of relationships such that one parent is 'shut in' and the 
other is 'shut out• of the life of the child (Grote and Weinstein, 
1977; Ramarand Haddad, 1978). 
(a) When a parent is 'shut out• his relationship with 
and availability to the child is for all intents. 
and purposes terminated. The Harvard Law Review 
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(1980) refers to the 'legal death' of the non 
custodial parent. The child's response to this 
loss is much the same as it would be to the 
death of the parent. These responses include 
distress and suffering and intense longing for 
the departed parent (Wallerstein and Kelley, 
1979); depression often masked by aggressive 
acting out at home and school (Lawrence, 1968); 
the fear of loss of both parents (Dancey, 1976; 
Richards, 1981); and feelings of rejection, 
abandonment and loss (Dancey, 1976). 
(b) They were also found to firmly believe that they 
were to blame for the divorce and no amount of 
verbal affirmation to the contrary altered this 
as the absence of the non-custodial parent served 
to confirm this belief (Abarbanel, 1977). 
Increased contact with the non custodial parent 
helped to decrease these feelings in the child 
(Littner, 1973) and confirmed for the child that 
he was loved and wanted by both parents (Abarbanel, 
1 979). 
(c) Contact also helps the child to deal with 
unconscious and conscious fantasies about the 
absent parent. In terms of psychoanalytic theory 
the need of the oedipal child to test the reality 
of his fantasies~ in order to resolve their com-
petitive feelings and resulting fears of 
retaliation from the same second parent, seems 
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devious in. order that these untested fantasies do not 
take on neurotic proportions at a later stage. 
Children also need to test out glorified or vilified 
fantasies of the absent parent (Me Dermott, 1968) ftS 
well as those impressions that might have been 
communicated to him (Derdeyn, 1975; Benedek & 
Benedek, 1977; Abarbanel, 1979). 
(d) Single parent children have been noted to present 
gender identity difficulties (Hetherington, 1972; 
1973; 1975; Bernstein, 1977). Again, here, access 
to both parents provides the important sexual identi-
fication models as well as living experiences required 
for healthy development (Littner, 1973). 
(e) Where access to one parent has been limited, the death 
of the other custodian faces the child with the 
problem of having to readjust to a relative stranger/ 
Where parenting has been shared, the transition and 
readjustment is far less traumatic (Benedek & Benedek, 
1977). 
5.2.2.2. Effect on the Custodial Parent 
The welfare of the child can never be considered in isolation 
from that of his parents who so closely affect his life • 
. Therefore the affect that the system has on the parent also 
has a direct affect on the child. While sole custody 'shuts 
out' the non custodial for the child, it also 'shuts in' the 
custodial parent. 
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(a) This represents for the custodial parent being 
faced with having to provide for all the child's 
daily needs, material and emotional at all 
times. Often too as a result of lowered income 
and failure on the part of the non custodial !parent 
to provide adequate maintenance, this parent is 
faced with the further demands of employment. 
(b) Emotionally ·~hut in• parents are expected to cope 
with their own feelings which they are required to 
put aside for long enough periods in order to deal 
with the child•s process of mourning and provide 
them with the support and reassurance they require. 
Contrary.to popular belief the denial or frustration 
of access by the custodial parent impairs rather 
than secures their relationship with their child, as 
frequently they are blamed for the divorce and bear 
the brunt of the child•s negative feelings (Beal, 
1979), while an often unnatural and undesirably 
intense relationship with the non-custodian may 
develop (Benedek & Benedek, 1977). 
(c) As a result of these incessant demands with no 
reciprocal support, this parent may become lonely 
and depressed such that the children feel the need 
to take on parental roles during this period 
(Westman, 1979). The obvious benefit for parents 
who share the parenting role is the reciprocal 
support they provide for each other, which allows 
for each of them the time and opportunity for the 
\ 
recharging of emotional batteries (Richards, 1981). 
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5.2.2.3 Effect on the non-custodial parent 
For the 'shut out' parent (~sually the fa~her) the situation 
is even more emotionally complex. A sad observation is that 
where limited orders of access exist, non-custodial fathers 
have tended to drift away from their children (Roman and Haddad, 
1978; Rosen, 1977; Richards, 1981). 
(a) Their first barrier to the children takes the form 
of 'legal advice' from the traditional lawyers, 
and the advice of others who view the father's 
wish to maintain contact with his child as a 
selfish, private iridulgence (Richards, 1981; 
Baum, 1976). 
(b) Practically the visits may prove too trying, where 
an ex-spouse uses her power of custodianship as a 
weapon to prevent or frustrate access arrangements 
(Grote and Weinstein, 1977) or where the non-
custodian has moved away in order to start again 
(Richards, 1981) •. 
(c) The emotional factors tend to play a major role. 
Grief (1979) attempted to explode the myth that 
fathers walk away from divorce and their families 
unscathed and carefree. She found that 57% of her 
sample of non-custodial fathers developed symptoms 
of depression, psychosomatic complaints, alcohol 
and sexual problems following separation from the 
family. They referred to feelings of loss, being 
devalued as a parent and some of a need to distance 
themselves from the child in order to cope with the 
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pain. Some felt that the pain ~hen returning or 
fetching their children from their home would be 
sufficient to overcome the wish to continue their 
relationship. The withdrawal was a form of 
emotional protection (Seagull & Seagull, 1977). 
They expressed feeling overwhelmed not only by the 
loss of their wives and children, but also of their 
friends, home and their fantasies, dreams, hopes 
and lifestyles (Dreyfus, 1979). 
(d) The self image of the father changes drastically 
with an assigned non-custodian status. Seagull & 
Seagull (1977) looked at the average non~custodial 
father who had not been involved with the housekeeping 
and care giving roles in the marriage. For this 
father, the new demands being made on him, his lack 
of experience, the tendency for the children to run 
to the custodial-mother with their problems, comfort 
and support, added to the depression and frustration 
he may feel in his attempts to master the new 
parental role in limited periods of access confirm 
his often already felt failure as a parent. 
Grief (1979) found that the less opportunity these 
fathers had for involvement, the less they saw them-
selves as parents and the less motivated they were 
to be with their children and the more they eventually 
acted in accordance with their assigned role as •non-
parent•. Grief further looked at the quality of 
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relationship between the child and non-custodial 
fathers and reported that although they were 
genuinely concerned with their children's 
distress they were often not there at times of 
stress, and when stress was perceived they found 
mutual difficulty and reluctance to open up 
emotionally which resulted in the development of 
more superficial relationships. As 'weekend 
fathers' they felt that the limited time that 
they spent together with their children should 
be enjoyed and not spoilt by anger or painful 
topics. 
There was always the fear on both sides of 
angering the other, with the child fearing that 
an angry or hurt father would not come back, 
while the father, often complicated by feelings 
of guilt about the impact of the divorce on the 
child, tended to overcompensate and displayed 
poor limit setting for fear that an angry child 
would not want to return. Richards (1981) 
describes the "Father Christmas syndrome" where 
picnics, gifts and treats become the accepted way 
of relating to the children. 
(f) Where several children were involved fathers found 
it difficult to find time for intimate relation-
ships with any of them individually after the 
competitive demands had been met within the 
limited available time. 
5.2.3 
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Joint Custody fathers on the other hand reported 
being able to continue normal, open spontaneous. 
and full emotional relationships with their 
children and felt that there were ample 
opportunities for intimacy. They learned the 
routine and how to care for the child, they felt 
involved and satisfied with their relationships. 
(g) Other factors were resentment from the children, 
from new spouses, a feeling that visits may be 
upsetting to the children, a new spousal relation-
ship, disinterest and as a means of escaping pay-
ments for maintenance (Richards, 1981). 
Indicators for successful joint custody arrangements 
Despite the strength of the case being made for the shared 
parenting ideal through liberal access or joint custody, its 
general applicability to all dissolving families must be viewed 
with some caution at this stage. The knowledge has so far been 
based.on a small selected middle class, educated and extremely 
motivated sample of families, which places limits on the long 
term predictability and generalizability of these findings. 
Ideally families choose this alternative because it fits in 
with their basic value system and are clearly committed to 
making it work even before they approach the attorney. It is 
more likely however that parties will have some vague ideas or 
no knowledge of this concept at all. One of the functions of 
the attorney or counsellor is to classify this concept for the 
parties as part of the educative process and assessing the 
possibility with them of adopting this option. 
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Although .there are no definite formulas, certain common, useful 
and consistent elements have emerged which could be used as 
prognostic indications or guidelines in assessing the appropriate-
ness of this alternative for each famiiy. 
(1) · Desire for joint custody is judged by assessing the 
strength of the intention, the rational basis for 
decisions, understanding of the concept and of 
. alternatives, the child's preference, and financial 
feasibility (Aberbanel, 1979; Benedek et al., 1979). 
(2) Personal Commitment to the concept as judged by the 
ability and willingness to.focus on the child's best 
interests, parental maturity and disposition towards 
personal sacrifice (Abarbanel~ 1979); Benedek et al., 
1979). Grief (1979) found that the parents in her 
sample had to resolve personally certain issues in 
order to make joint custody succeed: 
(a) they had to face their own mixed feelings 
about this arrangement, 
(b) they had to keep separate perception of 
their ex spouse as a mate and as a parent, 
(c) they had to stick to their resolution not 
to use the children as go-between or weapons, 
and 
(d) they had to accept partial loss of control 
over daily decisions in their children's 
lives, especially the parent who had taken 
the role of primary caretaker before the 
separation. 
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(3) Parents mutual co-operation, as judged by the parental 
disposition towards and record of co-parenting and 
sharing of responsibilities (Benedek et al., 1979). 
Grief {1979) states that it is not the degree of 
amicability, but the ability of parents to separate 
cut their parental responsibility from their marital 
problems. The bitter custody battles and hostility 
are therefore no indication per se that Joint Custody 
won't work. 
{4) Parents' mutual support, as judged by the parents' 
mutual tolerance of parenting ability, lifestyle and 
values and mutual support of their child's active and 
separate relationship with the other parent, while 
endorsing and sustaining each other's availability to 
the child (Kramer, et al., 1977; Abarbanel, 1979; 
Benedek, et al., 1979). 
(5) Capacity io negotiate and remain flexible, as judged 
by their ability to face each other, discuss, and come 
to a mutual decision on a plan of action, and then the 
ability and willingness to change the plan ~tJhen it 
becomes necessary, i.e. maintaining a good working 
relationship where there is a need to co-ordinate a 
multitude of routine details concerning the daily care 
and responsibility and intermittent and emergency 
tasks (Kramer, et al., 1977; Abarbanel, 1979). 
(6) Agreement_on the implicit rules of the system, which 
involves the agreement on issues of power· autonomy and 
control, the pacing and expression of the process of 
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separation and the basic rules by which .the two families 
will interact (Abarbanel, 1979). 
(7) Proximity of Residence, as judged by the intention to 
-
remain in the same neighbourhood (Benedek et al., 1979). 
(8) . A receptive attitude towards counselling. These 
families may well need support to help them over the 
initial adjustment period and should be willing to 
request or attend counselling sessions when required 
(Benedek et al., 1979). There is no reason why a 
joint custody settlement can•t be conditional o~ both 
restructured families attending post divorce counsell~ 
ing sessions in the.initial stages. 
These are definite situations which mitigate against joint 
custody settlements. These include a parent•s choice to 
surrender their parental rights, where one party consistently 
contests the other•s access to any parental right. 
Certain circumstances are thought to mitigate against joint-
custody settlements. 
(a) Hhen parents are disinterested and by choice surrender 
their parental rights (Grief, 1979). 
(b) When it is seen as a compromise solution in a disputed 
case because neither parent, for their own selfish 
needs, is prepared to lose (Richards, 1981; Beal, 1979; 
Abarbanel, 1979). 
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(c) Where parents live in separate geographical locations. 
The goal is to maintain contin~ity within the child 1 s 
context. 
The joint custody or liberal access alternative is clearly a 
solution which attempts to meet the needs of children and 
families in terms of how they have been defined by the recent 
research. The avera 11 feeiing of those who have adopted this 
alternative is that it does work. However, there are still 
many unknowns in this relatively new and rar~ practice. In 
England joint custody settlements are granted in less than 5% 
of cases. Clearly this arrangement may not satisfy the needs 
of many families. The choice of custody/access arrangement 
remains a very personal one which should not be imposed upon by 
unsubstantiated blind beliefs of outsiders. More research is 
needed across a wider spectrum of the population and over 
longer periods of time. For this to happen, however, this 
alternative needs to become more readily accepted by both the 
mental health and legal professions and promoted to the public 
at large. Only then will the problems be clarified and the 
system refined. 
Having established the requirements of a thorough knowledge and 
understanding of the child and his needs by the consultants as 
child advocates, the following sections attempt to outline an 
investigative procedure to be followed, provide a basic model 
of child development and an understanding of the optional 
primary caretaker and environmental characteristics at each 
stage of development against which to evaluate the data in 
order to formulate a life-plan for the child, offer a format 
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for medico legal reports and guidelines for the conduct of 
experts in court. 
5.3 The Investigative Process 
5.3.1 The Initial Contact 
5.3.2 
Before the consultant undertakes an investigation a brief 
specifically stating the issues that require investigation 
and assessment, should be obtained in writing from the source · 
of referral (Rosen and Abramovitz, 1975; Thring, 1982). 
The conditions under which he is prepared to work need to be 
clarified. He needs to assert 
(a) his free access to all relevant sources of information, 
(b) his neutrality vis-a-vis the parties but commitment to 
the child and the fami]y•s welfare as a whole, 
(c) the free availability of the final report for both 
sides and the Court, 
(d) an adequate period of time within which to complete 
this assessm~nt and 
(e) how costs will be calculated and establish by whom they 
will be paid. 
The Investigation 
What is being asked of consultants in disputed custody cases 
is to provide an opinion, based on their understanding of the 
specific child and his needs within his family and social 
context, as to which of the two parents will be better able in 
the future to take full responsibility for caring fo1~ the child. 
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This requires a .thorough knowledge and understanding of: 
(a) The child as a fully functioning individual. 
(b) The parent-child interaction system. ' 
(c) The child•s family system. 
(d) The child•s social/community system. 
Such an understanding can only be gained through a synthesis 
of a comprehensive set of information gained by tho~ough 
inv.estigation. 
The most effective technique used is the direct interview in 
which the most basic and valuable factors are the sensitivity, 
insight, experience and knowledge of the consultant, which 
operate from the first moment of contact. 
5.3.2.1 Getting to know the child requires information from many 
different sources. 
(i) The personal development and family history of the child 
is the information by which the clinician gets to know 
the child through the eyes of both parents (Fredericks, 
1975). 
Through th-is, he acquires information about the child 1s 
basic constitution, early physical development, the 
important primary interpersonal relationships and 
patterns of behaviour, psycho-social development, 
especially the duration, intensity and present status 
of his relationship with the competing parents and 
other family members, his emotional capacity and 
expression and styles of coping with life events and 
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stresses at different stages, his intellectual I 
educational development, achievements and opportunities. 
(ii) Interviews with the child potentially serve three 
effectively different purposes: 
(a) To inform them as participants in the process -
as it is felt that the child should know as much 
about the procedure as possible (Derdeyn, 1976). 
They should be openly spoken to about their 
parent's divorce, and the custody or access 
dispute within which they find themselves 
(Frederick, 1975), and should be invited to 
participate and be provided with any explanation 
·they may desire or be able to cope with while at 
the same time hi~/her desire not to participate 
should be respected (The Yale Law Journal, 1978). 
(b) To provide for them an opportunity of stating their 
preference- Judges have·long been aware of the 
difficulties of relying on choices expressed by 
children in chambers or in court because of the 
pressure brought to bear on these children as a 
result of 
{1} the emotional nature of the situation 
in which they find themselves; 
{2) the influences of parents who may bribe, 
make promises and threaten the child 
(Bradbrook, 1971~ Galligan; The Harvard 
News Review, 1980) and 
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(3) ·the fear of rejection by the unselected 
parent (Sugar, 1970). 
The judiciar,Y, except in ~1ichigan where the 
interests of the child are so protected that 
the child representative may even interfere 
with the freedom of parents to divorce9 and in 
Georgia where the child's preference is 
absolutely and presumptively controlling unless 
the selected parent is deemed not to be .a fit 
and proper person to have custody of the child, 
(Bersoff9 1976-77) views the child's choice as 
one of the many factors that need to be 
considered (Coyne, 1969), often using it to 
reinforce the correctness of a decision based 
on traditional factors (Mlyniec, 1977-78). 
The need, however, to consult with the child and seriously 
consider his re~sons and respect his perceptions of which 
parent really cares more about him and is more dependable, as 
well as which he would prefer not to see 9 has been strongly 
expressed (Rosen and Abramovitz, 1975; Benedek and Benedek, 
1977; Jenkins, 1977; The Yale Law Journal, 1978; Westman, 
1979). 
The child's ability to make rational choices is defined by 
his state of egocentricity and level of intellectual functioning, 
which determines his perceptions and understanding of the world, 
and his expression depends on his language development, 
articulation and sense of consequence of doing so. 
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However, most children•s evaluations are coloured by loyalty 
conflicts and their tendency to respond according to how 
they feel at that moment, and their current developmental 
needs. Expressed choices should, therefore, not automati-
cally be taken at face value but should be tested thoroughly 
for consistency. 
Choices may, for example, reflect a preference for a 
lenient, easy to manipulate or less effective parent where a 
more dependable, stable, effective parent is needed (Jenkins,. 
1977), or a choice based on a subtle or not so subtle priming 
by the parent (Rosen and Abramovitz, 1978). 
Although the principle method of gauging the choice of the 
child remains the direct interview, it often becomes necessary, 
when children have difficulty expressing their true feelings, 
to use a more indirect technique as an adjunct to the interview, 
as a way of gaining some insight as to the true feelings that 
are not being expressed. 
This includes the use of play material, especially with small 
children, and projective techniques such as the thematic 
aperception test or the child 1 s version of the sa~e test, 
incomplete sentences and the Bene Anthony test of family 
relations. 
Despite the provision of this opportunity, the child may still 
not be able to i~dicate a preference, either because he has a 
close attachment to bo~h parents (Jenkins, 1977) or because 
. . 
the burden of choice is too great in an anxious child already 
affected by the stress of the situation (Mlyniec, 1977-78). 
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The purpose of .the i'ntervention with the .child then becomes: 
(c) To assess the child's physical, social, ·intellectual 
and emotional needs, and although much of the 
relevant information will already have been acquired 
through interviews with the parental figures, 
interviews with the child sensitizes one to the 
world through the child's point of view. One 
learns what is important to that child (Westman, 1979). 
It is important to accept the uniqueness of each child's 
personality and ba~kground, to listen and discover the child's 
emotions, fantasies, urges and interests, to understand what 
the child is saying, the goals of hi~/her behaviour, the true 
meaning of his/her assertions, to evaluate conflict wishes 
and to deal with the ambivalences towards the parents as well 
as his guilt or conflicts about expressing his true feelings 
(Westman, 1979; Rosen and Abramovitz, 1975). 
Jenkins (1977) proposes that the significant questions to ask 
are: To whom does the child turn when hurt or in trouble 
or has a problem? 
In whom does the child confide? 
Who does the child trust? 
Westman (1979) stresses the need for consultants~o be sensitive 
to the issues and needs that are important to the child and 
aware of each child's uhique personality and background. 
. - \ 
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(iii) Longitudinal and current school observations 
ar~ an important source of collateral observation 
from parents and teachers and p~ovide crucial 
information about the child 1 s capability with 
school and classroom situations and peer 
relationships. 
(iv) Psychological and educational achievement testing 
may be used selectively when there are specific 
queries that require further investigation and 
indicate possible specific needs of the child which 
need to be considered. There is definitely no 
basis for,which to test these areas routinely 
(Solow and Adams, 1977) and when required should · 
be used as an adjunct to the basic direct interview 
technique only. 
(v) Medical evaluations again are not required routinely 
but are indicated when a potential problem presents 
itself. 
5.3.2.2 The Parent-child, Child-parent relationship and interaction 
Because of the tremendous inconsistencies one if faced with 
by distorted information from competing parents, collateral 
evidence from family, friends, neighbours, school doctors and 
so on is often very useful to pla~e the parent•s~eports in 
context and perspective. Another useful method for the cross-
checking of historical data is by making use of life-line 
charts with parents. 
Interview techniques are used to assess the parents• capacity 
and disposition to give the child love, affection and guidance 
(Foster & Freed, 1973-74) and to meet the c~ild•s developmental 
. ··- ~ 
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needs from dependency through the individuation/separation 
stages of development from·the personal and family history 
of each parent. It is also necessary to understand clearly 
the parents' moti~e for wanting ·custody/access which should 
never be taken at face value. This is also assessed. 
An important source of information on this relationship is 
the observations that are made of 'actual parent-child' 
I 
interactions. 
McDermott et al., (1978) devised a parent-child _interaction 
test to measure the child's attachment to the parent. They 
filmed and observed parents working together with their 
children on set tasks appropriate to the age of the child and 
evaluated them on two sets of interactional dimensions. 
(1) The child's attachment to the parent was measured 
by the degree of comfort, initiative, spontaneous 
fantasy, expressions, range of feelings and 
separation behaviour he/she exhibited and 
(2) the parents' attachment to the child was measured 
by their empathy, sensitivity, discipline, guidance, 
consistency, patience, intellectual stimulation; 
facilitation of emotional expression and spontaneity, 
physical closeness, encouragement and acceptance. 
Assessing family members in structured settings tends to induce 
anxiety resulting in distorted behaviour already complicated 
by.the stress induced by the divorce procedure. Swerdlow (1978) 
points to the unnatural and strained nature of the situation. 
·McDermott et ~1., (1978) talk about the possible staged 
performance that might result. 
--~ 
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Rosen and Abramovitz .(1975) suggest tha~, ideally, observation 
of the parent-child dyad should take place in the home 
environment of each parent. The merits of this are that they 
provide a second opinion either confirming or contradicting 
the already available information or evaluation. They may 
provide a cue as to where the investigations should focus and 
as a method of reducing the parent-child relationship to close 
scrutiny. 
5.3.2.3. Family System 
This assessment is based largely on direct obser~ations of 
these interactions with the family system as a whole or as 
sub units thereof for both potential custodial parents. 
Bentonim and Gilmour (1981) describe a process .of assessment. 
of the family system in a variety of combinations working on 
tasks set by the consultant to foster interaction in a clinical 
setting in which one member of the evaluation team remains with 
the family while the consultant observes behind a one-way 
mirror. 
What is assessed intltides: 
(1) the 'surface action' or "characteristic pattern 
of interaction which normally nurtures and socializes 
the members of a family or system through adequate 
communication, atmosphere, parenting, affective 
status, boundary integrity and decision making in 
relation to the outside world 11 (p.68). 
--~ 
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(2) Attachment beha~ieur, n~ture of relatio~ship and 
parental competence, insight, limit :setting, 
separation and .reunion and stranger reaction. 
(3} Non-verbal behaviour of the children involved 
with play material and each other and adults in 
the family. 
They felt that stress aroused enabled clear enactment of. 
adaptive behaviour but agreed with McDermott et .al. (1978) 
that such structured observations may well be distorting the 
picture through greatly heightened anxiety and stress, thus 
making it difficult to interpret. 
5.3.2.4. The Child Social and Community System 
Both interviews, and home, school and such visits ~auld 
provide the information in both potential environments against 
which the child•s needs could be measured. 
5.3.3 EVALUATION 
This stage consists of 3 specific tasks. 
5.3.3.1 (1) The synthesis of all the information into a 
formulation and understanding of ~he child within 
~is social context, from which opinions as to the 
needs of the child and the potential of each 
reconstituted home are based •. 
5.3.3.2 (2) .The formulation of a life-plan or recommendations 
involves the prediction of.the effect that certain 
factors will have on the development of the child 
(McDermott, et .al., 1978). ·This involves the 
weighing up of the available alternatives and 
··-· 
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assessing priorities based upon certain criteria 
which determine t~eir detrimental and beneficial 
effects on the child (Westman, 1979). Rosen and 
Abramowitz (1975), emphasize the need to recognize 
the relative merits and demerits of each party 
relative to the needs of the child, bearing in 
mind that very seldom do all the merits lie with 
one and none with the other party. 
Once this knowledge has been gathered together evaluation 
requires that the consultant needs to be able to measure it 
up against a solid basic knowledge of the stages of develop-
ment of childhood and the need~ ahd the ideal role of the 
primary caretaker at each stage.which will enhance the 
development of the child into a socially ·competent, respon-
sible, secure adult. Each stage must be approached from the 
cognitive, emotional, social, intellectual and behavioural 
points of view. 
Briefly summarised below, based largely on a model set out 
by Westman (1979), are the tasks that are required to be 
mastered by the child at each stage of his development and 
the prevailing qualities required to encourage this development. 
Infant Stage. 
The child at birth is entirely dependent on oth~s for his 
survival and to provide all his physical, social, emotional 
and intellettual ·needs. The most important task to be 
mastered is the formation of an.unbroken, iontinuous and 




regular and available primary caregiver who is committed to 
his welfare and to provide comfort, relieve tension, 
regulate his environmental stimulation and interact socially 
with him. (Bowlby, l951; 1969(a); Rutter, 1972; Goldstein, 
et al., 1973; Westman, 1979; Srouffe, 1979). A child may 
have more than one attachment figure (Ainsworth, 1979). This 
first attachment forms the basis for his later relationships 
(Bowlby, 1969(a)). Successful attachment during infancy 
precedes ~uccessful bonding, which provides the basis for 
later successful social development (Rutter, 1972). 
Rutter (1972) considers disturbed interpersonal relationships 
. as the single most important indicator of childhood and adult 
psychiatric disorders. He estimates that despite the lack of 
conducive evidence there would seem to be a 'sensitive period' 
during ~he fir~t two years of life, during which initial 
·bonding occurs and the later this develops the more difficult 
it becomes to achieve. 
This close relationship when it is regular and reliable fosters 
the development of a sense of confidence, trust and security 
(Benedek, 1938; Erikson, 1960). ·Where it is inadequate or 
frequently interrupted it becomes fragile and the child becomes 
vulnerable (Bowlby, 1969). When the relationship becomes too 
intense the child tends to become over secure and self content 
and strong exclusive attachments to single individuals tend to 
develop which are not socially adaptive (Mead, 1954). 
Bowlby (1959) focussed on the role of the mother figure which 
he stressed need not necessarily be the biological mother nor, 
) . 
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in fact, a mother at ~11 ·but rather a parent or other adult 
person who "mothers" or cares for the child on a regular 
daily basis. This may include more than one parent or person 
(Bowlby, 1969(a)). 
The biological connection should not however be lightly 
discarded as the parent/child relationship of biological 
origin has the highest potential for providing the child's 
needs. While dismissing 'maternal instinct' as a generalizable 
concep.t, the mother child relationship is. in fact a product of 
a whole series of physiological feedback mechanisms which, 
under 'normal • circumstances ensures the.mother's interest in 
her child from birth which builds up ~ •psycho-physiological • 
dependence, drawing them into an intimate, mutual need 
satisfying relationship (Watson, '1969). 
~sychologica~ parenting, however, must be suppbrted over 
failed biological parenting (Bentovim and Gilmour, 1981). 
The research indicates that the deprivation ~r loss of this 
' relationship at this stage results in serious complications 
for the child in his development (Rutter,·l972; Hess & 
Camara, 1979). The r~sults of this are largely dependent·o~ 
the quality of the relationship, the age of the child, and 
length of separation. (Srouffe, 1979; Ainsworth, 1979). 
This has specific relevance in the area of custody determina-
tions, as these primary at~achments should as far as possible 
not be di~turbed (Antonucci, 1976). loss in early life has 
been linked with depression ~nd suicide in ~dult life,.and 
more subtle and complex forms of ·vulnerability in the child 
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to certain stresses .whi~h may .become manifest in later life, 
when these individ~als attempt to establish ~dult roles or 
engage in parenting themselves (Sfouffe, 1979). 
The American Orthopsychiatric Association passed a 'position 
statement' by a 97% majority vote on the importance, in 
detisions about child ·custody, of the attual existence of. 
deep bonds of mutual attachment such as normally grow out of 
parent-child and child-parent relationships (Jenkins, 1977). 
Toddlers (18 months to 3~ year~)~ 
This is the stage where the child starts moving around and 
attempts to master the task of self control, gaining an 
awareness of himself as separate from the outside world. 
Venturing out from his familiar and secure base .to cope with 
unfamiliar environmental hazards, he gains a sense of self-
confidence. This corresponds to Erikson's stage of autonomy 
vs. shame and doubt. 
At this stage the child needs a trusted adult to.be available 
to selectively protect and expose him to a widening world. 
Supervised freedom r~quires frustrations, however, from limit 
setting to enable a.familiarity with the constraints ~f both 
physical and group·reality. 
This is a difficult (and mutually ambivalent) period requiring 
the facilitation by. the parent of the process of individuation. 
Early Childhood 3~- 4.years. 
The child at this stage ,needs to individuate and experience 
separation from primary attachment figures .(Bowlby, 1979). 
Children are now able to carry an internal image of these 
figures thus allowing separation to occur. 
.. _.., 
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Sexual identifi~ation aevelops and models of both sexes become· 
important •. There is also a tremendous a~ount of .physical 
energy that needs to be given the opportunity for expression 
so that large open spaces need to be provided or made available. 
The active participation with fantasy requires the parents to 
help the child distinguish between often frightening fantasies, 
reality and action. 
Although the child is still very egocentric, group experiences 
become important learning grounds where,·through confrontations 
resulting from rivalry for the exclusive attention of adults or 
toys, a sense of sharing and friendship is·developed, and 
through play social and.cultural patterns ar~ discovered and 
practiced. 
The peer group provides the opportunity to discover and identify 
their status and social identity outside of the h?me, thus 
expanding self concept and differentiation from the family, 
subordinating self interest and becoming sensitive to group 
approval and developing a "we feeling" (~estman, 1979). 
This stage corresponds to the play age where ·the child struggles 
between •initiative vs. guilt• (Erikson, 1960). The parental 
role here requires the facilitation of this individuation, 
provision of models of both sexes, opportunities .for peer play 
and physical and emotional self expression as w~4 as to provide 
routines to gain a sense of regularity and anticipation of 
events (Westman, 1979) and provide firm support and .clear rules 
and v~lues in order to facilitate management of impulses· 
Srouffe, 1979). 
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Middle Childhood 5 - ·8'years 
The school age of i~dustry vs. inferiority {Erikson, 1960) 
. -
follows the development of cognitive judgemental and motor 
function to the point where the child can take greater personal 
responsibility for himself in the neighbourhood and school 
where he needs to establish his place. Models are now 
assimilated and idealized and peer g~oups become the important 
socializing institution where techniques of sociability, self 
·assertion, competition and co-operation are learned and 
sensitivity to the expectations, censure and approval of the 
groups provides a sense of values and standards. 
Although attachment behaviour continues as a dominant strand 
in the child's life, it is weakened as emotional·support is 
increasingly provided by the peer group {Bowlby, 1967(.a)). 
The parental role here is one of facilitating peer group. 
interaction and recognizing and encouraging his physical, 
intellectual and social effects. The relevance that this 
knowledge has for custody. determination is the need to consider 
the importance of continuity for the child of his peer group 
relationships in the neighbourhood, school:and other activities, 
his close attachment figur.es and adult models. 
Late Childhood 9 - 13 years 
This is seen as an important stage by Westman .(.1.979), which 
he calls culmination of childhood. It is the stage in which 
rules and laws of society are mastered and confidence and 
le~dership experiences are gaiped. This enables them to loosen 




form of revolting and testing the adult ~ole~ 
The greatest need of parents at this stage .is to recognize 
their seniority in childhood and facilitate·their integration 
with peer groups. Often at this stage there is a felt need 
by the child to initiate contact with an adult friend. 
Adolescence 13 - adult 
This is ideally a time to devote to perfecting physical, 
social and intellectual ~kills "to explore ideas, ideals, 
ro 1 es, be 1 i efs, theories, commitments and a 11 sorts of pass i-
bilities at the level of thought" (ibid, p.l28). The thought 
process is still very egocentric. "Decentering" occurs 
through inter~ct1·on with the peer group and t~e acquisition of 
responsibilities. Attachments to the parents at this stage is 
subordinate to that of peers and sexual attachments e~tend the 
picture (Bowlby, 1969(a)). 
This is the stage of identity ·vs. identity diffusion (Erikson, 
1960). The parents' role is that of providing the ~dolescent 
with the opportunity to-·expand his persona 1 ·ski 11 s and resources 
in the preparation for assuming responsibilities for others, 
which serves to refine his sense of identity and self-esteem. 
In general tenns therefore, "parenting required for healthy 
.personality development seems to consist largely of a willingness ·---•· 
to assist and enjoy the normal maturation of a child" •.. and ••. 
"where a parent views the situation from a child's standpoint, 
and understands what is needed, no serious distortion follows, 
regardless of child rearing techniques employed" (Westman, 1979, 
p.114). 
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"Psychological parents want their children and are able 
to care for their needs. They provid~ support, 
stimulation, guidance and limits. They take care of 
their chil~ren's physical well-being. They help the 
children master their instinctual urges, provide the 
children with a motive for incrirporating a moral 
conscience and concern for the rights and feelings of 
others, and with models for identification. They 
value the children as members of the family and as 
f 
individuals in their own rights. 
Psychological parents recognize the importance of 
affirming their children's intrinsic loyalty ties to 
both parents., they encourage as positive contact as 
possible with the non-custodial parent. They do not 
use their children to further their own aims; to seek 
revenge on the other parent; to justify their own 
position; to serve as a mediator between parents; to 
parentify children into emotionally caring for them or 
taking on the primary responsibility for other children; 
to scapegoat children for the marital failure or 
personal ~nhappiness. Psychological parents encourage 
their children's connectedness with grandparents and 
extended family on both sides. They are willing to 
acknowledge their own contribution to the family prob-
lems~ They allow their children to express genuine 
feelings even if these feelings may be painful to the 
• 
parents. Psychological parents accept the responsi-
bility for being parents and expect some fair ccnsid-
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eration from their children for their efforts, 
neither infantalizing them into fixed dependent 
positions, nor parentifying them into roles that 
surpass their capabilities. Nor do psychological 
parents want cus'tody in order to force an 
unwilling spouse to stay in the marriage; to 
secure financial aids; or to replace another child 
lost by death or separation (Musetta, 1978, p.63~64). 
The contextual approach views the child in a social and cultural 
context. From early in its development the child becomes 
attached to more than one significant object figure, these 
include the rest of the family, siblings, grandparents and 
extended family, peers and other significant adults, and later 
to groups, schools, ideas, beliefs, prejudices and things like 
the home, motor car, neighbourhood and towns. For the child 
the removal of any of these to a greater or lesser extent 
entails a sense of loss of attachment for the child. In 
decisions of custody, although the strength of the attachment 
bond between the parents and the child should be a major con-
sideration, the continued access of the child to as many of 
their attachment objects as possible needs to be considered 
(Krasner, et al., 1976). 
Caldwell has identified 15 optional child rearing environmental 
experiences which could be used as another measure against which 
assessments could be made. These are: 
"1. Gratification of physical needs and providing for 
the health and safety of the child. 
2. A high frequency of adult contact, preferably with 
bot~ sex~s and with a small number of a~uits. 
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3. A positive emotiona.l climate permeated with trust 
and with assurance to the child that the parents 
will be there when the child needs th~m. 
-. 
4. Recognition and acceptance of individual differences 
in children by significant ~dults. 
5. An optimal level and pattern of need gratification 
which is not too much, nor too little, not too 
immediate, nor tqo late. This includes opportunities 
for joy, group contact, quiet and solitary reflection. 
6. Variation within patterned sensory and informational 
inputs that are neither too strong nor too weak. 
7. People who love and support a child and provide cues 
regarding appropriate behaviour and their adult values. 
8. Limited restrictions on a child's exploratory behaviour 
to avoid snuffing out curiosity. 
9. A rich and varied cultural experience based upon family 
background and each individual's heritage. 
10. Careful organization of physical and temporal environ-
ment so that a child can develop expectancies and 
predictability in order to provide a cognitive map 
through which children can interpret space and time. 
11. Simple play materials to facilitate the development 
and coordination of sensory-motor processes. Someone 
also needs to invest the toys with value, for example, 
a boy who says "I don_'t have anything to play with" 
may pick up a toy that his mother has handled and 
• 
-145-
indirectly suggested he use. 
12. Gradual exposure to and participation in the world of 
work not as a passive recip~ent 'but as an active 
contributor. 
13. · Opportunities to share talents and skills without 
destructive criticism. Adults must control 
destructive peer criticism, for extample, laughing at 
mistakes and teasing each other. 
14. Overlap between different environments in which the 
child is expected to function, for example, between 
home and day care centre by interaction between parents 
and staff. 
15. Adults who find children to be satisfying and 
rewarding." 
(Westman, 1979, p.l24). 
Probably the most important guideline to be held in mind is 
the one that would seem the most obvious and that is that each 
individual child is unique as is each family system, so that 
minimum use should be made of general principles per se. 
Here again the advantage is clear at this stage of a team 
approach in which a combination of mental health professionals 
contribute their views befot~e evaluation is finalized, thus 
contributing a variety of perspectives. 
5.3.3.3 The Interpreti·ve Process 
The third task is the interpretive process. Warner and Elliott 
(1979) insist that once finally decided, the findings and 
recommendations, with reasons, be conveyed to each parent. 
' . 
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O'Shea and Connery (1980) see this as a stage at vthich 
a further opportunity for a mediated settlement can be provided. 
Both _the above author_s, and Bentov im and Gilmour ( 1981) see 
the need to share with the parents, individually and in line 
with the principles of confidentiality, the rationale for the 
recommendation and the difficulties that exist with each in 
their relationships with the child. 
Warner and Elliott (1979) suggest that the parent not being 
recommended for custody be told first in order to prevent him 
being told in a destructive way by another. 
The role of the consultant is one of . 
(a) understanding the experience of loss of primary 
caretaking responsibility over a child's life 
on a day to day basis and loss of self-esteem 
in the parent, 
(b) confronting and 
(c) permitting the grieving process to begin, 
but where this is not possible, to relinquish the wish to help 
as the parent may need more time to accept this decision. The 
sense of loss may also be expressed through a~ger often 
directed at the consultant who is required in this instance to 
"maintain cognitive awareness of the parents' position as one 
that defends the parent against hurt. Ev~luators who mis-
understand this communication are likely to be drawn into a 
debate around the adequacy of the team or evaluator" (p.380). 
\ 
This is a difficult, painful and intense experience for . 
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consultants who, if·.~n~xperienced, might be tempted to revise 
their conclusions as a defence reaction to the sadness they 
share with the parent rather than as a consideration for the 
psychological needs of ~he children. 
Evaluation also requires the provision for continuing super-
vision and support for the children and families. 
5.3.4 Report Writing 
5.3.4.1 General Approach 
The purpose of the report is to communicate clearly to the 
court or attorneys the honest opinion of the expert, based 
on his knowledge and his investigati6n. It ~ust provide all 
the relevant material required by the lawyers in order to 
conduct an appropriate examination and cross examination 
(Watson, 1969). 
In order for it to make a constructive contribution it should 
be clearly understandable, accurate, logical and modest 
(Gibbens, no date). Bradbrook (1971) has crititized the use 
of 'impractical, formalized double talk' and Nichols (1980) 
reports on th~ tendency of experts unfamiliar with the court 
to produce technical reports, poorly understood by lay readers 
which do not answer the legal questions raised. Fredericks 
(1975) suggests that ideally, reports should make minimal use 
of technical language or vague terms, they should be clear and 
concise and should have no room for guesswork o~ interpreta-
tions by others. Both Gibbens (n.d.) and Nichols (1980) 
stressed the need to express any doubt felt. 
_ __., 
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5.3.4.2. Form and Length 
Gibbens puts it succinctly by stating that the recommendations 
or opinions form the heart of the report and ~11 that precedes 
the~-demonstrates that they are ration~l. 
The following format has been found to b~ usef~l: 
-1. Introduction includ~s: 
(a) the circumstances of the dispute 
(b) the conditions of appointment 
(c) what investigations consisted of ~ interviews 
with whom, observations of what and where,, 
affidavits. 
(d) the criteria of 'central issues' that need 
to be considered which would include the 
specific question as posed by the referral 
source which inevitably includes the 'fitness' 
or 'unfitness' of the parents. 
(e) the problems encountered in the process of 
the investigations hostility, limited access, 
limited time. 
2. The next section provides the packground data to the 
dispute. Here the lighlight of 
(a) the personal history of each contesting adult, 
(b) their courtship, marital and family history and 
(c) the personal and social history of the child, 
are succinctly presented. 
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3. This section d~als with the formulation or assessment 
of the •central·-i~sues• that require consideration, 
which includes 
-(a) the issues and allegations raised by both 
parties, such as neglect, poor mothering, 
caretaking, abuse and so on, and 
(b) issues considered central by the consultant 
based on his understanding of the case and 
knowledge of the child•s developmental needs, 
in terms of current and projected marital, 
family and social circumstances. 
4. Opinion and Recommendations answer the questions 
posed in the brief and correspond to the formulation 
of a life plan for the child. Recommendations may 
be definite and specific, and may suggest alternative 
possibilities. Rosen and Abramovitz (1975) specify 
· the need to carefully specify custody and access 
arrangements as rulings of •reasonable access• are 
vague and may l~ad to endless abuse. 
There would seem to be two general principles to which to 
adhere.: 
(a) to be able to substantiate all statements by 
reliable factual data and 
(b) to be able to back up all conclusions drawn by 
a sound knowledge of the psychological field. 
Gibbens states that Judges want to know the basis 
for opinions. 
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5. The final section ~ay raise ~uestions and problems . 
which might not have been answered and may suggest 
further observations or information which ~auld 
r~duce or support the corisultant's confidence in 
his expressed opinion (Fredericks, 1975). 
5.3.4.3 Confidentiality 
A contentious issue is that of confidentiality and whether 
information regarding the child should be withheld from parents 
and whether information regarding parent should be withheld 
from the other parent. 
Solow and Adams (1977) recommends that findings regarding parents 
should be withheld from the other in order to prevent the misuse 
of information by the parties and in order to allow greater self 
revealing. They felt, ·however~ that information regarding the 
child should be given to parents as this obvious break of 
confidentiality would be greatly outweighed by potential 
increased awa~eness and understanding by parents for the child's 
needs. 
Westman (1979), on the other hand, feels the need to protect the 
privacy and confidentiality of the child and family and to deal 
with sensitivity to generational differences in needs and 
interests. 
Gibbens suggests ttiat this issue be dealt with by carefully 
considering the impact of the report on the family. It is 
jmportant to consider whether the report is fair or whether 
anyone could be resentful or surprised by some of the information 
5.3.5 
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(e.g. discovery of .illegitimacy) which might create further 
problems for the family. He suggests that very sensitive 
issues be marked as confidential. 
Rosen and Abramovitz (1975) stress the need for a balanced 
representation of the situation which is never 'black or white'. 
They also see the need to set the report out in such a way as 
to lessen the blow for the parent who loses custody. 
Ideally reports should be handed to the lawyer appointed to 
the child, the court and the contesting parents, .all of whom 
should be at liberty to question the validity of the findings 
expressed. 
Again it is important that, once the opinion of the expert is 
known, a further opportunity be provided for a settlement to 
be reached by the competing parties on the basis of the report. 
One spouse may be sufficiently assured by the other spouse's 
fitness as a parent that they can at this stage accept custody 
being granted to them. The assessment made of them as a fit 
parent may be suffi~iently face-saving as to allow settlement 
to proceed on a more practical basis. 
The Expert Witness in Court 
The tendency for mental health professionals to avoid court-
work in which their methods, opinions and conclusions are 
disputed and c~allenged has been recognized (Derdeyn, 1975; 
0' Shea and Connery, 1980). 
As a re~ult many avoid taking a definite stand by asserting 
that the data was inconclusive, or providing an opinion so 
guarded, focussing on irrelevant aspects and providing such 
impractical solutions as to render their opinions useless for 
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the purpose of assistin~ the Court (Benedek and Benedek, 1972}. 
Clearly, in view of the vulnerability of the corisultants to 
bias within the adversary system as well as the inevitable 
subjectivity of such assessments, the need to subject the 
expert's 'opinion evidence' to the critical analysis of cross 
examination is central to due process of law (Duquette, 1~78). 
It provides the consultant with opportunity to specify 11 the 
criteria used, the definitions thereof, the academic rationale 
for selecting them, the reliability and validity of the 
evaluation, the safeguards against bias and unjustified 
subjectivity, and the best method for interpreting and 
communicating the data 11 (Woody, 1978, p.86). It is therefore 
a safeguard against unquestioned, automatically adopted opinion 
of someone who could other'v'lise develop into a very powerful 
expert (Duquette, 1978). 
The Court has criticized experts for defensive and argumentative 
attitudes in court (Selzer and Benedek, 1965; Stock vs. Stock, 
1981)~ Unfortunately, however, experience has shown that while 
direct examination by the 'supported' counsel tends to be gentle 
and kind and designed to-support the opinion reached, the opposing 
counsel attempts to strike, probe and penetrate into the areas 
not covered in order to uncover blind spots and gen~rally discredit 
the expert's evidence (Bernstein, 1977), a process which is 
aggressively threatening for any expert. 
very often, persons approached to provide expert opinion have 
~little experience or knowledge of the judicial process that must 
be followed. 
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In South Africa, the ·normal procedure would seem to be that 
once the report has .clarified towards whom the opinion of the 
expert leans, he becomes a witness for that side and then 
relies on that parent's counsel to represent what he has 
assessed to be the best interests of the child and family to 
the Court. The disadvantages of this system have been previously 
discussed (Section 5.1.2). 
Ideally the child would be represented by an independent attorney 
whose role it is to coordinate and present the case ensuring the 
• 
protection of the child's best interests. Whatever the system, 
however, the primary aim is clearly to present an honest objective 
opinion. 
Nichols (1980) offers a set of very practical guidelines for 
experts to follow in the Courtrooms. These include: 
1. As records used in Court may be kept as exhibits, 
copies rather than originals should be handed in. 
Records should never be altered, destroyed or . 
withheld. Nothing forbids the handing in of a 
supplementary record in order to correct or 
modify a previous report. 
2. The expert in the witness stand should, after 
stating his name and professional address, provide 
his credentials qualifying him for expert testimony 
which could include an updated curriculum vitae. 
3. He provides a list of do's and don't's. 
(a) Always tell the truth as one falsehood destroys 
the cridibility of the testimony {evidence). 
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(b) Listen caref4lly to the ·question and answer 
only what .is being asked. 
(c) If your answer requires further exp1anation 
in order to place it in proper context, request 
that this be permitted. 
(d) Wait to hear the whole question before attempt-
ing to answer. 
(e) Do not start to answer before knowing what the 
answer is going to be. If it is not clear ask 
for it to be repeated or clarified so that you 
have understood. 
It has been suggested that experts avoid attempting to answer 
questions outside of their field of knowledge. 
(f) Do not look to counsel for support or guidance 
before answering. 
(g) Dress neatly and professionally. 
(h) Be polite and non-defensive. Brodsky and Robeys 
(1972), in Nichols, 1980, observe that inexperienced 
professionals tend to react to cross examination 
with resentment, anger, confusion and stubborness, 
and tend to be easily manipulated, while more 
experienced professionals tend to remain steady 
while conceding minor points. They tend generally 
to accept the need for a thorough review of all 
aspects of their contribution (Frederick, 1975). 
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Benedek and Benedek (1982) suggest that it may be 
necessary for experts to consider, explore and 
even suggest alternative solutions. 
(i)- Be prepared to supply information on the cost and-
time taken to date on the investigation. 
(j) Do not be the advocate for either party per se. 
However, Brodsky and Robeys (ibid) do observe that 
professionals unfamiliar with Court proceedings tend 
to provide an objective presentation of clinical 
data, while 'Court orientated professionals' aim at 
persuasion, teaching. and mild advocacy of their 
findings and direct this testimony at the Judge. 
(k} Having concluded the examination, the Judge should 
be thanked if he has allowed the consultant to give 
evidence out of order. 
(1) The expert should not remain to listen to the rest 
of the testimony unless asked to do so by the Court 
or attorneys. 
On the question of confidentiality the expert finds himself 
in a 'catch 22' situation particularly for the therapist who 
has been seeing the parent, parents, family or child in 
therapy and is subpoenaed to court as a witness to give evidence. 
Jenkins (1977) advises that such professionals contact the 
Judge concerned and explain that they are not the best possible 
source of data for determining child custody and admit to any 
bias held, and if necessary arrange for more useful investigations 
to be undertaken. 
5.3.6 
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Costs need to be assessed on actual time spent in investigating, 
evaluating, reporting and courtroom time based on regular 
private practice fees (Nichols, 1980). 
The reluctance expressed by lawyers to refer clients to private 
counsellors and consultants (Selzer and Benedek, 1972), could be 
largely overcome if clinicians were engaged by the Court. This 
would in addition open the services to all sectors of the 
public (Rosen, 1978). 
Training 
Felner and Farber (1980) recognize that if social science and 
legal professionals are to work together constructively for the 
best interests of the families in divorce and to develop a social 
policy for the settlement of custody and access issues they 
should first of all gain a clearer understanding of each other's 
operating paradigms and goals. 
Much as the legal professional needs to familiarize himself with 
the psychological and social aspects of custody/access disputes, 
so too the psychological consultant, given the complexity of his 
role, needs appropriate training, including academic knowledge in 
child custody in general, and practical familiarity with the working 
of the legal system which relates to children and families in 
specific, as well as some understanding about general legal issues 
and values. 
Over and above the legal orientation there is a need to cope 
with the specific emotional demands of this work (Derdeyn, 1975). 
as well as to understand the possible influence of personal/ 
professional characteristics and values on the evaluation process 
itself. This aspect of training can only really be achieved 
through experience with close supervision. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The previous chapters have stressed the need of the child 
for continued contact with both parents as an importarit 
determinant in their healthy emotional development. We 
know however that conflict does not end with the divorce 
and that such contrast provides a 'convenient vehicle for 
the expression of post marital malice' (Weiss, 1977) which 
is disruptive to family relationships and causes, debilitating 
loyalty conflicts for the child. Jacobson (1978) states that 
60% of such exchanges between parents involve conflict. We 
are a 1 so aware that even when contact \'Ji th one parent is severed 
hostility is not necessarily terminated. 
This chapter examines the need for post divorce interventions 
as a way of helping both parents and children resolve their 
conflicts and feelings relating to the separation and loss. It 
defines the goals, forms of intervention and the role played 
by counsellors~ Also considered are the various ways in which 
communities could facilitate post divorce adjustment by families. 
6. Post Divorce Counseiling 
6.1 The need for counselling after divorce 
In terms of the true Child Advocacy model, formulation, opinion 
and referrals need follow-up by case managers who provide 
support for the family and supervision of the proposed life plan 
(Westman, 1979). This service corresponds to the fourth stage 
of the CAU program as described by O'Shea and Connery (1980). 
) ' 
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Such follow-up recognizes that problems arise and adjustments 
need to be made by families i.n the post divorce peri~d which require 
both time and support. It also recognizes that many couples are 
not, for many reasons, able to resolve the divorce experience and 
thus become involved in post divorce 'angerism', described by 
Elkin (1977, p.56), as "a destructive mixture of deep-seated 
unresolved anger, dependency, anxiety, fear and at times .. a. 
degree of irrationality, and an inability to set aside the anger 
long enough to do what is necessary for the best interest of all 
concerned, particularly the children". This becomes the source 
of distress and suffering for both the parents and the children 
concerned. The followup therefore also serves the purpose of 
assessing and distinguishing between families who have not, 
through divorce, been able to resolve their conflict, and use 
the.Courts to punish each other and support their polarized 
positions, and those for whom changes in arrangements need to 
be made. 
It further recognizes that the unnecessary removal and transplanting 
of children should be discouraged (Finlay and Gold, 1971; Jenkins, 
1977). 
Many of the painful sequelae of divorce can be greatly reduced 
by the provision of a counselling service which helps parents to 
understand and cooperate with the terms of the agreement and to 
promote growth and emotional health of the restructured families. 
Rosen (1978) found, in a Canadian study of post divorce families, 
that the presence of emotional support, practical advice and 
guidance during the stressful period immediately foliowing divorce, 
made a considerable difference to the single parent's ability to 
cope with the many demands made by their ne\'/ role. 
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,.The reason and justifi.cat ions, goa 1 and procedures proposed 
by various workers in the field have evolved from clinical 
experience and observations over the years. The findings 
of two prominent contributors in the field, Elkin (1977), 
the Director of Family Counselling Service, Conciliation Court, 
Los Angeles (which helped over 300 families during its first 
three years of service) and Wallerstein and Kelley who have 
worked with 60 families and 131 children over a period of five 
years at the Children of Divorce Project in California, are 
combined and summarized on the basis of common views expressed. 
The need for post divorce counselling has been justified by the 
following observations which are central to the development of 
any post divorce program. 
(1) "The divorce experience does not stop with the final 
decree •••. more important than the legal divorce is 
the emotional divorce, (Elk~~' 1977, p.SS). The 
divorce experience shares with death a deep sense of 
loss for both parents and children which requires a 
process of mourning by the family members. When this 
fails to occur, neither the children nor the parents 
are able to 'let go' of the pre-divorce family. 
(2) Although the marital relationship is terminated, 
parents continue to be parents to their children. 
(3) The way children cope with the divorce experience will 
depend on the divorce process and the way the parents 




(4) The immediate post divorce separation period, when 
the imp~tus and direction for change is strongest, 
seems the most effective time to provide the 
opportunity for intervention efforts which focus 
on the parental relationship with the child and 
the spousal relationship. 
(5) Divorce, as in any crisis, constitutes a process of 
disorganization and reorganization in which the 
original families are dissolved and re-structured 
in the form of new and separate families of the father 
and the mother. Old relationships are never ended but 
merely changed. 
Grote and Weinstein (1977) put it succinctly. 11 A post 
divorce family is still a family, and a family by any definition 
is a unit of intimate interpendent relationship. Even though 
the man ~nd the woman are no longer husband and wife, they are 
still, and must be, mutually dependent upon one another, in 
very special \"Jays as father and mother to their children. This 
mutual dependence is shared in turn by the children in their 
relationship with their parents, and the whole unit of inter-
dependent reJationship is psychologically irreducible and 
inseparable. The reality of this interdependence is thus the 
ground of either continued pain, bitterness, hostility and 
resultant courtroom battles, or it is the ground for acceptance 
. 
and regeneration .. , p.46. 
6.2 The Goals 
The general goals of such services are therefore: 
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(1) To help the parents arrive at a mutually acceptable 
working settlement. The Los Angeles Conciliation 
Court incorporates the mutually acceptable decisions 
into a written agreement (see Appendix II; Elkin, 
1977, p.59). 
(2) To open up channels of communication that may be 
blocked by unresolved anger. 
(3) To assess at what level the parents are still 
emotionally married and work through the mourning 
process with them in order to achieve detachment 
and reduce or eliminate the suffering and distress. 
(4) To help the parents separate the spousal and parental 
issues and recognize that their roles as parents are 
forever. 
(5) Help the parent become aware of the impact their 
conflict may have on their children and provide 
information regarding the developmental and psycho-
logical needs of their children and the type of 
symptoms that may develop which might indicate the 
need for professional help. 
(6) Provide the opportunity for children to express and 
resolve their feelings and learn constructive ways 
of coping with problems. 
(7) To refer to more appropriate sources where necessary. 
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6.3 Children responses. to the d.i.vorce experience 
Benedek and Benedek (1979) stress that divorce related 
problems are not necessarily symptomatic of serious mental 
illness, although they may become forerunners for such 
emotional disturbances as depression and anxiety at a later 
stage. 
Despite adequate support there is an inevitable period of 
•normal• or expected stress and adjustment for both the 
parents and the child which is not indicative of pathology 
and simply has to run its course over time. For the purpose 
of counselling, therefore, it is important to recognize what 
is expected and what is pathological behaviour. Wallerstein and 
Kelley have looked at non clinical populations and made an in 
depth study of what they considered normal responses of children 
to the divorce experience at different stages of development. 
These are briefly summarised. 
The pre-school children tend to use denial extensively as a way 
of coping with the separation. Regression, confusion, 
irritability and anxiety was also often observed (Wallerstein 
and Kelley, 1975). 
I 
The children in early latency tend to suffer openly. No longer 
able to use denial effectively they tended to become distressed, 
immobilized and vulnerable to regression. They evidenced sadness, 
grieving, fear of the present and future situation, they felt 
deprived and became excessively demanding, experienced a strong 
sense of loss for the non-custodial, absent parent, to whom they 
had difficulty expressing anger openly, but became angry towards 
the custodial parent (usually the mother), or displaced this 
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anger on peers, si.blings and the school. They held strong 
reconciliation fantasi.es (Wallerstein and Kelley, 1975-76). 
The later latency and pre-adolescent children being more 
mature clearly recognized the reality of the situation. They 
actively attempted to master their conflicts and fears and to 
gain control of the disorder in their lives. Courage, 
bravado, seeking support from others and-increased activity 
were evidenced as means of dealing with their feelings of loss, 
rejection and loneliness. The single clearly distinguished 
feeling in this group was focussed and clearly expressed anger 
towards both parents together with realistically based fears 
(Wallerstein and Kelley, 1975; 1976). 
The Adolescents felt the hurried need to achieve independence 
in a shortened time with an insecure home base and changing 
parental roles and little control and guidance. They felt 
vulnerable to their own sexual and aggressive impulses, anxious 
about parents • sexua 1 ity and sexua 1 and mar ita 1 issues generally. 
The divorce exaggerated their already felt sense of loss as a 
result of their appropriate moving away from family and child-
hood. Anger \'las a common response and loyalty conflicts wet·e 
apparent as parents turned to them for support. Many gained 
greater maturity and sense of responsibility (Wallerstein and 
Kelley, 1974; 1980). 
Gardner (1976) suggests that children should only be referred for 
psychotherapy when it is clear that social relationships have 
become dysfunctional. Ordinarily, preventative counselling should 
be used to aid the process of resolution. For adults too, the 
need is not to effect major personality changes but to provide 
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brief, readily available, ~ersattle, goal directed, problem 
ori.entated, educati.onal, advisory and supportive counselling. 
6.4 Intervention Program Models 
Benedek and Benedek (1977 (a)) proposed a broad comprehensive 
model including a multi-disciplinary staff to provide specific 
divorce related education, individual, conjoint and family 
interviews, small didactic groups which make use of films, 
videotapes and other stimuli and educational material, directed 
counselling and short term group therapy. They promote the 
involvement of all family members as the need arises and provide 
for referrals to such outside sources as long term psychotherapy 
and self-help groups and other community services. They include 
in their program the task of training and educating judges, 
attorneys, behavioural scientist and students. 
Workers in the field have drawn largely on crisis intervention 
theory directed towards the resolution of conflict, as the basic 
approach, on the assumption that divorce constitutes a time 
limited crisis in the life of the child and his parents in which 
adaptive and coping mechanisms are in disarray and the adults• 
capacity to parent is diminished. This has been combined with 
attachment, loss and mourning, cognitive, behavioural, educational, 
family and group theory. 
The optimum period for intervention was estimated by Wallerstein 
and Kelley (1977(a)) to be between one month and six months 
following parental separation. Prior to this, the state of initial 
shock and denial of the individuals rendered intervention 
ineffective, and beyond this period symptomatic behaviour and 
parent child allegiances are often already consolidated and 
strongly defended and it is unnecessary to· extend the state of 
confusion and suffering. 
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6.4.1 Assessment for counselling 
All programs begin wi:th the necessary diagnostic, evaluative 
interview upon which the intervention strategies specific to 
the individual needs of the family are based and planned. Even 
for children's groups it has been suggested that leaders have 
some basic information regarding the environmental context of 
the child (Sonnenstein -Schneider and Baird (1980). 
Wallerstein and Kelley base their planning of intervention 
strategies on an assessment process which encompasses 11 the 
child 1 S overall response, including capacities and strengths 
in the child and his environment, as well as indications of 
difficulties and vulnerabilities .. (p.25). 
The assessment process co'nsists of: 
(l) A developmental assessment based on 
(a) a brief deve 1 opmenta 1 hi story of the child from 
the parents, 
(b) information about his level of functioning from 
the school setting as well as 
(c) information obtained from actual observations of 
the child. 
(2) A divorce specific assessment of the child's specific 
response to the divorce experience based on: 
(a) his understanding of the divorce, information 
acquired, thoughts and fantasies, 
6.4.2 
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(b) his emotional affecti~e responses and 
defenses used, 
(c) the pervasiveness of behavioural responses or 
defenses in various setting, 
(d) the emergence of new behaviours or •symptoms• 
in response to the separation. 
(3) An evaluation of the support systems available to 
the child (or lack thereof), which includes the 
current parent-child relationship, sibling, extended 
family, school, peer group and other activities. 
This information leads to a formulation or understanding of 
the interaction of divorce induced stresses with the develop-
mental and personality achievement of each child which suggests 
the appropriate level, issues and techniques of intervention 
with each family, interventions being child-centered, 
relationship-centered or parent-centered. 
Individual approach - children 
In recognition of the fact that the responses of children to 
both the parental separation and intervention strategies are 
specifically determined by their developmental stage, Wallerstein 
and Kelley (1977(a); 1977(b)) have developed two models of 
intervention with children. One is for younger children in 
which the therapist worked intensively with the parents and 
another for older children and adolescents who were able to 
benefit from brief intervention which focussed on reality testing 
with an outsider, reassurance and encouragement. 
I 
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Preprimary Chi.ldren below the age of 6 years, are too young 
to understand and integrate a fd~ussed crisis intervention 
approach. These authors found parents to be ideally suited 
to the task of providing children of this age with the much 
needed explanations which require frequent repetition and to 
observe and interpret their responses to divorce related events. 
The child centered intervention with parents therefore focussed 
on educational and advisory issues: 
(1) Teaching parents specific techniques of communication 
with children in order to promote the discussion of 
divorce and related events so as to enable resolution 
and mastery of divorce related feelings. 
(2) Advising parents on the handling of divorce related 
symptomatic behavioural responses and providing 
explanations and support. 
(3) Making parents aware of the aspect of their behaviour 
which ~ay cause distress and suffering, as with limited 
access. 
Children in early latency pose different problems as their 
immature ego with their ineffective use of denial and their 
av1areness of rea 1 ity make it difficult for them to integrate 
and discuss this painful experience. There is a need to respect 
the defences of this age group, who need to work their stress 
out for themselves. The authors found, however, that a 1 divorce 
monologue• by the Counsellor who .. recounted for the child what 
things were like for other 7 year olds whose parents divorced .. 
(ibid. p.33)~ sharing examples which the Counsellor intuitively 
felt corresponded to what the child would be experiencing based 
·6.4.3 
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on the initial assessment, helped the child to work on his 
conflict while not threatening his defences. 
' Parental intervention at this level focussed on educating 
the parents a~ to the presence in the child of strong 
loyalties for both parents and the resulting difficulty of 
their forming new relationshkps or accepting substitute 
parents at this stage. 
Children in later latency and pre-adolescence were found to 
possess an acute sense of reality, which urged them to validate 
their reality testing by discussions with family outsiders who 
were not involved in loyalty conflicts, and anger which 
complicated their relationship with the parental figures. They 
were able to make use of brief intervention which focussed on 
resolving feelings, planning ahead and solving problems. The 
focus of intervention with the parents took the form of education 
and setting the stage for more productive communication later on. 
Children•s divorce groups have been enthusiastically advanced 
over the past five years as an ideal medium for children as 
young as 6 years onwards. The basic principle is that much of 
children learning at this stage occurs in his peer groups. The 
support of a peer group that shares the empathy of a common 
reality, in terms of needs, feeiings and life experiences, under 
the guidance of a trained counsellor, facilitates the sharing 
and exploration of feelings and modification of attitudes, so 
that children are better able to deal with both their divorce 
specific and general developmental problems (Green, 1978; 
Sonnenshein-Schneider and Baird, 1980). 
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The specific aims of such groups as defined by the various 
authors have been notably similar. 
(1) To clarify, recognise and understand feelings 
pertaining to the divorce experience (Wilkinson 
& Black, 1977; Green, 1978; Hammond, 1981). 
(2) To help the child understand that he is not alone 
but that others share his feelings and experiences 
(Wilkinson & Black, 1977; Hammond, 1981). 
(3) To facilitate interaction and support (Green, 1978) 
and thus provide peer group membership (Sonnenshein-
Schneider & Baird, 1980) to children who at this 
time generally feel isolated from friends and fear 
rejection from peers (Hammond, 1981). 
(4) To provide an opportunity to confront their problems 
and to learn new communication and coping skills 
through modelling and behavioural practice (Wilkinson 
& Black, 1977; Green, 1978; Guerney & Gordon, 1979;. 
Hammond, 1981 ) • 
(5) To help the latency child gain a realistic perspective 
of the divorce situation (Wilkinson & Black, 1977) and 
develop rational, correct thoughts regarding them-
selves and divorce (Green, 1978; Guerney & Jordan, 
1979). 
(6) To provide the oppo1·tunity for adolescents to clarify 
attitudes related to future love and marriage relation-
ships (Hammond, 1981). 
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(7) To help children ~e~elop ~ positi~e self image and 
broaden thei.r range of interests (Green, 1978; 
Guerney and Jordan, 1979). 
(8) To help children change their existing negative 
behaviour patterns to more positive ways of acting 
(Green, 1978). 
(9) To provide emotional support and new coping skills 
at a time when many adjustments have to be made and 
parents are often not available to meet their 
children's needs (Guerney & Jordan, 1979). 
In the groups described by the above authors, the number of 
sessions varied from 6 to 10 and the sessions themselves varied 
in length from 20 to 30 minutes for the younger children to 
45 minutes for the older groups. 
These groups \'Jere carefully structured. Each session \·Jas 
divided into two or three stages. 
(a) The first part of the session consisted of a fun, 
warming up, icebreaking activity. 
(b) The main part of the session consisted of a stimulus 
activity around which discussions were held which 
facilitated the sharing of personal feelings and, 
(c) The closing stage tended to consist of a summary of 
what had been learned with evaluation and feedback 
by the children, the assignment of homework and, to 
end off, the serving of refreshments. 
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For all groups, the topic for discussion in the session 
were anchored around concrete sti.muli. or activities. This 
helped the children especially the younger ones to 'see' 
the point being made thus making it more cognitively valuable 
to the children (Sonnenshein-Schneider and Baird, 1980) and 
making the sessions less threatening for them and facilitating 
communication in the groups (Hammond, 1981). 
Examples of such activities or stimuli include: puppets, 
books, films, videos, drawing material and other creative 
materials, games, relevant statements and sentences, role 
playing, role rehearsal. 
As with all groups the goal and rules such as taking turns to 
speak, listening to others speak, the confidentiality of 
material and so on were clearly stated and discussed from the 
beginning. 
Evaluation of the program run by Guerney and Jordan (1979) 
for 9 to 13 years old indicated that the children enjoyed the 
experience and it had helped them to talk about and understand 
different aspects of their experiences. Parents felt that the 
children had maintained strict confidentiality and had shared 
relatively little with them. The leaders felt that the children 
had been interested and open from the beginning. This they felt 
was facilitated by 
(a) the empathic approach, 
(b) content summaries 
(c) a few verbal open children who served as models. 
6.4.4 
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They felt that most had come to terms with their family 
situation and were less involved with active problem solving 
than consolidating their position and reviewing gains. 
An important point made was that participation of the child 
depended on parental motivation to a large extent, which made 
it important that parents understand and support the need for 
such groups and not feel threatened by them. 
Parent-Child centered Interventions 
A second focus of intervention was defined by Wallerstein 
and Kelley (1977(a)) as the parents • capacity to respond 
effectively as parents to their children. The parents• 
relationship with the child is extremely vulnerable to the intra-
psychic and interpersonal pressures and ambivalence of parents 
when old marital conflicts become installed in restructured 
families. Where this occurs and results in the child being 
drawn into a continuous, conflictual relationship between his 
parents, intervention is aimed at 
(1) explaining the underlying dynamics of the child 1 s 
behaviour to the parents, 
{2} consistent and accurately times interpretation and 
difficulty in exercising proper parental functions 
and 
(3) supporting the painful, slow beginning efforts at 
changing and regaining parenting capacity of both 
parents. The aim is to disengage the child from the 
marital struggles and validate for both parents their 
con~inuing importance to their children. 
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Thi.s goa 1 can a 1 so be a.c.hi.e~ed through fami.ly sessions. Both 
Weisfeld and Laser (no date) and Baideme et al., (1978) proposed 
a family therapy model in which the absent, non-custodial parent, 
often ignored or see~ separately in th~ traditional therapy 
process is included. Both Weisfelt and Laser argue that the non-
custodial parent as much as the other parenting adults, is an 
active participant in the "Corrupt Contact" that facilitate 
"neurotic patterns of relating". When left out he alone remains 
unaware of the changes that are being instituted which 
potentially threatens the progress of therapy and change. 
Baideme et al in fact encourage the inclusion of all members of 
the divorce family system including step-parents and grand-
parents when indicated. 
Where family therapy is the intervention of choice and children 
need to be included it must be made perfectly clear to them that 
the reconciliation of his parents is not the purpose of the 
intervention. 
Baideme et al also suggest that two therapists instead of one 
would provide a show of strength to the clients and a safe 
environment for them. For the therapists it would provide 
mutua 1 support. 
Baideme et al. used a three stage procedure: a contact stage, 
an evaluative stage and follovJing a commitment by the clients, 
a 6 - 8 session treatment stage. They worked with the adult 
parental system where possible, shifting the focus from the 
child to the adult relationship, encouraging the expression of 
hurt and angry feelings to the therapist, attempted to resolve 
the conflict and reduce the stress and re-establish the parents 




The manner in which children adapt to their post divorce life 
is almost entirely dependent on the manner in which their 
parents resolve their disputes and constructively create post 
divorce homes and foster a working relationship with each other 
and their children. 
The fact is that many adults persist in engaging in malevolent 
conflictual relationship for sometimes years. following the 
legal divorce. The reason for this seems to stem from the 
inability of one or both parties to 'let go' of the marriage. 
The process of 'letting go' or 'decathexis' or 'detachment' is 
comparable to the mourning process which follows loss through 
death and is necessary in order to separate from the former 
marriage {Seagull and Seagull, 1977). The process of divorce 
consists of three stages, the stage of disorganisation, the 
stage of acceptance and the stage of reorganization (Elkin, 1977) 
and it is towards the facilitation of this process that parent-
centered intervention must aim. 
Thweatt (1980) has used the attachment model to understand this 
process and on which to base a therapeutic approach. 
Attachment behaviour is the form of behaviour that keeps people 
close to another differentiated and preferred person. It develops 
ahd becomes more varied from childhood and is evident throughout 
life. The permanent loss of an attached relationship, as in death, 
results in a predictable sequence of behaviour evident in both 
children (Spitz and Wolf) and adults. The first phase of denial 
is characterized by a sense of numbness, difficulty in accepting 
the loss and periodic bursts of tearfulness. This, follo~tJed by a 
second phase of protest, characterized by attempts to recover the 
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lost object and dependency needs thorough preoccupation with 
past memories and tension, weeping and anger. The third phase 
is of despair, characterized by disorganization of normal life 
patterns, aimlessness and an inability to see any purpqse in 
1 i fe and a genera 1 soci a 1 vii thdrawa 1 which is finally fa 11 owed 
by the detachment phase. This fourth phase is characterized by 
a reduction in affective responses and renewed interest in the 
present. 
The divorce process as with death constitutes the loss of 
attachment objects, the spouse, children (for many the non-
custodial fathers), friends, family home, beliefs, values, 
fantasies, aspirations and the process of grieving is similar. 
Unlike death, however, the divorce does ncit constitute a complete 
and final loss. The result in many cases, essentially where the 
persons have not themselves instituted divorce proceedings, is 
that progress through certain phases may be prolonged such that 
the emotional marriage persists. 
~his model has direct implications for brief therapeutic 
interventions which correspond expounded by Dreyfus (1979) for 
divorcing fathers. 
In phase 1 of his model the role of the therapist is to 
respect the need for denial initially and respond with 
support and empathy and then slowly and gently confronting 
this defence. 
In phase II possible threats of violence or suicide should 
be taken seriously and confronted as well as the potential 
·consequences. Hospitalization may be necessary, but generally 
frequent shortened periods of support are sufficient in helping 
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parents to deal with thetr emotions of anger, resentment and 
anxiety. 
In phase II I_ depressive symptoms may appear but distractions 
are possible. The focus of therapy here is on providing 
structure and planning, correction of cognitive distortions 
and rebuilding and recreation of a_social network. 
In phase IV the parent is able to look at the factors that 
contributed to the malfunctioning of the marriage and to prepare 
for future post-divorce relationships and a role as a single 
(or joint) parent. 
Dreyfus (1979) stresses the importance, in between sessions, 
of assigning the parent tasks related to particular problems 
being encountered in order to reinforce the belief th~t they 
can do something positive themselves, thus accepting some 
responsibility for their lives and reducing the possibility of 
a dependency relationship developing. 
Counselling may also require working with both spouses 
(Gardner, 1977, 1978; Fine, 1980). Swerdlow (1978) suggests 
that where this is required, each spouse should be assigned a 
therapist before conjoint sessions are held. It is suggested 
. that new spouses who resent this approach should be helped to 
. understand that as long as the emotional/psychological break 
has not been made, the new marriage and children•s interests 
a1·e clearly compromised. 
Granwold and Welch, 1977, describe a problem orientated seminar 
approach in which cognitive - behavioural treatment methodologies 
are appJied to various post-divorce adjustment problems in large 
group settings. 
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The program i.nc1 uded, 
(a) A seminar format whfch, each week, presents a 
subject topic 
(b) A group process which facilitated the sharing of 
experiences and self-disclosure, brought a 
realization of the participants' commonality with 
others, provided the means for vicarious learning 
to take place and provided participants with 
understanding and support, which functioned as 
social reinforcers 
(c) A cognitive restructuring process which made use of 
the rational-emotional model of therapy as used by 
Ellis, based on the assumption that change can be 
brought about by the modification 'of assumptions 
and expectations or 'cognitive set'. Individuals 
were taught the basic tenets of l~a t i ana 1 judgement 
. . 
through instructions, group discussions, homework 
assignments and practice. 
(d) Modelling and behaviour rehearsal helped the 
participants incorporate the desired behavioural 
response which was modelled by the leaders, 
rehearsed by the participants through the play 
situation and feedback in the group. 
(e) Homework assignments required the performance of 
the behaviour in the natural context to promote 
behavioural transfer and generalization for 
highly specific~ realistic goals, to which 
individuals committed themselves to attempt and 
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report back to the group. 
Therapy groups have recently started in Cape Town which 
are being run by two social workers in private practice 
(Judge and VanWyk). 
6.5 Post Divorce Community Support Systems 
6.5.1 
Despite the growing trend in the upsurge in divorce and the 
concern that goes with it, many couples in Western Societies 
continue to struggle through this crisis on their own. Some 
may find support and advice from friends or family, through 
counselling or from the few divorce specific groups which have 
been established. The majority, however, find themselves with 
their full parental responsib81ities to bear, alone and 
isolated. Clearly the community has a very significant role 
to play here. 
Self help groups 
Stack (1976) draws from cultures from non-industrialized 
cultures of the world and black American culture to illustrate 
support systems of friends and kin, which help parents in 
different \'Jays to carry out their pa renta 1 duties in the midst 
of crisis. -She also draws on recent studies which show how, 
over recent years, single white American mothers, widov:ed, 
divot·ced and separated have formed support networks tht;'ough 
communal groups in which their child caring and emotional 
burdens are shared on a reciprocal basis. 
•Parents without Partners' is an international group which, 
through such social activities as rap groups, informal dis-
cussions and conversation, .make a very meaningful contribution 
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towards post-divorce adjustment by providirig single parents 
with: 
(a) socially acceptable substitutes for some activities 
of married life, 
(b) potential for new growth and social patterns as coping 
strategies are learned, 
(c) companionship which neutralizes the solitary character 
of divorce, 
(d) practical information and advice, moral support from 
others in the same situation, 
(e) role models for children through planned family 
activities and as a result of living with a more 
satisfied and coping parent (Benedek and Benedek, 1979). 
Several centres exist in Cape Town for single parents .including 
(1) Parents without Partners, which tends to focus on the 
social activities and mutual support and in overcoming 
the loneliness experienced by the parents. 
{2) The Divorce Workshop Group in contrast to the Parents 
without Partners focuses on academic interests and the 
adjustment to singleness and single parenthood through 
regular monthly workshop-type sessions ~tith speakers 




{3) The Chri.s.topher ~obi.n Resi.~enti.al Hotel provides 
accommodation and creche faci.l i.ti.es for children 
and parents. Implicit to this arrangement is a 
sense of companionship (De la Hunt, 1982). 
{4) The very recently formed Cape Town Divorce Workshop 
.{Short, 1983) has evolved, although at present takes 
a more academic approach in the form of lecture 
meetings. 
{5) Gardner (1977) suggests the need for the support of 
the elderly in the community, who could at this time 
provide the support needed by parents by taking the 
role of parental surrogates for the children. 
Schools are ideal resources for providing the need for male 
and female models for single parent children {Gardner, 1977). 
They are also in an ideal position and rich in potential for 
the provision of divorce related education and supportive groups 
for both children and their parents (Benedek and Benedek, 1979). 
Experimental groups for children have been successfully run by 
elementary school counsellors (Wilkinson and Bleck, 1977; 
Hammond, 1981). 
6.6. 1 Education Teachers, attorneys, advocates, psychologists, 
doctors and others who work so intimately with families, 
as well as the general public, clearly need to become aware 
and sensitized through education programs to the reality and 
nature of the problems faced by families of divorce (Guerney 




The feeling is tha.t the tremendous resi.stance to talking about 
divorce, because of .its often emotionally unpleasant and 
sensitive nature, especially when children of divorce are 
present in class, must be overcome, as it simply denies under-
sta~ding by peers and support for the child. 
Books Richard (1981) expressed the need for instruction 
booklets for divorcing parents, which contain sensible advice 
for parents about children and for children and parents 
detailing what could be expected and how they can cope. 
There is in fact a noted increase in the quantity of divorce 
related literature for all ages coming on the market. 
Television with its tremendously powerful potential influence 
is an ideal education medium. So far it has tended to exploit 
the sensational, unusual and dramatic aspects of divorce 
and tends to provide a romantic and often misleading impression. 
It should aim at familiarizing adults and children with more 
reality ba~~d issues relating to the financial, emotional and 
social consequences of divorce (Benedek and Benedek, l979(b)) 
and how these issues can be constructively dealt with, stressing 




This study does not attempt to provide a model which can 
simply be incorporated into the present legal structure. It 
has provided a model which seeks rather to meet the needs of 
the family. 
On the basis of what has been said it is clear that the mental 
health professional as an unaligned party has a major role to 
play in the determination Of marital dissolution and custody/ 
access disputes. His function is in the prevention of the 
establishment of longlasting or pathological consequences which 
might potentially follow the divorce experience. 
His role in this model of dissolution has been indicated in 
the following areas in which he should be thoroughly versed. 
(1) Orientation- in this area the mental health 
professional should be thoroughly familiar with the 
background and workings or proceedings of the legal 
system within which dissolution and custody/access 
determinations take place. 
(2) Reco~ci1iation - This area requires an ability to 
work within the brief crisis intervention model, and 
to apply conflict resolution and problem solving 
methods, maintain a neutral stand with either the 
couple or family, educate and facilitate the gaining 
of understanding and insight by the family about 
their relationships and the process of divorce. 
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{3) Mediation - As a newly developing speciality this area 
requires specialized training in the divorce and family 
mediation process which involves conflict management. 
It further requires a knowledge of the process and 
stages of divorce, the effects of divorce on the 
children, an understanding of what constitutes the best 
interests of the child and an understanding of the 
advantages and commitment to mediated settlements where 
at all possible. 
(4} Child Advocacy - This is the role that needs to be 
adopted by the mental health professional who becomes 
involved in an adjudicated settlement between parents 
concerning their custody or access to the child. It 
requires a thorough knowledge of the child's needs at 
·each stage of development and the factors which 
constitute the child's best interests, competence to 
objectively assess and evaluate the parental situations 
against this standard, an ability to work within a team 
approach and assert his conditions within the adversary 
system in order to provide a competent service to both 
the family and the court, an obligation to conduct ~ 
thorough comprehensive investigations, ana·wtllingness 
to communicate his findings in a clear and useful 
manner to the court both in written form and as verbal 
evidence as expert witness. He should also be aware 
of the problems of confidentiality created fm~ the 
helping professionals by the adversary system and 
above all his commitment to the child to provide a 
solution in his best interests but congruent with the 
welfare of the family. 
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(5) Post-Dt~orce Counselling -This area requires the mental 
health profe$sional to be able to recognize the ~eqa~1ae 
that arise in the process of normal adjustment to divorce 
by the child and his parents and those which could be 
considered as pathological and persistent. He is 
required to provide education concerning possible 
consultation advice and support to families. 
(6) Community support requires of the mental health 
professional active involvement in the setting up of 
support systems within the commitments 
such as self help groups and educational programs·· 
which help to minimise the strain and trauma and 
facilitate readjustment for all the family members. 
It has unfortunately not been possible within the range of 
this study to explore all the associated areas in the same 
amount of detail. They nevertheless all have considerable 
relevance to the mental health professional working in the 
field and it is assum~d that any professional wishing to play 
an effective role in this field will have at least the basic 
knowledge, awareness, interest and commitment in this area 
as has been proposed above~ 
In our present adversarial system of law in which the courts 
have effectively dismissed their responsibilities for the 
children and families of divorce, an obvious argument against 
the involvement of the mental health professional is that of 
costLwhich can also be perceived as a justification for maintain-
ing the status quo. It is submitted that all divorcing families 
~hould be provided with the opportunity to carefully consider 
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the possibilities of reconciliation, and where that fails, to 
be a.ss i.s ted through a. process of med.i.a.t i.on to ami. cab 1 y reso 1 v:e 
. . . . . . . . . 
the ancilla.ry issues arisi.ng from the dissolution of .the marriage. 
The costs of such ·outside intervention should be borne at least in 
part by the state as should the cost of the equally important 
child advocate, the role suggests for the mental health 
professional acting either alone or preferably as a member of a 
multi-disciplinary team, who should preferably be appointed by 
the court. 
11 The law specifies its responsibility for protecting the 
psychological best interests of the child whe·n families are 
divorcing. A framework for this protection of the rights and 
needs of children must be developed" (McDermott, 1970, p.427). 
Sinclair {1979) cautions, "the unsuitability of the.adversary 
procedure for the .resolution of fmaily conflicts is receiving 
attention the world over .•.•• South Africa could do worse than 
take heed of what is occurring in other places. Children of 
today a:re parents of tomorrow - their phys i ca 1 and mora 1 we 11-
being is crucial", p.62. 
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DIVORCE ACT 
NO. 70 OF 1979 
[Ass~"'l'£0 TO 8 JUNE, 1979] [DATE OF C0?t-IMENCEMEN1: 1 JULY, 1979) 
(Afrikaans text signed by the Acting State President) 
ACT 
To amend the Jaw relating to divorce and to provide for incidental matters. 
1. Definitions.-(!) In this Act, unless inconsistent with the context-
"court" means the provincial or local division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, 
or a divorce court established under section 10 of the Black Administration Act, 1927, · 
Amendment Act, 1929 (Act No. 9 of 1929), which has jurisdiction with respect to a 
divorce action; 
"divorce action" means an action by which a decree of divorce or other relief in con-
nection therewith is applied for, and includes- · 
(a) an application pendente lite for an interdict or for the interim custody of, or 
. access to, a minor child of the marriage concerned or for the payment of 
maintenance; or · 
(b) an application for a contribution towards the costs of such action or to 
institute such action, or make such application, in fomia pauperis, or for the 
substituted service of process in, or the edictal citation of a party to, such 
action or such application. 
· {2) For the purposes of this Act a divorce action shaH be deemed to be instituted 
on the date on which the summons is issued or the notice of motion is filed or the notice 
is delivered in terms of the rules of court, as .the case may be. 
2 • . Jurisdiction.-( I) A court shall have jurisdiction in a divorce action if-
(a) the parties to the action are domiciled in the area of jurisdiction of the court 
·on the date on which the action is instituted; or 
(b) the wife is the plaintiff or applicant and she is ordinarily resident in the area 
of jurisdiction of that court on the date on which the action is instituted 
and has been ordinarily resident in the Republic for a period cf one year 
immediately prior to the said date and-
(i) is domiciled in the Republic; or 
{ii) was domiciled in the Republic immediately before cohabitation between 
her and her husband ceased; or 
(iii) was a South African citizen or was domiciled in the Republic imme-
diately prior to her marriage. 
(2) A court which has jurisdiction in terms of subs'!ction (l) (b) shall also have 
jU::5diction in respect of a cbim in reconvention or a counter-application in the divorce 
act:('n concerned. 
\ 
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(3) A court \vhlch has jurisdiction in terms of this section in a case wherl! the 
· parties are not domiciled in the Republic shall determine any issue in accordance with the 
law which would have been applicable had the parties been domiciled in the area of juris-
diction of the court concerned on the date on which the divorce action was instituted. 
· (4) The provisions of this Act shall not derogate from the jurisdiction which a court 
. has in terms of any other law or the common law. 
3. Dissolution of marriage and grounds of divorce.-A marriage may be dissolved by 
a court by a decree of divorce and the only grounds on which such a decree may be 
granted are-
(a) the irretrievable break-dov.'D of the marriage as contemplated in section 4; 
(b) the mental illness or the continuous unconsciousness, as contemplated in 
section 5, of a party to the marriage. 
4. Irretrievable break--down of marriage as ground of divorce.-( I) A court may grant. 
a decree of divorce on the ground of the irretrievable break-down of a marriage if it is 
satisfied that the marriagl! relationship between the parties to the marriage has reached 
· . such a state of disintegration that there is no reasonable prospect of the restoration of a 
normal marriage relationship between them. · 
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (1), and without excluding any facts or. 
circumstances which may be indicative of the irretrievable break-down of a marriage, the 
. court may accept evidence-
·. (a) that the parties have not lived together as husband and wife for a continuous 
period of at least one year immediately prior to the date of the institution 
of the divorce action; 
(b) that the defendant has committed adultery and that the plaintiff finds it 
irreconcilable with a continued marriage relationship; or 
(c) that the defendant has in terms of a sentence of a court been declared an 
habitual criminal and is undergoing imprisonmentas a result of such sentence, 
'as proof of the irretrievable break-down of a marriage. 
\ .. ·. · (3) If it appears to the court that there is a reasonable possibility that the parties 
... ·· . may become reconciled through marriage counsel, treatment or reflection, the court may 
i . ,: postpone the proceedings in order that the parties ~ay attempt a reconciliation. 
, . . (4) Where a divorce action which is not defended is postponed in terms of sub-
. s~ction (3), the court may direct that the action be tried de novo, on the date of resumption 
tb~reof, by any other judge of the court concerned. 
5. l\Iental illness or continuous unconsciousness as grounds of divorce.--(!) A court 
may grant a decree of divorce on the ground of the mental illness of the defendant if it 
is satisfied-
·.. · ('1) that the defendant in t<:rms of the Mental Health Act, 1973 (Act No. 18 of 
1973)-
(I~s~:e ~o. 13) 
(i) has been admitted as a patient to an institution in terms of a reception 
order; · 
(ii) is being detained as a President's patient at an institution or other pia~ 
specified by the ;...Jinister of Prisons; or 
(iii) is being det~ined as a mentally ill convicted prisoner at an institution 
or hospital prison for psychopaths, 
and that he has, for a continuous period of at least t\vo years immediately 
prior to the institution of the divorce action, not been discharged uncon-
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(b) after having heard the evidence of at least two psychiatrists, of whom one 
shall have been appointed by the court, that the defendant is mentally ill and 
that there is no reasonable prospect that he will be cured of his mental illness. 
(2) A court may grant a decree of divorce on the ground that the defendant is by 
· reason of a physical disorder in a state of continuous unconsciousness, if it is satisfied-
(a) that the defendant's unconsciousness has lasted for a continuous period of 
at least six months immediately prior to the institution of the divorce action; 
and 
(b) after having heard the evidence of at least two medical practitioners, of whom 
one shall be a neurologist or a neurosurgeon appointed by the court, that 
there is no reasonable prospect that the defendant will regain consciousness. 
(3) The court may appoin! a legal practitioner to represent the defendant at pro· 
.· ceedings under this section and order the plaintiff to pay the costs of such representation. 
(4) The court may make any order it may deem fit with regard to the furnishing of 
security by the plaintiff in respect of any patrimonial benefits to which the defendant may 
be entitled by reason of the dissolution of the marriage. 
(5) For the purposes of this section the expressions "institution .. , "mental illness", 
"patient", "President's patient" and ••reception order'' shall bear the meaning assigned to 
them in the Mental Health Act, 1973. 
6. Safegu:rrding of interests of dependent and minor children.---{1) A decree of divorce 
shall not be granted until the court is satisfied that the provisions made or contemplated 
with regard to the welfare of any minor or dependent child of the marriage are satisfactory 
or are the best that can be effected in the circumstances. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) the court may cause any investigation which 
it may deem necessary, to be carried out and may order any person to appear before it 
and may order the parties or any one of them to pay the costs of the investigation and 
appearance. 
(3) A court granting a decree of divorce may, in regard to the maintenance of a 
dependent child of the marriage or the custody or guardianship of, or access to, a minor 
child of the marriage, make any order which it may deem fit, and may in particuiar, if in 
its opinion it would be in the interests of such minor child to do so, grant to either parent 
. the sole guardianship (which shall include the power to consent to the marriage of the 
child) or the sole custody of the minor, and the court may order that, on the predecease 








the surviving parent shall be the guardian of the minor, either jointly with or to the ex-
clusion of the surviving parent. · 
(4) For the purposes of this section the court may appoint a legal practitioner to 
represent a child at the proceedings and may order the parties or-any one of them to pay 
the costs of the representation. 
7. Dh·ision of assets and maintenance of parties.-{!) A court granting a decree of 
divorce may in accordance with a written agreement between the parties make an order 
with regard to th.: di\'ision of the assets of the parties or the payment of maintenance by 
the one party to the other. 
. (2) In the absence of an order made in terms of subsection (1) with regard to the 
;:ayrnent of maintenance by the one party to the other, the court may, having regard to 
· . :::~ existing or prospective means of each of the parties, their respective earning cap:1cities, 
f.::1ncial needs and obligations, the age of each of the parties, the duratiun of the marriage, 
:::e standard of living of the parties prior to the divorce, their conduct in so far as it may 
\ 
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~ relevant to the break~own of the marriage, and any other factor which in the opinion 
of the court should be taken into account, make an order which the court finds just in 
respect of the payment of maintenance by the one party to the other for any period until 
the death or remarriage of the party in whose favour the order is given, whichever event 
may first occur .. 
8. Rescission, suspension or variation or orders.--(1) A maintenance order or an order 
in regard to the custody or guardianship of, or access to, a child, made in terms of this 
Act, may at any time be rescinded or varied or, in the case of a maintenance order or an 
order with regard to access to a child, be suspended by a court if the court finds that there 
is sufficient reason therefor. 
(2) A court other than the court which made an order referred to in subsection (1) 
may rescind, vary or suspend such order if the parties are domiciled in the area of juris-
diction of such first-mentioned court or the applicant is domiciled in the area of jurisdiction 
of such first-mentioned court and the respondent consents to the jurisdiction of that court. 
(3) The provisions of subsections (1) and (2) shall mutatis mutandis apply with 
reference to any order referred to in subsection (1) given by a court in a divorce action 
before the commencement ofthis Act. 
9> Forfeiture of patrimonial benefits of marriage.-(!) When a decree of divorce is 
granted on the ground of the irretrievable break-down of a marriage the court may make 
an order that the patrimonial benefits of the marriage be forfeited by one party in favour 
of the other, either wholly or in part, if the court, having regard to the duration of the 
marriage, the circumstances which gave rise to the break-down thereof and any substantial 
misconduct on the part of either of the parties, is satisfied that, if the order for forfeiture 
is not made, the one party will in relation to the other be unduly benefited. 
(2) In the case of a decree of divorce granted on the ground of the mentai illness 
or continuous unconsciousness of the defendant, no order for the forfeiture of any patri-
monial benefits of the marriage shall be made against the defendant. 
10. Costs.-In a divorce action the court shall not be bound to make an order for 
costs in favour of the successful party, but the court may, having regard to the means of 
the parties, and their conduct in so far as it may be relevant, make such order as it considers 
just, and the court may order that the costs of the proceedings be apportioned between 
. the parties. · 
11. Procedure.-The procedure applicable with reference to a divorce action shall 
be the procedure prescribed from time to time by rules of court. 
12. Limitation of publication of particulars of divorce action.--(1) Except for making 
known or publishing the names of the parties to a divorce action, or that a divorce action 
between the parties is pending in a court of law, or the judgement or order of the court, 
no person shall make known in public or publish for the information of the public or any 
section of the public any particulars of a divorce action or any information which comes 
· to light in the course of such an action. 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not apply with reference to the publication 
of particuiars or information-
(a) for the purposes of the administration of justice; 
(b) in a bona fide law report which does not form part of any other publication 
than a series of reports of the proceedings in courts of law; or 
(c) for the advancement of or use iil a particular profession or science .. 
(3) The provisions of subsections (1) and· (2) shall mutatis mutandis apply with 
r:f:!re:J.ce to proceedings relating to the enforcement or variation of any order made in 
te:ns of this Act. 
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(4) Any person who in contravention of this section publishes any particulars or 
information shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding 
one thousand rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to both 
· such fine and such imprisonment. 
13. Recognition of certain foreign divorce orders.-(1) The ·validity of a decree of 
divorce granted in a country or territory in which the husband was not domiciled at the 
· time of the granting of the decree shall be recognized by a court in the Republic if that 
country or territory has been designated by the State President by proclamation in the 
Ga:ette for the purposes of the recognition of such decrees. 
(2) The State President may designate a country or territory for the purposes of 
subsection (l) if he is satisfied that the law of that country or territory provides for the 
exercise of jurisdiction which substantially corresponds to the jurisdiction referred to in 
section 2 (1) (b) (ii) and (iii). 
(3) No proclamation shall be issued in terms of this section ~mless the State President 
is satisfied that the law of the country or territory concerned makes sufficient provision 
for the recogrJtion by the courts of that country or territory of a decree of divorce granted 
in the Republic in terms of a jurisdiction under section 2 (1) (b) (ii) or (iii). 
(4) A proclamation issued in terms of this section may be withdrawn at any time. 
·14. Abolition of orders for restitution of conjugal rights and judicial separation.-It 
shall not be competent for a court to issue an order for the restitution of conjugal rights 
or for judicial separation. 
15. Application of Act.-This Act shall not apply with reference to a divorce action 
. or proceedings for the restitution of conjugal rights or for judicial separation instituted 
. before the commencement of this Act. 
I· 16. Amends section 5 of the Matrimonial Affairs Act, No. 37 of 1953. as follows:-
! · paragraph (a) substitutes subsection (1); paragraph (b) substitutes subsection {2); para-'. 
I
!· . · graph (c) substitutes subsection {3); and paragraph (d) substitutes subsection (6). 
17. Amends section 72 of the Administration of Estates Act, No. 66 of 1965, by. 
substituting that part of subsection (l) which precedes paragraph {b) thereof- see title 
I EsTATES. . 
I 18. Repeal of laws.-The laws mentioned in the Schedule are hereby repealed to the extent set out in the third column of the Schedule. I 
19. Short title and commencement.-Tbis Act shall be called the Divorce Act, 1979, 
and shall come into operation on !July, 1979. 
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THE LOS ANGELES HUSBAND AND WIFE AGREEMENT 
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of 
Los Ange 1 es . 
Conciliation Court 
Petitioner No. CC ------------------ --------------------
and 
Respondent No. D ------------------ ----------~--------
Post Dissolution Agreement 
Re Custody/Visitation 
The aid of the Court having been requested to effect an amicable 
settlement of the controversy existing between the above named 
parties, and a court conference having been held thereon in 
which it was indicated that certain conduct is deemed necessary 
to maintain an amicable relationship between the parties for the 
best interests of the children, the parties hereby agree, each 
with the other and with the Court, as follows: 
In entering into this agreement, each acknowledges that it is 
necessary to do so for the best interests of our children. 
In the event that further difficulties arise, and·either one or 
both cf us believe that the services of this court may be 
helpful in solving them, we agree that we will contact the counsellor 
named below and arrange for further conference(s). 
·Each of us agrees to return to the Conciliation Court for a 6 week 
evaluation conference. If at any time we desire to continue this 
agreement, it is understood by each of us that the referring bench 
will be asked to sign this agreement, making it an order of the court. 
Each of us acknowledges that we received a copy of this agreement. 
Dated , 19 Petitioner ------------------- -----------------
Approved Respondent ------------------
Marriage Counsellor 
It is so ordered the matter heretofore continued to (date) 
is placed off calendar. ---------
Date ------------------- Judge (or Commissioner) 
\ 
Elkin, M. 1977~ p.59. 
Factor 
Definition of the issues 
legal framework 
Who is the client? 
Relationship of divorcing 
parties to each other 
Relationship of divorcing 
parents to their children 




Expense of divorce to parties 
Time to reach settlement 
Court costs and time 
Confident i a 1 i ty 
Expectations re• settlement 
Goal and desired outcome 
Decision re, final settlement 
Adherence to terms of divorce 
by the parties 
Postdivorce disputes and 
litigation in the future 
ADVERSARIAl AND ~1EniATIONAL APPROACHES TO DIVORCE 
Adversarial 
Strongly influenced by attorneys 
1·1arital dissolution: John Doe~· t1ary Doe 
The husband or the wife 
Focus on past; blame, mistrust, revenge; 
communication minimal or nonexistent 
Creates conflicts, adjustment problems, 
divided loyalties 
Not the concern of attorney; focus not on 
parent-child relationships 
Court decides 
Rekindled, tend to increase and intensify 
Prolonged, tend to increase 
Usually more, sometimes much more 
More, longer delay 
More time and more tax dollars 
tlot maintained; public exposure in court 
Strongly influenced by attorneys 
Win: give as little as possible and get 
as much as possible 
f1ade by a judge 
less ~ikely, since the terms are imposed 
by outside authority (judge) 
ltore likely 
Mediational 
Defined by divorcing parties 
Marital dissolution: John and Mary Doe 
The family (divorcing couple and children) 
I 
Focus on current issues, restructuring 
family relations; conmunication preserved 
Focus on preserving parent-child relations 
and postdivorc~ co-parenting arrangements 
Primary concern of media tor; focus on 
"parents are forever" 
Parents decide 
Defused, tend to decrease and \'lea ken 
Shortened, tend to lessen 
Usually less, sometimes much less 
Less •. as rapidly as couple desire 
Reduces time and saves tax dollars 
Maintained; no public exposure 
Those of the divorcing parties 
A fair, equitable, mutually acceptable 
agreement made by the parties themselves 
Made by the divorcing parties themselves 
More likely since the terms are those 
agr·eed to by the parties themselves 
Less likely 
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